

Optimal Time-Consistent Government Debt Maturity

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Abstract:

This paper develops a model of optimal debt maturity in which the government cannot issue state-contingent debt. As the literature has established, if the government can perfectly commit to fiscal policy, it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short-term assets and issuing long-term debt. These positions are quantitatively very large relative to GDP and do not need to be actively managed by the government. Our main result is that these conclusions are not robust when lack of commitment is introduced. Under lack of commitment, large and tilted debt positions are very expensive to finance ex-ante since they ex-post exacerbate the government's problem stemming from a lack of commitment. In contrast, a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost entailed by a lack of commitment, though this structure also limits the ability to insure against shocks and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions. We show that the optimal time-consistent maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility. Thus, under lack of commitment, the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols.

Keywords: public debt, optimal taxation, fiscal policy

JEL Classifications: H63, H21, E62

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The authors thank Marina Azzimonti, Marco Bassetto, Luigi Bocola, Fernando Broner, Francisco Buera, V.V. Chari, Isabel Correia, Mike Golosov, Patrick Kehoe, Alessandro Lizzeri, Guido Lorenzoni, Albert Marcet, Jean-Baptiste Michau, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Facundo Piguillem, Andrew Scott, Pedro Teles, Joaquim Voth, Iván Werning, and seminar participants at the Bank of Portugal, Boston College, Cambridge University, Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics, Columbia University, CREI, EIEF, European University Institute, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, London Business School, the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York University, Northwestern University, Nova School of Business and Economics, Paris School of Economics, Princeton University, and SUNY-Stonybrook for comments.

This paper presents preliminary analysis and results intended to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, by the principals of the Board of Governors, or by the Federal Reserve System.

This paper, which may be revised, is available on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston at <http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/index.htm>.

This version: May 17, 2016

1 Introduction

How should government debt maturity be structured? Two seminal papers by Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) argue that the maturity of government debt obligations can be optimally structured so as to completely hedge the economy against fiscal shocks. This research concludes that optimal debt maturity is tilted long, with the government purchasing short-term assets and selling long-term debt. These debt positions allow the market value of outstanding government liabilities to decline when spending needs and short-term interest rates increase. Moreover, quantitative exercises imply that optimal government debt positions, both short and long, are large (in absolute value) relative to GDP. Finally, these positions are constant and do not need to be actively managed since the combination of constant positions and fluctuating bond prices delivers full insurance against potential shocks.

In this paper, we show that these conclusions are sensitive to the assumption that the government can fully commit to fiscal policy. In practice, however, a government chooses taxes, spending, and debt sequentially in each period, taking into account its outstanding debt portfolio, as well as the behavior of future governments. Thus, a government can always pursue a fiscal policy that reduces (or increases) the market value of its outstanding (or newly-issued) liabilities *ex-post*, even though it would not have preferred such a policy *ex-ante*. Moreover, households lending to the government anticipate its future behavior, which affects its *ex-ante* borrowing costs. We show that once the government's lack of commitment is accounted for, it becomes costly for the government to use its debt maturity structure to completely hedge the economy against shocks: a tradeoff exists between the cost of funding and the benefit of hedging.¹ Our main result is that, under lack of commitment, the optimal maturity structure of government debt is quantitatively nearly flat, so that the government owes the same amount to households at all future dates. Moreover, debt is actively managed by the government.

We present these findings using the dynamic fiscal policy model of Lucas and Stokey (1983). This framework, which posits an economy with public spending shocks and no capital, has the government choosing to levy linear taxes on labor and issuing public debt to finance government spending. Our model features two important frictions. First, as in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004), we assume that state-contingent bonds are unavailable, and that the government can only issue real noncontingent bonds of all maturities. Second, and in contrast to Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004), we assume that the government lacks commitment to policy.

These two frictions combine to create an inefficiency. The work of Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) shows that even in the absence of state-contingent bonds an optimally structured portfolio of noncontingent bonds can perfectly insulate the government from all shocks to the economy. Moreover, the work of Lucas and Stokey (1983) shows that even if the government cannot commit to a path of fiscal policy, an optimally structured portfolio of contingent bonds can perfectly induce a government without commitment to pursue the *ex-ante* optimally chosen policy *ex-post*.² Even though each friction by itself

¹Our framework is consistent with an environment in which the legislature sequentially chooses a primary deficit and the debt management office sequentially minimizes the financing cost subject to future risks, which is what is done in practice (see the International Monetary Fund report 2014).

²This result requires the government to lack commitment to taxes or to spending but not to both. See Rogers (1989) for

does not lead to an inefficiency, the combination of the two frictions leads to a nontrivial tradeoff between market completeness and commitment in the government's choice of maturity.

To get a sense of this tradeoff, consider the government's optimal policy under commitment, which in the presence of shocks uses debt to smooth fiscal policy distortions. If fully contingent claims were available, there would be many maturity structures that would support the optimal policy. However, if the government can only issue noncontingent claims, then there is a unique maturity structure that replicates full insurance. As has been shown in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004), such a maturity structure is tilted in a manner which guarantees that the market value of outstanding government liabilities declines when the net present value of future government spending rises. If this situation occurs when short-term interest rates rise—as in the case of quantitative examples with Markovian fiscal shocks—then the optimal maturity structure requires that the government purchases short-term assets and sells long-term debt. Because interest rate movements are quantitatively small, the tilted debt positions required for hedging are large.

Under lack of commitment, such large and tilted positions are very costly to finance ex-ante if the government cannot commit to policy ex-post. The larger and more tilted the debt position, the greater a future government's benefit from pursuing policies ex-post that will alter bond prices to relax the government's budget constraint. To do so, the government can either reduce the market value of its outstanding liabilities by choosing policies which increase short-term interest rates, or it can increase the market value of its newly issued short-term liabilities by choosing policies that reduce short-term interest rates. Households purchasing government bonds internalize ex-ante the fact that the government will pursue such policies ex-post, and they therefore require higher interest rates for lending to the government, which raises the government's cost of hedging to insure against shocks to the economy.

Our main result is that the problem posed by lack of commitment dominates the problem due to lack of insurance. Therefore, the optimal maturity structure is not tilted; instead, it is nearly flat so as to ensure that the government will choose policies guaranteeing ex-post short-term interest rates similar to those it would prefer ex-ante. We present this result in a Markov perfect competitive equilibrium in which the government dynamically chooses its policies at every date as a function of payoff-relevant variables: the fiscal shock and its outstanding debt position at various maturities. Because it is not feasible to conduct a complete analysis of such an equilibrium in an infinite-horizon economy with an infinite choice of debt maturities, we present our main result in three exercises.

Our first exercise shows that the optimal debt maturity is exactly flat in a three-period example, as the volatility of shocks goes to zero or as the persistence of shocks goes to one. In both of these cases, a government under commitment that is financing a deficit in the initial period chooses a negative short-term debt position and a positive long-term debt position. These positions are large; for instance, as persistence goes to one, both positions approach infinity in absolute value.

However, under lack of commitment a government chooses an exactly flat debt maturity structure with positive short-term and long-term debt positions that are equal to each other. Even though a flat debt maturity reduces hedging, it guarantees that the government ex-post will choose the same smooth

more discussion.

fiscal policy with constant consumption in the middle and final periods that the government ex-ante would prefer. Instead, if all debt were long-term obligations, then a government in the middle period would deviate from a smooth policy by reducing short-term consumption and increasing long-term consumption, which will raise short-term interest rates and benefit the government by reducing the market value of its outstanding liabilities.³ If all debt were short-term maturities, the government's deviation would reduce short-term interest rates and benefit the government by increasing the market value of its newly issued debt. Thus, only a flat debt maturity guarantees that ex-post short-term interest rates coincide with the ex-ante preferred interest rates.

In our second exercise, we show that the insights from the three-period example hold approximately in a quantitative finite-horizon economy under fiscal shocks with empirically plausible volatility and persistence. We consider a finite-horizon economy since this also allows the government's debt maturity choices to be finite. Despite having the ability to choose from a flexible set of debt maturity structures, we find that the optimal debt maturity is nearly flat, and the main component of the government's debt can be represented by a consol, a bond with a fixed nondecaying payment at all future dates.

The intuition for this result is that a flatter debt maturity maximizes the government's commitment and lowers its funding costs. For example, if households are primarily buying long-term bonds ex-ante, then they accurately anticipate that if the government lacks commitment, it will pursue future policies that will increase future short-term interest rates, thereby diluting the value of their claims. In this case, households require a higher ex-ante interest rate (relative to commitment) to induce them to lend long-term to the government. Similar reasoning holds if households are primarily buying short-term bonds ex-ante. It is clear that a flat debt maturity comes at a cost of less hedging. However, as has been shown in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004), substantial hedging requires massive and tilted debt positions. Due to their size, financing these positions can be very expensive in terms of average fiscal policy distortions because of the government's lack of commitment. Moreover, under empirically plausible levels of public spending volatility, the cost of lack of insurance under a flat maturity structure is small. Therefore, the optimal time-consistent policy pushes in the direction of reducing the *average* fiscal policy distortion versus reducing the *volatility* of distortions, and the result is a nearly flat maturity structure.⁴

In our third and final exercise, we consider an infinite-horizon economy and show that the optimal policy under lack of commitment can be quantitatively approximated with active consol management, so that the optimal debt maturity is again nearly flat. An infinite-horizon analysis allows us to better capture the quantitative features of this optimal policy and to characterize the policy dynamics, but this approach also comes entails a cost of not being able to consider the government's entire range of feasible debt maturity policies. We consider a setting in which the government has access to two debt instruments: a nondecaying consol and a decaying perpetuity. Under full commitment, the government holds a highly

³Our observation that long-term debt positions lead to lower fiscal discipline is consistent with other arguments in the literature on debt maturity (see Missale and Blanchard 1994; Missale, Giavazzi, and Benigno 2002; Chatterjee and Eyigungor 2012; and Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler 2013).

