# Monetary policy and bank lending after the crisis

## Stephen Cecchetti

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The views expressed in the following do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank for International Settlements

## Old division of labor

- Regulatory policy:
  - Eliminate the contagion created by individual failure
  - Control the moral hazard created by the safety net
- **Fiscal** policy:
  - Long-term growth
  - Division of Y into C+I+G+NX
- Monetary policy:
  - Short-term stabilization using short-term interest rates
  - Insure availability of liquid assets in the very short term

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## Old order of action

- Regulatory policy was timeless
- Fiscal policy was focused on the long-term acts infrequently
- Monetary policy flexible and frequent

# But life is more complicated

- Monetary policy influences fiscal policy (central bank balance sheet policy)
- Fiscal policy influences regulatory policy (subsidizes debt)
- Monetary policy influences regulatory policy (interest rates affect incentives)
- Regulatory policy influences fiscal policy (demand for sovereign debt)

These are <u>not</u> second order effects!



## The lending channel...


- Monetary policy affects demand <u>and</u> supply of loans
- Supply:
  - By changing lending spreads and profitability
  - By changing the level of bank capital
- Demand:
  - Business prospects increase
  - Net worth and cash flow

# ...during the crisis

- Growth and lending collapsed
- Policy responded with policy rates at zero
- But low policy rates did not translate into
  - low lending rates

## Lending rate spreads over policy rates

In basis points



Notes: New loans. The average maturity on loans to non-financial firms is considerably shorter than that on household mortgage loans.




# ...during the crisis

- Growth and lending collapsed
- Policy responded with policy rates at zero
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  - and increased lending

## **Private credit**


In billions of national currency units



Sources: National data.

## **Real GDP**

Quarterly data, in billions of respective currency units




Seasonally adjusted, on a logarithmic scale. Sources: National data: BIS calculations.




- Banks
  - Low capital
  - Impaired assets

# Bank price to book ratios<sup>1</sup>

#### **United States and Europe**



#### Bank price to book ratios and bank credit



AU = Australia; CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; ES = Spain; FR = France; GB = United Kingdom; GR = Greece; IT = Italy; JP = Japan; US = United States.


Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; national data; BIS calculations.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Simple averages across major banks. <sup>2</sup> Averages of 2009 Q1. <sup>3</sup> Changes from 2009 Q1 to 2010 Q1, in per cent.

- Businesses
  - Banks and other financial frims are still weak
  - Poor business prospects and high uncertainty

## **Business outlook**



Purchasing managers' index (PMI) derived from monthly surveys of private sector companies. Values above (below)
 50 indicate expansion (contraction).


Sources: ECB; U.K. Office for National Statistics; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bloomberg; Datastream; Markit.




- Households
  - Are still highly leveraged in many countries
  - Debt-service remains a burden

## **Debt service ratio**

#### Debt service ratio and credit



#### Debt service ratio and GDP



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> At end-2007, in per cent. <sup>2</sup> Changes from 2008 Q1 to 2012 Q4, in per cent.

Sources: National data; BIS calculations.

## **Unconventional measures**

- With weak lenders & weak borrowers equilibrium real rates < 0</li>
- Polices to directly influence lending:
  - Quantitative Easing
  - Funding for lending
  - Forward guidance
  - LTRO
- Real effects are muted:
  - Bank balance sheets weak
  - Household balance sheets weak
  - Business prospects poor




## Lessons

- Weak banks do not lend
- Indebted households do not borrow
- Businesses with poor prospects do not invest

## Central bank balance sheet size and composition

#### Appendix Graph 1

In trillions of respective currency units




Bank of England and Federal Reserve: breakdown by remaining maturity; Eurosystem: breakdown of outstanding repo operations by original maturity.
 Outstanding in repos, term auction facility, other loans and net portfolio holdings of Commercial Paper Funding Facility LLC.
 US Treasury securities, mortgage-backed securities and agency debt; face value.
 One-week, other maturity within-maintenance period, and fine-tuning repo operations.
 Longer-term repo operations.
 Holdings of the Asset Purchase Facility; proceeds.
 Receivable under resale agreements and loans excluding those to the Deposit Insurance Corporation.
 Includes US dollar liquidity auctions.
 Japanese government bonds.
 Commercial paper, corporate bonds, exchange-traded funds and listed real estate investment trust securities.
 Covered bonds held under the Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) 1 and the CBPP 2.
 Securities held under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP).
 Sources: Datastream; national data.



# Policy rates<sup>1</sup>

#### Appendix Graph 2



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Policy rate or closest alternative; for target ranges, the midpoint of the range. Aggregates are weighted averages based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates. <sup>2</sup> Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. <sup>3</sup> China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

4 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. <sup>5</sup> Other emerging market economies (EMEs): the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.

Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; national data.