⁴This conclusion—that the welfare benefit of smoothing economic shocks is small relative to that of raising economic levels—is more generally tied to the insight in Lucas (1987).

tilted debt maturity, where each position is large in absolute value and constant. In contrast, under lack of commitment, the government holds a negligible and approximately constant position in the decaying perpetuity, and it holds a positive position in the consol which it actively manages in response to fiscal shocks. Additionally, we show that our conclusion that the optimal debt maturity is approximately flat is robust to the choice of volatility and persistence of fiscal shocks, to the choice of household preferences, and to the introduction of productivity and discount factor shocks.

We recognize that our policy prescription differs from the current practices used in advanced economies. However, we note that the use of consols has been pursued historically, most notably by the British government in the Industrial Revolution, when consols were the largest component of the British government's debt (see Mokyr 2010). Moreover, the reintroduction of consols has received some support in the press and in policymaking circles (for example Cochrane 2015).⁵ Our analysis provides an argument for consols based on the government's limited commitment to the future path of fiscal policy.

Related Literature

This paper is connected to several literatures. As discussed, we build on the work of Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) by introducing lack of commitment.⁶ Our model is most applicable to economies in which the risks of default and inflation surprises are not prominent, but whose governments are not committed to a path of deficits and debt maturity issuance. Arellano et al. (2013) study a similar setting to ours but with nominal frictions and lack of commitment to monetary policy.⁷ In contrast to Aguiar et al. (2015), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Fernández and Martin (2015)—who consider small-open economy models with the possibility of default—we focus on lack of commitment to taxation and debt issuance, which affects the path of risk-free interest rates. This difference implies that, in contrast to their work, short-term debt does not dominate long-term debt in minimizing the government's lack of commitment problem. In our setting, even if the government were only to issue short-term debt, the government ex-post would deviate from the ex-ante optimal policy by pursuing policies which reduce short-term interest rates below the ex-ante optimal level.^{8,9}

More broadly, our paper is also tied to the literature on optimal fiscal policy which explores the role of noncontingent debt and lack of commitment. A number of papers have studied optimal policy under

⁵See Matthew Yglesias, "Don't Repay the National Debt," *Slate*, January 29, 2013. See James Leitner and Ian Shapiro, "Consols Could Avert Another Debt-Ceiling," *The Washington Post*, November 14, 2013.

⁶Additional work explores government debt maturity while continuing to maintain the assumption of full commitment. Shin (2007) explores optimal debt maturity when there are fewer debt instruments than states. Faraglia, Marcet, and Scott (2010) explore optimal debt maturity in environments with habits, productivity shocks, and capital. Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2008) explore the optimal maturity structure of government debt in an economy with nominal rigidities. Guibaud, Nosbusch, and Vayanos (2013) explore optimal maturity structure in a preferred habitat model.

⁷In addition, Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004) and Persson, Persson, and Svensson (2006) consider problems of lack of commitment in an environment with real and nominal bonds of varying maturity when the possibility of surprise inflation arises. Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004) find that to minimize incentives for surprise inflation, the government should only issue real bonds.

⁸In a small open economy with default, the risk-free rate is exogenous and the government's ex-post incentives are always to issue more debt, increasing short-term interest rates (which include the default premium) above the ex-ante optimal level. For this reason, short-term debt issuance ex-ante can align the incentives of the government ex-ante with those of the government ex-post.

⁹Niepelt (2014), Chari and Kehoe (1993a,b), and Sleet and Yeltekin (2006) also consider the lack of commitment under full insurance, though they focus on settings which allow for default.

full commitment but noncontingent debt, such as Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002).¹⁰ In line with this work, we find that the optimal taxes respond persistently to economic shocks, though in contrast to this work, this persistence is due to the lack of commitment by the government as opposed to ruling out the use of long-term government bonds. Other work has studied optimal policy in settings with lack of commitment, but with full insurance (for example, Krusell, Martin, and Ríos-Rull 2006 and Debortoli and Nunes 2013). We depart from this work by introducing long-term debt, which in a setting with full insurance can imply that the friction due to lack of commitment no longer introduces any inefficiencies.

Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we define the equilibrium and characterize it recursively. In Section 4, we show that the optimal debt maturity is exactly flat in a three-period example. In Section 5, we show that the optimal debt maturity is nearly flat in a finite-horizon economy with unlimited debt instruments and in an infinite-horizon economy with limited debt instruments. Section 6 concludes and the Appendix provides all of the proofs and additional results not included in the main text.

2 Model

2.1 Environment

We consider an economy identical to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983) with two modifications. First, we rule out the use of state-contingent bonds. Second, we assume that the government cannot commit to fiscal policy. There are discrete time periods $t = \{1, \dots, \infty\}$ and a stochastic state $s_t \in S$ which follows a first-order Markov process. The initial state, s_0 , is given. Let $s^t = \{s_0, \dots, s_t\} \in S^t$ represent a history, and let $\pi(s^{t+k}|s^t)$ represent the probability of s^{t+k} conditional on s^t for $t+k \geq t$.

The economy's resource constraint is

$$c_t + g_t = n_t, \tag{1}$$

where c_t is consumption, n_t is labor, and g_t is government spending.

There is a continuum of mass 1 of identical households that derive the following utility:

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (u(c_t, n_t) + \theta_t(s_t) v(g_t)), \beta \in (0, 1). \tag{2}$$

The function $u(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing in consumption and strictly decreasing in labor, globally concave, and continuously differentiable. The function $v(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable. Under this representation, $\theta_t(s_t)$ is high (low) when public spending is more (less) valuable. In contrast to the model of Lucas and Stokey (1983), we have allowed g_t in this framework to be chosen by the government, as opposed to being exogenously determined. We allow for this possibility to also consider that the government may not be able to commit to the ex-ante optimal level of public spending.

¹⁰See also Farhi (2010).

In our analysis, we also consider the Lucas and Stokey (1983) environment in which there is no discretion over government spending, and we show that all of our results hold.

Household wages equal the marginal product of labor (which is one unit of consumption), and are taxed at a linear tax rate τ_t . The expression $b_t^{t+k} \geq 0$ represents government debt purchased by a representative household in period t , which is a promise to repay one unit of consumption at $t+k > t$, and q_t^{t+k} represents its price at t . At every period t , the household's allocation $\left\{c_t, n_t, \left\{b_t^{t+k}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}\right\}$ must satisfy the household's dynamic budget constraint,

$$c_t + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} q_t^{t+k} \left(b_t^{t+k} - b_{t-1}^{t+k}\right) = (1 - \tau_t) n_t + b_{t-1}^t. \quad (3)$$

$B_t^{t+k} \geq 0$ represents debt issued by the government at t with a promise to repay one unit of consumption at $t+k > t$. At every period t , government policies $\left\{\tau_t, g_t, \left\{B_t^{t+k}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}\right\}$ must satisfy the government's dynamic budget constraint,

$$g_t + B_{t-1}^t = \tau_t n_t + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} q_t^{t+k} \left(B_t^{t+k} - B_{t-1}^{t+k}\right).^{11} \quad (4)$$

The economy is closed and bonds are in zero net supply:

$$b_t^{t+k} = B_t^{t+k} \quad \forall t, k. \quad (5)$$

Initial debt $\left\{B_{-1}^{k-1}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ is exogenous.¹² We assume that debt limits exist to prevent Ponzi schemes:

$$B_t^{t+k} \in [\underline{B}, \overline{B}]. \quad (6)$$

We let \underline{B} be sufficiently low and \overline{B} be sufficiently high so that (6) does not bind in our theoretical and quantitative exercises.

In this environment, a key friction is the absence of state-contingent debt, since the value of outstanding debt B_t^{t+k} is independent of the realization of the state s_{t+k} . If state-contingent bonds were available, then at any date t , the government would own a portfolio of bonds $\left\{\left\{B_{t-1}^{t+k} | s^{t+k}\right\}_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}}\right\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$, where the value of each bond payout at date $t+k$ would depend on the realization of a history of shocks, $s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}$. In our discussion, we will refer back to this complete market case.

The government is benevolent and shares the same utility preferences as the households in (2). We

¹¹We follow the same exposition as in Angeletos (2002) in which the government restructures its debt in every period by buying back all outstanding debt and then issuing fresh debt at all maturities. This assumption holds without loss of generality. For example, if the government at $t-k$ issues debt due at date t of size B_{t-k}^t which it then holds to maturity, then all future governments at date $t-k+l$ for $l = 1, \dots, k-1$ will choose $B_{t-k+l}^t = B_{t-k}^t$, implying that $B_{t-k}^t = B_{t-1}^t$.

¹²Our model implicitly allows the government to buy back the long-term bonds from the private sector. While ruling out bond buybacks is interesting, 85 percent of countries conduct some form of bond buyback and 32 percent of countries conduct these buybacks on a regular basis (see the OECD report by Blommestein, Elmadag, and Ejsing 2012). Furthermore, note that even if our environment did not permit bond buyback, a government can replicate the buyback of a long-term bond by purchasing an asset with a payout on the same date (see Angeletos 2002).

assume that the government cannot commit to policy and therefore chooses taxes, spending, and debt sequentially.

3 Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium

3.1 Definition of Equilibrium

We consider a Markov perfect competitive equilibrium (MPCE) in which the government must optimally choose its preferred policy at every date as a function of current payoff-relevant variables. The government takes into account that its choice affects future debt levels and thus affects the policies of future governments. Households rationally anticipate these future policies, and in turn their expectations are reflected in current bond prices. Thus, in choosing policy today, a government about future policy.

Formally, let $\mathbf{B}_t \equiv \{B_t^{t+k}\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ and $\mathbf{q}_t \equiv \{q_t^{t+k}\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$. In every period t , the government enters the period and chooses a policy $\{\tau_t, g_t, \mathbf{B}_t\}$ given $\{s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}\}$. Households then choose an allocation $\{c_t, n_t, \{b_t^{t+k}\}_{k=1}^{\infty}\}$. An MPCE consists of: a government strategy $\rho(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1})$ which is a function of (s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) ; a household allocation strategy $\omega((s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}), \rho_t, \mathbf{q}_t)$ which is a function of (s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) , the government policy $\rho_t = \rho(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1})$, and bond prices \mathbf{q}_t ; and a set of bond-pricing functions $\{\varphi^k(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}, \rho_t)\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ with $q_t^{t+k} = \varphi^k(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}, \rho_t) \forall k \geq 1$, which depend on (s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) and the government policy $\rho_t = \rho(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1})$. In an MPCE, these objects must satisfy the following conditions $\forall t$:

1. The government strategy $\rho(\cdot)$ maximizes (2) given $\omega(\cdot)$, $\varphi^k(\cdot) \forall k \geq 1$, and the government budget constraint (4),
2. The household allocation strategy $\omega(\cdot)$ maximizes (2) given $\rho(\cdot)$, $\varphi^k(\cdot) \forall k \geq 1$, and the household budget constraint (3), and
3. The set of bond pricing functions $\varphi^k(\cdot) \forall k \geq 1$ satisfy (5) given $\rho(\cdot)$ and $\omega(\cdot)$.

While for generality we assume that the government can freely choose taxes, spending, and debt in every period, throughout the paper we also consider cases in which the government does not have discretion either in setting spending or in setting taxes. These special cases highlight how choosing the right level of government debt maturity can induce future governments to choose the commitment policy.

3.2 Primal Approach

Any MPCE must be a competitive equilibrium. We follow Lucas and Stokey (1983) by taking the primal approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria since this allows us to abstract away from bond prices and taxes. Let

$$\left\{ \{c_t(s^t), n_t(s^t), g_t(s^t)\}_{s^t \in S^t} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \quad (7)$$

represent a stochastic sequence, where the resource constraint (1) implies

$$c_t(s^t) + g_t(s^t) = n_t(s^t). \quad (8)$$

We can establish necessary and sufficient conditions for (7) to constitute a competitive equilibrium. The household's optimization problem implies the following intratemporal and intertemporal conditions, respectively:

$$1 - \tau_t(s^t) = -\frac{u_{n,t}(s^t)}{u_{c,t}(s^t)} \text{ and } q_t^{t+k}(s^t) = \frac{\sum_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}} \beta^k \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k})}{u_{c,t}(s^t)}. \quad (9)$$

Substituting of these conditions into the household's dynamic budget constraint implies the following condition:

$$u_{c,t}(s^t) c_t(s^t) + u_{n,t}(s^t) n_t(s^t) + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}} \beta^k \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k}) B_t^{t+k}(s^t) = \quad (10)$$

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}} \beta^k \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k}) B_{t-1}^{t+k}(s^{t-1}).$$

Forward substitution into the above equation and taking into account the absence of Ponzi schemes implies the following implementability condition:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}} \beta^k \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) \left(u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k}) c_{t+k}(s^{t+k}) + u_{n,t+k}(s^{t+k}) n_{t+k}(s^{t+k}) \right) = \quad (11)$$

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}} \beta^k \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k}) B_{t-1}^{t+k}(s^{t-1}).$$

By this reasoning, if a stochastic sequence in (7) is generated by a competitive equilibrium, then it necessarily satisfies (8) and (11). In the Appendix we prove that the converse is also true, which leads to the following proposition that is useful for the rest of our analysis.

Proposition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) *A stochastic sequence (7) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (8) $\forall s^t$ and $\exists \left\{ \left\{ B_{t-1}^{t+k}(s^{t-1}) \right\}_{k=0}^{\infty} \right\}_{s^{t-1} \in S^{t-1}} \Big|_{t=0}^{\infty}$ which satisfy (11) $\forall s^t$.*

A useful corollary to this proposition concerns the relevant implementability condition in the presence of state-contingent bonds, $B_t^{t+k}|s^{t+k}$, which provide payment at $t+k$ conditional on the realization of a history s^{t+k} .

Corollary 1 *In the presence of state-contingent debt, a stochastic sequence (7) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (8) $\forall s^t$ and (11) for $s^t = s^0$ given initial liabilities.*

If state-contingent debt is available, then satisfying (11) at s^0 guarantees the satisfaction of (11) for all other histories s^t , since state-contingent payments can be freely chosen so as to satisfy (11) at all future histories s^t .

3.3 Recursive Representation of MPCE

We can use the primal approach to represent an MPCE recursively. Recall that $\rho(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1})$ is a policy that depends on (s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) , and that $\omega((s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}), \rho_t, \mathbf{q}_t)$ is a household allocation strategy that depends on (s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) , government policy $\rho_t = \rho(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1})$, and bond prices \mathbf{q}_t , where these bond prices depend on (s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) and government policy. As such, an MPCE in equilibrium is characterized by a stochastic sequence in (7) and a debt sequence $\left\{ \left\{ \left\{ B_t^{t+k}(s^t) \right\}_{k=1}^{\infty} \right\}_{s^t \in S^t} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, where each element depends only on s^t through (s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) , the payoff relevant variables. Given this observation, in an MPCE, one can define a function $h^k(\cdot)$ as

$$h^k(s_t, \mathbf{B}_t) = \beta^k \mathbb{E}[u_{c,t+k} | s_t, \mathbf{B}_t] \quad (12)$$

for $k \geq 1$, which equals the discounted expected marginal utility of consumption at $t+k$ given (s_t, \mathbf{B}_t) at t . This function is useful since, in choosing \mathbf{B}_t at date t , the government must take into account how this choice will affect future expectations of policy which, in turn, affect current bond prices through the expected future marginal utility of consumption.

Furthermore, note that choosing $\{\tau_t, g_t, \mathbf{B}_t\}$ at date t is equivalent to choosing $\{c_t, n_t, g_t, \mathbf{B}_t\}$ from the government's perspective, and this follows from the primal approach delineated in the previous section. Thus, we can write the government's problem recursively as

$$V(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1}) = \max_{c_t, n_t, g_t, \mathbf{B}_t} \left\{ u(c_t, n_t) + \theta_t(s_t) v(g_t) + \beta \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \pi(s_{t+1} | s_t) V(s_{t+1}, \mathbf{B}_t) \right\} \quad (13)$$

s.t.

$$c_t + g_t = n_t, \quad (14)$$

$$u_{c,t}(c_t - B_{t-1}^t) + u_{n,t} n_t + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} h^k(s_t, \mathbf{B}_t) (B_t^{t+k} - B_{t-1}^{t+k}) = 0, \quad (15)$$

where (15) is a recursive representation of (10). Let $f(s_t, \mathbf{B}_{t-1})$ correspond to the solution to (13)–(15) given $V(\cdot)$ and $h^k(\cdot)$. It therefore follows that the function $f(\cdot)$ necessarily implies a function $h^k(\cdot)$ which satisfies (12). An MPCE therefore is composed of functions $V(\cdot)$, $f(\cdot)$, and $h^k(\cdot)$, which are consistent with one another and satisfy (12) – (15).

4 Three-Period Example

We turn to a simple three-period example to provide the intuition for interpreting our quantitative results. This example allows us to explicitly characterize government policy both with and without commit-

ment, making it possible to highlight how dramatically different optimal debt maturity is under the two scenarios.

Let $t = 0, 1, 2$ and define a low and high shock θ^L and θ^H with $\theta^H = 1 + \delta$ and $\theta^L = 1 - \delta$ for $\delta \in [0, 1)$. Suppose that $\theta_0 > \theta^H$, $\theta_1 = \theta^H$ with probability $1/2$ and $\theta_1 = \theta^L$ with probability $1/2$. In addition, let $\theta_2 = \alpha\theta^H + (1 - \alpha)\theta^L$ if $\theta_1 = \theta^H$ and $\theta_2 = \alpha\theta^L + (1 - \alpha)\theta^H$ if $\theta_1 = \theta^L$ for $\alpha \in [0.5, 1)$. Therefore, all uncertainty is realized in period 1, with δ capturing the volatility of the shock and α capturing the persistence of the shock between periods 1 and 2.

Suppose that the government lacks commitment to spending and that taxes and labor are exogenously fixed to some τ and n , respectively, so that the government collects a constant revenue stream in all periods.¹³ Assume that the government's welfare function can be represented by

$$\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0,1,2} \beta^t ((1 - \psi) \log c_t + \psi \theta_t g_t) \quad (16)$$

for $\psi \in [0, 1]$. We consider the limiting case in which $\psi \rightarrow 1$ and we let $\beta = 1$ for simplicity. Initially, the government has no debt and all debt is repaid in the final period.

In this environment, the government does not have any discretion over tax policy, and any ex-post deviation by the government is driven by a desire to increase spending since the marginal benefit of additional spending always exceeds the marginal benefit of consumption.

4.1 Full Commitment

This section shows analytically that a government with commitment chooses highly tilted and large debt positions to fully insulate the economy from shocks.

The necessary and sufficient conditions for a competitive equilibrium in an economy with noncontingent debt are expressed in Proposition 1. These conditions are more stringent than those prevailing in an economy with state-contingent debt, which are expressed in Corollary 1. The key result in Theorem 1 of Angeletos (2002) proves that *any* allocation under state-contingent debt can be approximately implemented with noncontingent debt. This result implies that there is no inefficiency stemming from the absence of contingent debt. Our example explicitly characterizes these allocations to provide a theoretical comparison with those under lack of commitment.

The analog of the implementability condition at date zero in (10) can be written as a weak inequality constraint (since it binds in the optimum):

$$\frac{c_0 - n(1 - \tau)}{c_0} + \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{B_0^1}{c_1} + \frac{B_0^2}{c_2} \right) \geq 0, \quad (17)$$

¹³Such a situation would prevail for example if taxes are constant and the underlying preferences satisfy those of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988).

which after substitution yields the analog of (11) (which also binds in the optimum):

$$\frac{c_0 - n(1 - \tau)}{c_0} + \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{c_1 - n(1 - \tau)}{c_1} + \frac{c_2 - n(1 - \tau)}{c_2} \right) \geq 0. \quad (18)$$

Moreover, the date one implementability condition (11), which can also be written as a weak inequality constraint, is:

$$\frac{c_1 - n(1 - \tau)}{c_1} + \frac{c_2 - n(1 - \tau)}{c_2} \geq \frac{B_0^1}{c_1} + \frac{B_0^2}{c_2}. \quad (19)$$

Now let us consider an economy under complete markets. From Corollary 1, in a complete market economy the only relevant constraints on the planner are the resource constraints and the period zero implementability constraint (18). It can be shown that maximizing social welfare under these constraints leads to the following optimality condition,

$$c_t = \frac{1}{\theta_t^{1/2}} \frac{n(1 - \tau)}{3} \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{k=0,1,2} \theta_k^{1/2} \right) \forall t. \quad (20)$$

Equation (20) implies that in the presence of full insurance, spending is independent of history and depends only on the state θ_t , which takes on two possible realizations in the second and third periods.

The main result in Angeletos (2002) is that this allocation can be sustained even if state-contingent bonds are not available. To see this, note that from Proposition 1, the absence of state-contingent bonds leads to an additional constraint (19), which binds in the optimum. It can be shown that this constraint does not impose any additional inefficiency. Namely, the optimal solution under complete markets in (20) can be implemented under incomplete markets by choosing appropriate values of B_0^1 and B_0^2 which simultaneously satisfy (19) (which holds with equality) and (20). This implies that

$$\begin{aligned} (\theta^H)^{1/2} (n(1 - \tau) + B_0^1) + (\alpha\theta^H + (1 - \alpha)\theta^L)^{1/2} (n(1 - \tau) + B_0^2) = \\ (\theta^L)^{1/2} (n(1 - \tau) + B_0^1) + (\alpha\theta^L + (1 - \alpha)\theta^H)^{1/2} (n(1 - \tau) + B_0^2). \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

By algebraic substitution, it can be shown that

$$B_0^1 < 0 \text{ and } B_0^2 > 0.$$

Why does such a maturity structure provide full insurance? Consider the allocation at $t = 1$ and $t = 2$ under full insurance, as defined in (20). This allocation implies that the net present value of the government's primary surpluses is lower if the high shock is realized. This implication follows from the fact that the left-hand side of the government budget constraint (19) is lower if $\theta_1 = \theta^H$ and is higher if $\theta_1 = \theta^L$. In a complete market economy with state-contingent bonds, the government is able to offset this increase in the deficit during the high shock with a state-contingent payment it receives from households. In an economy without state-contingent debt, such a state-contingent payment can be replicated with a capital gain on the government's bond portfolio. More specifically, the market value of

the government's outstanding bond portfolio at $t = 1$ is represented by

$$B_0^1 + \frac{c_1}{c_2} B_0^2, \quad (22)$$

where we have substituted (9) for the one-period bond price. Since the shock is mean-reverting, it follows from (20) that the one-period bond price at $t = 1$, c_1/c_2 , is lower if the shock is high. As such, if the government issued long-term debt at date zero ($B_0^2 > 0$), then the market value of government bonds in (22) declines during the high shock. The reason that the government purchases short-term assets at date zero ($B_0^1 < 0$) is to be able to buy back some of outstanding long-term debt at date one. If the date one fiscal shock is high and the government needs resources, it will be able to buy this debt back at a lower price.

How large are the debt positions required to achieve full insurance? The following proposition shows that these positions can be very high.

Proposition 2 (Full Commitment) *The unique solution under full commitment is characterized by:*

1. **(Deterministic Limit)** As $\delta \rightarrow 0$,

$$B_0^1 = -n(1-\tau) \frac{\frac{\theta_0^{1/2} + 2}{3} (2\alpha - 1) + (1 - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha} < 0, \quad (23)$$

$$B_0^2 = n(1-\tau) \frac{\frac{\theta_0^{1/2} + 2}{3} - (1 - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha} > 0. \quad (24)$$

2. **(Full Persistence Limit)** As $\alpha \rightarrow 1$,

$$B_0^1 \rightarrow -\infty \text{ and } B_0^2 \rightarrow \infty.$$

The first part of Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal value of the short-term debt B_0^1 and the long-term debt B_0^2 as the variance of the shock δ goes to zero. There are a few points to note regarding this result. First, it should be emphasized that this is a limiting result. At $\delta = 0$, the optimal values of B_0^1 and B_0^2 are indeterminate. This is because there is no incentive to hedge, and any combination of B_0^1 and B_0^2 which satisfies

$$B_0^1 + B_0^2 = 2n(1-\tau) \frac{\theta_0^{1/2} - 1}{3} \quad (25)$$

is optimal, since the market value of total debt—which is what matters in a deterministic economy—is constant across these combinations. Therefore, the first part of the proposition characterizes the solution when δ is arbitrarily small, in which case the hedging motive still exists, leading to a unique maturity structure. Second, in the limit, the debt positions do not go to zero, and the government maintains a positive short-term asset position and a negative long-term debt position. This happens, even though the need for hedging goes to zero as volatility goes to zero, since the volatility in short-term interest rates

goes to zero as well. The size of a hedging position partly depends on the variation in the short-term interest rate at date one captured by the variation in c_1/c_2 in the complete market equilibrium. The smaller this variation, the larger is the required position to generate a given variation in the market value of debt to generate insurance. This fact implies that the positions required for hedging do not need to go to zero as volatility goes to zero. As a final point, note that the debt positions can be large in absolute value. For example, since $\theta_0 > 1$ and $\alpha \geq 0.5$, $B_0^1 < -n(1 - \tau)$ and $B_0^2 > n(1 - \tau)$, so that the absolute value of each debt position strictly exceeds the disposable income of households.

The proposition's second states that as the persistence of the shock between dates one and two goes to one, the magnitude of the government's chosen debt positions explode to infinity, so that the government holds an infinite short-term asset position and an infinite long-term debt position. As already discussed, the size of a hedging position depends in part on the variation in the short-term interest rate at date one captured by the variation in c_1/c_2 in the complete market equilibrium. As the persistence of the shock goes to one, the variation in the short-term interest rate at date one goes to zero, and since the need for hedging does not go to zero, this leads to the optimality of infinite debt positions. Under these debt positions, the government can fully insulate the economy from shocks since (20) continues to hold.

The two parts of Proposition 2 are fairly general and do not depend on the details of our particular example. These results are a consequence of the fact that in any application of our environment, fluctuations in short-term interest rates should go to zero as the volatility of shocks goes to zero or the persistence of shocks goes to one. To the extent that it is possible to complete the market using various debt maturities, the reduced volatility in short-term interest rates is a force that increases the magnitude of the optimal debt positions required for hedging. In addition, note that our theoretical result is consistent with the quantitative results of Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004). These authors present a number of examples in which volatility is not equal to zero and persistence is not equal to one, yet the variation in short-term interest rates is very small, and the optimal debt positions are very large in magnitude relative to GDP.

4.2 Lack of Commitment

We now show that the optimal policy changes dramatically once we introduce lack of commitment. We solve for the equilibrium under lack of commitment by using backward induction. At date two, the government has no discretion in its choice of fiscal policy, and it chooses $c_2 = n(1 - \tau) + B_1^2$.

Now consider government policy at date one. The government maximizes its continuation welfare given B_0^1 and B_0^2 , the resource constraint, and the implementability condition (19). Note that if $n(1 - \tau) + B_0^t \leq 0$ for $t = 1, 2$, then no allocation can satisfy (19) with equality. Therefore, such a policy is not feasible at date zero and is never chosen. The following lemma characterizes government policy for all other values of $\{B_0^1, B_0^2\}$.

Lemma 1 *If $n(1 - \tau) + B_0^t > 0$ for $t = 1, 2$, the date one government under lack of commitment*

chooses:

$$c_t = \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{n(1-\tau) + B_0^t}{\theta_t} \right)^{1/2} \left(\sum_{t=1,2} \theta_t^{1/2} (n(1-\tau) + B_0^t)^{1/2} \right) \text{ for } t = 1, 2. \quad (26)$$

If $n(1-\tau) + B_0^t \leq 0$ for either $t = 1$ or $t = 2$, the date one government can maximize welfare by choosing c_t arbitrarily close to zero for $t = 1, 2$.

Given this policy function at dates one and two, the government at date zero chooses a value of c_0 and $\{B_0^1, B_0^2\}$ given the resource constraint and given (17) so as to maximize social welfare.

It is straightforward to see that the government never chooses $n(1-\tau) + B_0^t \leq 0$ for either $t = 1$ or $t = 2$. In that case, c_t is arbitrarily close to zero for $t = 1, 2$, which implies that (18) is violated since a positive value of c_0 cannot satisfy that equation. Therefore, date zero policy always satisfies $n(1-\tau) + B_0^t > 0$ for $t = 1, 2$ and (26) applies.

We proceed by deriving the analog of Proposition 2 but removing the commitment assumption. We then conclude by discussing optimal debt maturity away from the limiting cases considered therein.

4.2.1 Deterministic Limit

If we substitute (26) into the social welfare function (16) and the date zero implementability condition (17), we can write the government's problem at date zero as:

$$\max_{c_0, B_0^1, B_0^2} \left\{ -\theta_0 c_0 - \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{t=1,2} \theta_t^{1/2} (n(1-\tau) + B_0^t)^{1/2} \right)^2 \right\} \quad (27)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{s.t.} \\ c_0 &= \frac{n(1-\tau)}{3 - 2n(1-\tau) \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{\sum_{t=1,2} \theta_t^{1/2} (n(1-\tau) + B_0^t)^{-1/2}}{\sum_{t=1,2} \theta_t^{1/2} (n(1-\tau) + B_0^t)^{1/2}} \right)}. \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

We can simplify the problem by substituting (28) into (27) and defining

$$\kappa = (n(1-\tau) + B_0^2) / (n(1-\tau) + B_0^1), \quad (29)$$

so that (27) can be rewritten as:

$$\max_{B_0^1, \kappa} \left\{ \begin{aligned} & -\theta_0 \frac{n(1-\tau)}{3 - 2n(1-\tau)(n(1-\tau) + B_0^1)^{-1} \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{\theta_1^{1/2} + \theta_2^{1/2} \kappa^{-1/2}}{\theta_1^{1/2} + \theta_2^{1/2} \kappa^{1/2}} \right)} \\ & - \frac{1}{2} (n(1-\tau) + B_0^1) \mathbb{E} \left(\theta_1^{1/2} + \theta_2^{1/2} \kappa^{1/2} \right)^2 \end{aligned} \right\}. \quad (30)$$

Optimality of a Flat Maturity Structure Proposition 3 states that as the volatility of the shock δ goes to zero, the unique optimal solution under lack of commitment admits a flat maturity structure with $B_0^1 = B_0^2$. This implies that for arbitrarily low levels of volatility, the government will choose a nearly flat maturity structure, in stark contrast to the case of full commitment described in Proposition 2. In that case, debt positions take on opposing signs and are bounded away from zero for arbitrarily low values of volatility.

Proposition 3 (Lack of Commitment, Deterministic Limit) *The unique solution under lack of commitment as $\delta \rightarrow 0$ satisfies*

$$B_0^1 = B_0^2 = n(1 - \tau) \frac{\theta_0^{1/2} - 1}{3} = \frac{1}{2} \bar{B} > 0. \quad (31)$$

When δ goes to zero, the cost of lack of commitment also goes to zero. As in Lucas and Stokey (1983), the reason is that the government utilizes the debt maturity structure in order to achieve the same allocation as under full commitment characterized in (20). More specifically, while the program under commitment admits a unique solution for $\delta > 0$, when $\delta = 0$, any combination of B_0^1 and B_0^2 satisfying

$$B_0^1 + B_0^2 = \bar{B}$$

is optimal. Whereas the government with commitment can choose any such maturity, the government under lack of commitment must by necessity choose a flat maturity in order to achieve the same welfare.

Why is a flat maturity structure optimal as volatility goes to zero? To see this, let $\delta = 0$, and consider the incentives of the date one government, which only cares about raising spending. This government would like to reduce the market value of what it owes to the private sector which, using the intertemporal condition, can be represented by

$$B_0^1 + \frac{c_1}{c_2} B_0^2. \quad (32)$$

Moreover, the government would also like to increase the market value of newly issued debt which can be represented by

$$\frac{c_1}{c_2} B_1^2. \quad (33)$$

If the debt maturity structure were tilted toward the long end, then the date one government would deviate from a smooth policy so as to reduce the value of what it owes. For example, suppose that $B_0^1 = 0$ and $B_0^2 = \bar{B}$. Under commitment, it would be possible to achieve the optimum under this debt arrangement. However, under lack of commitment, (26) implies that the government deviates from the smooth ex-ante optimal policy by choosing $c_1 < c_2$. This deviation, which is achieved by issuing higher levels of debt B_1^2 relative to commitment, serves to reduce the value of what the government owes in (32), therefore freeing up resources to be utilized for additional spending in period one.

Analogously, if the debt maturity structure were tilted toward the short end, then the government would deviate from a smooth policy so as to increase the value of what it issues. For example, suppose that $B_0^1 = \bar{B}$ and $B_0^2 = 0$. As in the previous case, this debt arrangement would implement the optimum under commitment. However, rather than choosing the ex-ante optimal smooth policy, the date one

government lacking commitment chooses policy according to (26), with $c_1 > c_2$. This deviation, which is achieved by issuing lower levels of debt B_1^2 relative to commitment, serves to increase the value of what the government issues in (32), therefore freeing up resources to be utilized for additional spending at $t = 2$.

It is only when $B_0^1 = B_0^2 = \bar{B}/2$ that there are no gains from deviation. In this case, it follows from (26) that $B_1^2 = B_0^2$, and therefore any deviation's marginal effect on the market value of outstanding debt is perfectly outweighed by its effect on the market value of newly issued debt. For this reason, a flat debt maturity structure induces commitment.

Tradeoff between Commitment and Insurance More generally, what this example illustrates is that, whatever the value of δ , the government always faces a tradeoff between using the debt maturity structure to fix the problem of lack of commitment and using the maturity structure to insulate the economy from shocks. To see this, note that under lack of commitment, the date one short-term interest rate captured by c_2/c_1 is rising in B_0^2 and declining in B_0^1 and this follows from (26). The intuition for this observation is related to our discussion above. As B_0^2 rises, the date one government's incentives to reduce the market value of what it owes rises, which leads to an increase in the date one short-term interest rate. As B_0^1 rises, the date one government's incentives to increase the market value of newly issued debt rises, which leads to a reduction in the date one short-term interest rate.¹⁴

To see how a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost of lack of commitment, it is useful to consider how the value of c_1/c_2 differs under commitment relative to under lack of commitment. Equation (20) implies that under full commitment the solution requires $c_1/c_2 = (\theta_2/\theta_1)^{1/2}$. From (26), this can only be true under lack of commitment if $B_0^1 = B_0^2$, since in this case,

$$c_1/c_2 = (\theta_2/\theta_1)^{1/2} \left((n(1-\tau) + B_0^1) / (n(1-\tau) + B_0^2) \right)^{1/2}.$$

Therefore, the short-term interest rate at date one under lack of commitment can only coincide with that under full commitment if the chosen debt maturity is flat under lack of commitment. This observation more generally reflects the fact that, conditional on $B_0^1 = B_0^2$, the government under full commitment and the government under lack of commitment always choose the same policy at date one. In this sense, a flat debt maturity structure minimizes the cost imposed by lack of commitment.

To see how a tilted maturity structure minimizes the cost of incomplete markets, let c_t^H and c_t^L correspond to the values of c at date t conditional on $\theta_1 = \theta^H$ and $\theta_1 = \theta^L$, respectively, under full commitment. From (20), under full commitment it is the case that $c_1^H/c_1^L = (\theta^L/\theta^H)^{1/2}$ and $c_2^H/c_2^L = ((\alpha\theta^L + (1-\alpha)\theta^H) / (\alpha\theta^H + (1-\alpha)\theta^L))^{1/2}$. From (26), this can only be true under lack of commitment if (21) is satisfied, requiring $B_0^1 \neq B_0^2$. In other words, under lack of commitment the variance in consumption at date one can only coincide with that under full commitment if the chosen

¹⁴One natural implication of this observation is that the slope of the yield curve at date zero is increasing in the maturity of debt issued at date zero. Formally, starting from a given policy, if we perturb B_0^1 and B_0^2 so as to keep the primary deficit fixed at date zero, one can show that q_0^1/q_0^2 is strictly increasing in B_0^2 . This result is in line with the empirical results of Guibaud, Nosbusch, and Vayanos (2013) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2014).

debt maturity under lack of commitment is tilted in a similar fashion.

Thus, the government at date zero faces a tradeoff. On the one hand, it can choose a flat maturity structure to match the short-term interest rate between dates one and two which it would prefer ex-ante under full commitment. On the other hand, it can choose a tilted maturity structure to match the variance in consumption at dates one and two which it would prefer ex-ante under full commitment. This example illustrates the key tradeoff between insurance and commitment that the government considers at date zero.

In Appendix A-2 we formally analyze this tradeoff through a second-order approximation to welfare (30), in a neighborhood of the deterministic case ($\delta = 0$). Up to this approximation, for any value of the variance $\delta > 0$, we find that the cost of lack of commitment is of higher order importance than the cost of lack of insurance. Thus, the debt maturity should be structured to fix the problem of lack of commitment, and therefore should be flat.

4.2.2 Full Persistence Limit

The previous section considered an economy in which the volatility of the shock is arbitrarily low, and we showed that optimal policy is a flat debt maturity that minimizes the cost of lack of commitment. In this section, we allow the volatility of the shock to take any value, and we consider what the optimal policy should be as the persistence of the shock, α , goes to one.

Proposition 4 (*Lack of Commitment, Full Persistence Limit*) *The unique solution under lack of commitment as $\alpha \rightarrow 1$ satisfies*

$$B_0^1 = B_0^2 = n(1 - \tau) \frac{\theta_0^{1/2} - 1}{3} = \frac{1}{2} \bar{B} > 0. \quad (34)$$

This proposition states that as the persistence of the shock α goes to one, the unique optimal solution under lack of commitment admits a flat maturity structure with $B_0^1 = B_0^2$. This means that for arbitrarily high values of persistence, the government will choose a nearly flat maturity structure, which is in stark contrast to the case of full commitment described in Proposition 2. In that case, debt positions are tilted and are arbitrarily large in magnitude for high values of persistence, since B_0^1 diverges to minus infinity and B_0^2 diverges to plus infinity as α approaches one. Given (20) which holds under full commitment and (26) which holds under lack of commitment, this proposition implies that under lack of commitment, the government no longer insulates the economy from shocks, since the level of public spending at dates one and two is no longer responsive to the realization of uncertainty at date one. Therefore, as α goes to one, the cost of lack of commitment remains positive.

The reasoning behind this proposition is as follows. As the shock's persistence between dates one and two goes to one, the government at date zero would prefer to smooth consumption as much as possible between dates one and two. From (26), the only way to do this, given the government's incentives at date one, is to choose a flat debt maturity with $B_0^1 = B_0^2$. Clearly, choosing $B_0^1 = B_0^2$ reduces hedging, since from (26) it implies that consumption, and therefore public spending, is unresponsive to the shock. If, as

under commitment, the government were to attempt some hedging with $B_0^1 < 0$ and $B_0^2 > 0$, it would need to choose debt positions of arbitrarily large magnitudes, since the variation in the short-term interest rate at date one across states diminishes as persistence goes to one. From Lemma 1, such offsetting debt positions lead to very nonsmooth consumption and an increasing short-term interest rate between dates one and two. Moreover, if $B_0^1 \leq -n(1 - \tau)$, this leads the date one government to choose c_1 and c_2 arbitrarily close to zero, which violates (18) since a solution for c_0 does not exist.

Since any hedging has an infinite cost in the limit, the date zero government chooses to forgo hedging altogether, and instead chooses a flat debt maturity structure that induces the date one government to implement a smooth consumption path. While under commitment such a smooth consumption path could be implemented with a number of maturity structures, under lack of commitment it can only be implemented with a flat debt position. In doing so, the government minimizes the welfare cost due to lack of commitment.¹⁵

4.2.3 Discussion

The two limiting cases that we have described provide examples in which the optimal debt maturity under lack of commitment is flat. This is because large and tilted debt maturities—which would be optimal under full commitment—are very costly to finance under lack of commitment.

More generally, away from these limiting cases, any attempt by the government to hedge will be costly in terms of commitment. To illustrate this insight, recall that at $t = 1$, the government pursues policies which reduce the market value of outstanding debt and increase the market value of newly issued debt. More specifically, the date one government is interested in relaxing the implementability condition (19) by reducing the right-hand side of (19) as much as possible. This is why if $B_0^1 < (>) B_0^2$, the government chooses to set $c_1 < (>) c_2$. If B_0^1 and B_0^2 are very different, then there is greater scope for deviating from a smooth policy in period one. For example, suppose that $B_0^1 < B_0^2$ with $c_1 < c_2$ chosen according to (26). Clearly, if B_0^1 were to be reduced by some $\epsilon > 0$ and B_0^2 increased by ϵ , then (19) could be relaxed even further, and the date one government would choose a policy which further reduces the right-hand side of (19).

The greater scope for deviation ex-post is very costly from an ex-ante perspective. This is because if the right-hand side of (19) is lower, then the left-hand side of (17) is also lower. Therefore, by relaxing the implementability condition at date one, the date one government is tightening the implementability condition at date zero, which directly reduces the ex-ante welfare at date zero.

In both of the limiting cases we considered, the date zero government is principally concerned about the date one government's lack of commitment to fiscal policy and the date zero government chooses a flat debt maturity. In the case where the volatility of the shock goes to zero, the benefit of hedging goes to zero, and for this reason, the government chooses a flat maturity structure to minimize the cost of lack

¹⁵Using numerical methods, one can easily show that the results in Propositions 3 and 4 do not depend on the details of our particular example. In any application of our environment, a smooth policy between dates one and two can only be guaranteed with a flat debt maturity structure. Moreover, as the persistence of the shock goes to one, any hedging has an infinite cost in the limit. Our example allows us to show the optimality of a flat maturity theoretically, since we are able to solve for the date one policy in closed form using Lemma 1.

of commitment. A similar reasoning applies in the case where the persistence of the shock goes to one, since the cost of any hedging becomes arbitrarily large. Thus, the optimal debt maturity under lack of commitment starkly contrasts to the optimal maturity structure under full commitment. In this case, the government continues to hedge in the limit by choosing large and tilted debt positions.

A natural question concerns what happens to the optimal debt maturity under lack of commitment once we move away from these limiting cases. This is a quantitative question which we explore in detail in the following section. What our examples make clear is that the smaller the volatility of the shock and the greater the persistence of the shock, the more likely it that the optimal policy under lack of commitment admits a flat debt maturity structure. The reason is that in these circumstances, utilizing the debt maturity to fix the problem of lack of commitment is more important than utilizing the debt maturity to fix the problem of lack of insurance.

5 Quantitative Exercise

We first consider a finite-horizon economy. The advantage of a finite horizon over an infinite horizon is that it is computationally feasible to allow the government to choose any arbitrary debt maturity structure. We then move to consider an infinite-horizon economy with limited debt instruments, as this approach allows us to more suitably capture the quantitative features of optimal policy and to characterize policy dynamics. In these exercises we show that the optimal debt maturity is nearly flat.

We use the same parameterization as in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). More specifically, we set the per period payoff of households to

$$\frac{c_t^{1-\sigma_c} - 1}{1 - \sigma_c} + \eta \frac{(1 - n_t)^{1-\sigma_l} - 1}{1 - \sigma_l} + \theta_t \frac{g_t^{1-\sigma_g} - 1}{1 - \sigma_g}, \quad (35)$$

with $\sigma_c = \sigma_l = \sigma_g = 1$. We calibrate $\eta = 3.33$, since this value implies that hours worked $n = 0.23$ under full commitment. Each period is a year, and hence $\beta = 0.9644$, such that the riskless interest rate is 4 percent. We consider an economy with two shocks, θ^L and θ^H , following a symmetric first-order Markov process. The levels and persistence of the shocks imply that under full commitment, the average spending to output ratio is 0.18, the standard deviation of spending equals 7 percent of average spending, and the autocorrelation of spending is 0.89. All these values match the statistics and steady-state values in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). We set $\theta_0 = \theta^H$.

5.1 Finite-Horizon Analysis

We begin our quantitative analysis in a finite-horizon economy with $t = 0, \dots, T$, where the set of available maturities is unrestricted. In order to compare our results with those of the three-period example developed in Section 4, showing that a flat debt maturity (that is, $B_0^1 = B_0^2$) is optimal, we allow the government at every date t to issue a consol $B_t^L \geq 0$, which represents a promise by the government to pay a constant amount B_t^L at each date $t + k$ for $k = \{1, \dots, T - t\}$. In addition, the government can

issue a set of zero-coupon bonds $\{B_t^{t+k}\}_{k=1}^{T-t-1}$. It follows that for $t < T - 1$, the government's dynamic budget constraint (4) can be rewritten as:

$$g_t + B_{t-1}^t + B_{t-1}^L = \tau_t n_t + \sum_{k=1}^{T-t-1} q_t^{t+k} \left(B_t^{t+k} - B_{t-1}^{t+k} \right) + q_t^L \left(B_t^L - B_{t-1}^L \right),$$

where q_t^L corresponds to the price of the consol. This budget constraint takes into account that at date t , the government: i) makes a flow payoff to households equal to $B_{t-1}^t + B_{t-1}^L$ according to their holdings of one-period bonds and consols, ii) exchanges old zero-coupon bonds B_{t-1}^{t+k} for new zero-coupon bonds B_t^{t+k} at price q_t^{t+k} , and iii) exchanges old consols B_{t-1}^L for new consols B_t^L at price q_t^L . In this environment, a flat debt maturity—which we found to be optimal in the theoretical example of Section 4—corresponds to one in which $B_t^{t+k} = 0 \forall k$.¹⁶

We choose initial conditions so that, under full commitment, the debt's value equals 2.1 percent of the net present value of GDP, out of which 28 percent has a maturity of less than one year, with the rest equally distributed across the remaining maturities.¹⁷ The main results are unaffected by our choice of initial conditions, as shown below. All debt must be repaid at the terminal date. As in Section 4's theoretical example, we let θ_T be deterministic from the government's perspective at $T - 1$, and equal to its expected value, conditional on the realization of θ_{T-1} . This modification implies that full hedging is possible under full commitment, so that any inefficiencies in our setting arise purely from the lack of commitment. All of our results continue to hold if instead θ_T is stochastically determined.

Table 1 summarizes the main results. Panel A describes our results in a three-period economy, and Panel B describes our results in a four-period economy. In all cases, we display bond positions as a fraction of GDP and, with some abuse of the textual notation, the bond positions B represent B normalized by GDP. Panel A describes the benchmark simulation under full commitment. In this case, $B_0^1 = -10,057$ and $B_0^L = 5,120$ (percent of GDP). These large magnitudes are consistent with the analysis of Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004). In the case of lack of commitment, $B_0^1 = 0.07$ and $B_0^L = 2.32$, so the optimal debt maturity is nearly flat. This characterization is consistent with Section 4's theoretical three-period model in which the optimal debt maturity is exactly flat.

In Panel B, we find similar results when the horizon is extended to a four-period economy. In this circumstance, under commitment the optimal maturity structure at date zero is indeterminate since there are more maturities than shocks. If confined to a one-period bond and a consol, the government chooses a one-period bond equal to $-7,317$ percent of GDP and a consol equal to $2,529$ percent of GDP. In contrast, under lack of commitment, $B_0^1 = -0.04$, $B_0^2 = 0.00$, and $B_0^L = 2.41$, so that the optimal

¹⁶At $t = T - 1$, the dynamic budget constraint is

$$g_t + B_{t-1}^t + B_{t-1}^L = \tau_t n_t + q_t^L \left(B_t^L - B_{t-1}^L \right), \quad (36)$$

since there are no zero-coupon bonds that can be issued. We can exclude T -period zero-coupon bonds B_t^T because these securities are redundant given the presence of the consol B_t^L .

¹⁷These values are consistent with our parameterization of the infinite-horizon economy which matches the U.S. data from 1988 to 2007 described in the next section. Given a discount factor $\beta = 0.9644$, a debt equal to 2.1 percent of the net present value of output corresponds to a debt-to-GDP ratio of roughly 60 percent in an infinite-horizon economy.

maturity structure is nearly flat. Moreover, the optimal government debt maturity is even flatter at date 1, since $B_1^2 = 0.00$ and $B_1^L = 2.44$.

In the second, third, and fourth columns of Table 1, we consider the robustness of our results as we increase the volatility of shocks and decrease their persistence, since this moves us further away from the limiting cases considered in Section 4. We find that the optimal debt maturity under lack of commitment remains nearly flat if the standard deviation of shocks is two and four times larger than in the benchmark simulation. We find the same result if shocks have zero persistence and are i.i.d.

In the last two columns of Table 1, we explore whether our results depend on the initial tilt of the maturity structure. We consider an extreme case where the majority of the debt consists of one-period bonds, so that these constitute 72 percent instead of 28 percent of liabilities, and the total amount of debt is unchanged. We find that under lack of commitment, the optimal debt maturity at date 0 remains nearly flat both in the three-period and four-period models; however, it is less flat than in the benchmark case since the one-period bond B_0^1 is larger in absolute value. In part, this is because the initial debt position is itself highly tilted and there is a large flattening out that occurs during the initial period. In the four-period model, the optimal debt maturity becomes even flatter with time (date one policies involve a nearly flat maturity with $B_1^2 = 0.05$ and $B_1^L = 2.59$). In the last column, we consider the consequences of having the initial debt be exactly flat, and we find that the optimal maturity structure under lack of commitment is nearly flat in all cases.

In the bottom of Panel B, we consider the consequences of restricting the set of maturities to a one-year bond and a consol. Our main results continue to hold and the optimal debt maturity is nearly flat even when using this restricted set of debt instruments.

Our quantitative results from the finite-horizon environment are in line with our theoretical results. The optimality of a flat debt maturity emerges because of the combination of two forces. First, substantial hedging requires massive and tilted debt positions, as has been shown in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004). Due to their size, financing these positions can be very expensive in terms of average tax distortions because of the government's lack of commitment. Second, under empirically plausible levels of public spending volatility, the cost of lack of insurance under a flat maturity structure is small. Therefore, the optimal policy choice is directed at reducing *average* tax distortions versus reducing the *volatility* of tax distortions, and the result is a nearly flat maturity structure.

5.2 Infinite-Horizon Analysis

The previous section suggested quantitatively that, in a finite-horizon economy, a government lacking commitment should principally issue consols. We now consider the robustness of this result in an infinite-horizon. In an infinite-horizon economy, the set of tradeable bonds is infinite, and to facilitate computation, we reduce the set of tradeable bonds in a manner analogous to the work of Woodford (2001) and Arellano et al. (2013). Namely, we consider an economy with two types of bonds: a decaying perpetuity and a nondecaying consol. We allow for a nondecaying consol since our analysis in the previous sections suggest that the optimal debt maturity is nearly flat. We then consider whether or not the government

makes use of the nondecaying perpetuity in its financing strategy.

Let $B_{t-1}^S \geq 0$ denote the value of the coupon associated with the decaying perpetuity issued by the government at $t - 1$. Moreover, let $B_{t-1}^L \geq 0$ denote the value of the coupon associated with the nondecaying consol issued by the government at $t - 1$. It follows that the government's dynamic budget constraint becomes:

$$g_t + B_{t-1}^S + B_{t-1}^L = \tau_t n_t + q_t^S (B_t^S - \gamma B_{t-1}^S) + q_t^L (B_t^L - B_{t-1}^L). \quad (37)$$

Relative to (36), the only difference relates to the decaying perpetuity. Besides the consol, the government exchanges nondecayed perpetuities γB_{t-1}^S for new perpetuities B_t^S at price q_t^S , where $\gamma \in [0, 1)$.

We focus on a MPCE in which the value and policy functions are differentiable. We cannot prove that this MPCE is unique, but we have verified that our computational algorithm converges to the same policy when starting from a large grid with many different initial guesses.¹⁸ In our benchmark simulation we let $\gamma = 0$, so that B^S represents a one-year bond. We choose initial debt positions to match the U.S. statistics for the 1988–2007 period, with total debt having an average market value of 60 percent of GDP, 28 percent of which has a maturity of less than one year.¹⁹

5.2.1 Benchmark Simulation

Figure 1 displays the path of the one-year bond and the consol relative to GDP. The left panel shows the path of these quantities under full commitment. From $t \geq 1$ onward, the value of B^S is $-2,789$ percent of GDP and the value of B^L is 102 percent of GDP. The price of the consol is significantly higher than that of the one-year bond, which explains why the position is significantly lower; in fact, the consol's market value is 2,858 percent of GDP. These large and highly tilted quantities are consistent with previous results under commitment. These debt positions are not actively managed and remain constant over time.

The right panel considers the economy under lack of commitment, and in this scenario debt is actively managed from $t \geq 1$ onward. Since it is actively managed, we plot the average value of debt for each time period taken from 1,000 simulations. Between $t = 1$ and $t = 100$, the average value of B^S is -0.01 percent of GDP and the average value of B^L is 2.22 percent of GDP.²⁰ Therefore, the maturity structure of debt is approximately flat. Additionally, the total amount of debt maturing in one period (that is, the value of the one-period bond plus the consol's coupon payment) is positive and equals 2.21 percent of GDP. At the same horizon, a government with commitment instead would hold assets valued at about 26 times the GDP.

Figure 2 considers an equilibrium sequence of shocks and shows that B^S is approximately zero and constant in response to shocks, whereas B^L is actively managed. More specifically, the level of the

¹⁸Further details regarding our computational method are available in the Appendix Section A-3.

¹⁹This calculation ignores off-balance sheet liabilities, such as unfunded mandatory spending obligations that are significantly more long term. Taking this additional debt into account and changing initial conditions would not alter our main conclusion that the optimal debt maturity under lack of commitment is nearly flat.

²⁰We calculate the average starting from $t = 1$ rather than $t = 0$ since the simulation suggests that debt quickly jumps towards its long-run average between $t = 0$ and $t = 1$.

consol rises (declines) during high (low) spending shocks. This pattern occurs because the government runs larger deficits (surpluses) when spending is high (low). Therefore, in contrast to the case of full commitment, the government actively manages its debt, which is primarily composed of consols.

Figure 3 presents the policy path under this sequence of shocks. Whereas under full commitment taxes are nearly constant—a claim that is consistent with the complete market results of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994)—they are volatile and respond persistently to shocks under lack of commitment. More specifically, during periods of high (low) expenditure, taxes jump up (down) and continue to increase (decrease) the longer the fiscal shock persists. Periods of high (low) expenditure are periods with lower (higher) primary surpluses in the case of full commitment and lack of commitment but, in contrast to the case of full commitment, under lack of commitment the surplus responds persistently to shocks. This persistence is reflected in the debt’s total market value, which contrasts with the transitory response of the debt’s market value in the case of full commitment.²¹

We can calculate the welfare cost of lack of commitment in this setting. Specifically, we compare welfare under full commitment to that under lack of commitment and report the welfare difference in consumption-equivalent terms. We find that this welfare cost is 0.0038 percent. In comparison, the welfare cost of imposing a balanced budget on a government with full commitment is 0.04 percent, more than ten times larger.²² These numbers mean that the welfare cost of lack of commitment is very low—as long as the maturity is structured optimally, which implies a nearly flat maturity.

In addition, we can compute the welfare cost of imposing a completely flat maturity. To do this, we compare welfare under lack of commitment when the government can freely choose B^S to that when B^S is constrained to zero in all periods (so that debt issuance is exactly flat). We find that the difference in welfare is less than 0.00001 percent. Such a negligible welfare cost implies that optimal policy under lack of commitment can be approximated by constraining debt issuance to consols.

5.2.2 Robustness: Alternative Debt Maturities

One limitation of our infinite-horizon analysis is that we have restricted the horizon of the short-term debt instrument. We now show that the optimal maturity structure is flat even if alternative horizons are considered. Figure 4 displays the average values of B^S and B^L under commitment and under lack of commitment for different values of γ (the decay rate of the perpetuity B^S).²³ Under full commitment, the optimal value of B^L is positive and nearly unchanged by different values of γ , whereas the optimal value of B^S is negative, large, and decreasing in magnitude as γ rises. The reason is that the higher is γ , the lower is the decay rate of B^S and the higher its price, implying that a smaller position is required for hedging. In contrast, under lack of commitment, the average value of the perpetuity B^S is zero regardless

²¹Shin (2007) considers a model under full commitment and shows that if there are N possible states of the shock but at any moment only $N_1 < N$ can be reached, then N_1 bonds of different maturities can provide full insurance. Such a model would require active management of debt positions. Our model under lack of commitment also captures the active management of debt. This result, however, is not achieved by limiting the maturities available; instead it follows from the tradeoff between hedging and the cost of borrowing.

²²This corresponds to the cost of forcing a government to set $B_t^S = B_{-1}^S$ and $B_t^L = B_{-1}^L \forall t$.

²³For this exercise, the initial conditions are calculated for each γ so as to keep fixed the market value of initial debt.

of the value of γ , and the value of the consol B^L is large and unaffected by γ . As such, the optimal debt maturity remains flat, even when considering alternative debt maturities.

5.2.3 Robustness: Variance and Persistence of Fiscal Shocks

The quantitative results are consistent with the theoretical results from the three-period model that considered the limiting cases as volatility declined to zero and persistence increased to one. A natural question concerns the degree to which our results depend on the parameterization of public spending shocks. To explore this question, we return to the benchmark environment with $\gamma = 0$ and choose different values of volatility and persistence for the public spending shock.

Figure 5 displays the average values of B^S and B^L under different assumptions for the shocks' process. In the case of full commitment, debt positions are large and tilted independently of the volatility and persistence of the shocks. Moreover, consistent with our three-period example, the debt positions become arbitrarily large as the autocorrelation of the shock goes to 1. In contrast, the optimal maturity structure under lack of commitment is nearly flat for all volatilities and persistence levels of public spending. We also find that the debt positions decrease in size as volatility increases. This occurs because the volatility of the marginal utility of consumption increases, which facilitates hedging through the consol with a smaller debt position. As such, our result is robust to changes in the stochastic characteristics of fiscal shocks.

5.2.4 Robustness: Additional Shocks

We have thus far considered an economy in which the only shocks to the economy are fiscal. In Table 2, we show that our main result—that the optimal debt maturity is flat—is robust to the introduction of productivity and discount factor shocks. We consider each shock in isolation in the first two columns. We then increase the number of shock realizations in the third column (so that the number of shock realizations exceeds the number of debt instruments), and in the last two columns we consider combinations of different shocks.

Panel A reports the debt position in our benchmark model with fiscal shocks θ_t and replicates our results described in the previous sections. Panel B introduces a productivity shock in an environment in which θ_t is constant and equal to its average value. More specifically, we replace n_t in the resource constraint (1) with $A_t n_t$, where A_t captures the productivity of labor and therefore equals the wage. Let $A_t = \{A^L, A^H\}$ follow a symmetric first-order Markov process with unconditional mean equal to 1. We choose A^L , A^H , and the persistence of the process so that, as in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994), the standard deviation of A_t equals 0.04 and the autocorrelation equals 0.81. The first column of Panel B shows, consistently with the results in Buera and Nicolini (2004), that under commitment the average debt positions are tilted, though the magnitudes of debt are smaller than those under fiscal shocks. In the second column, it is clear that optimal debt positions under lack of commitment are nearly flat.

Panel C of Table 2 introduces a discount factor shock in an economy in which θ_t and A_t are constant

and equal to the average value. We replace the utility function in (35) with

$$\zeta_t \left(\frac{c_t^{1-\sigma_c} - 1}{1 - \sigma_c} + \eta \frac{(1 - n_t)^{1-\sigma_l} - 1}{1 - \sigma_l} + \theta_t \frac{g_t^{1-\sigma_g} - 1}{1 - \sigma_g} \right)$$

for some $\zeta_t = \{\zeta^L, \zeta^H\}$, which follows a first-order Markov process. The symbol ζ_t represents a discount factor shock that can impact the variance of short-term interest rates without affecting the time series properties of other variables in the model. As discussed in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004), the large debt positions required for hedging under commitment are partly driven by the fact that fluctuations in short-term interest rates are small in the benchmark economic environment. Introducing the discount factor shock allows us to increase the volatility of interest rates and determine whether the optimality of a flat debt maturity in our setting depends on the presence of low interest rate volatility.

To that end, we choose the stochastic properties of ζ_t so that under commitment, the mean of the one-year interest rate is 4 percent, its standard deviation is 0.73 percent of the mean, and its persistence is 0.78, which matches the properties of the real one-year interest rate in the United States from 1988 to 2007.²⁴ The first column of Panel C shows that, in this situation, the maturity structure is exactly flat under commitment; this is because optimal policy is smooth from date one onward. As such, a flat debt maturity allows the consol's market value to fluctuate one-to-one with the present value of future surpluses. Analogous logic implies that under lack of commitment, the optimal debt maturity structure is flat, and the flat maturity also mitigates the commitment problem.²⁵

In the third column of Table 2, we increase the number of shocks so that these exceed the number of debt instruments. In each panel, we extend the environment by allowing the shocks to take on 20 realizations that approximate a Gaussian AR(1) process. This exercise is performed while preserving the mean, standard deviation, and persistence of the shocks. We find that our results are unchanged, and that the optimal debt maturity remains flat under lack of commitment.

In Table 2, the last two columns consider our results in environments with two types of shocks, where we take all combinations of the shocks previously analyzed. This allows us to analyze situations where the government may have greater incentives to hedge, even under lack of commitment. For instance, discount factor shocks combined with either fiscal or productivity shocks means that fluctuations in the government's financing needs come hand-in-hand with larger fluctuations in short-term interest rates. These larger interest rate fluctuations imply that hedging does not require very large debt positions and is therefore less expensive. In fact, in all the situations considered, we find that the maturity is slightly more tilted, but it remains nearly flat.

In Panel B, we consider an environment with fiscal and productivity shocks, where we set $Corr(\theta_t, A_t) = -0.33$ so that our simulation matches the correlation between total factor productivity and primary

²⁴The real interest rate is calculated as the difference between the nominal one-year rate and realized inflation (using the GDP deflator).

²⁵Note that because the government lacks commitment to both spending and taxes, in this case a flat debt maturity does not completely solve the government's lack of commitment problem in this case (as it would if there was lack of commitment to taxes only).

deficits in the United States from 1988 to 2007.²⁶ We find that the optimal debt maturity continues to be approximately flat, though it is a little more tilted compared to the case in which the impact of each shock is assessed separately.

In Panel C, we consider an environment with fiscal shocks and discount factor shocks. We set $Corr(\theta_t, \zeta_t) = -0.51$ so that our simulation matches the correlation between real interest rates and primary deficits in the United States from 1988 to 2007. In this case, the maturity structure is slightly more tilted than in the case that excludes the discount factor shock (the one-year bond is 0.068 percent of GDP), but the optimal debt maturity remains essentially flat.²⁷ In the final column of Panel C, we consider an environment with productivity and discount factor shocks, and we set $Corr(A_t, \zeta_t) = -0.43$, so that our simulation matches the correlation between total factor productivity and real interest rates. We find that the maturity structure is slightly more tilted than in the case which excludes the discount factor shock, but that the maturity remains approximately flat.

5.2.5 Robustness: Commitment to Spending

So far, we have considered an economy in which the government lacks commitment to taxes, spending, and debt issuance. In the economy of Lucas and Stokey (1983), public spending is exogenous and can therefore not be chosen by the government. Table 3 shows that our results hold, even if the government is able to commit to the spending level, as is the case in their model. Under commitment the optimal maturity structure is tilted, and the optimal tilt is extremely sensitive to the particular type of shocks affecting the economy. Instead, under lack of commitment the maturity remains nearly flat under all types of shocks considered.

5.2.6 Robustness: Alternate Preferences

We now consider the robustness of our results compared to other preference specifications. In Figure 6, the top panel considers the consequences of altering the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ_c . In the case of full commitment, lower values of σ_c generate larger and more tilted debt positions. A lower value of σ_c reduces the volatility of the marginal utility of consumption and therefore makes it more difficult to achieve significant hedging with smaller debt positions. In the case of lack of commitment, a similar force emerges since both the tilt and the size of debt positions rise. Note however that, quantitatively, the maturity structure remains nearly flat as σ_c declines. The reason is that even though more tilted positions are useful for hedging, more tilted positions also exacerbate the problem of lack of commitment, so that the best way to deal with this problem is still to choose a nearly flat maturity structure.

²⁶The series of the total factor productivity shock and the primary deficit are taken from the World Penn Table and the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, respectively.

²⁷The optimal debt maturity is tilted to the short end in this case since there is a negative correlation between interest rates and the government's financing needs. We have also explored the extent to which one can put an upper bound on the degree of tilt in the government's debt maturity. For example, in the case when interest rates and fiscal shocks are perfectly positively correlated, the value of the one-year bond is -0.23 and the consol is 2.14 percent of GDP, so that even in this extreme case, the bulk of public debt is in the consol.

The exercise in the bottom panel considers the equilibrium under different values of σ_l , which relates to the utility function's curvature with respect to leisure. We find that for all values of σ_l below 2, the optimal debt maturity under lack of commitment is essentially flat. Higher values of σ_l have a two-fold effect. First, higher values of σ_l imply that it is socially costly to have labor supply volatility, and consequently, oscillations in consumption play a greater role in absorbing public spending shocks. This force increases the volatility in the marginal utility of consumption and implies that smaller debt positions are required to generate hedging. Second, higher values of σ_l also imply that it is more beneficial to engage in hedging as a way of smoothing out labor-market distortions. This force implies larger debt positions since the value of hedging increases. In the case of full commitment, we find that, quantitatively, the first force dominates since debt positions become less tilted as σ_l increases. In the case of lack of commitment, we find that the second force dominates since the consol position become larger as σ_l increases, which facilitates hedging. It continues to be the case throughout, however, that the debt maturity is nearly flat under lack of commitment.

6 Conclusion

The current literature on optimal government debt maturity concludes that the government should fully insulate itself from economic shocks. This complete insulation is accomplished by choosing a maturity structure that is heavily tilted towards the long end, with a constant short-term asset position and long-term debt position, and both positions extremely large relative to GDP. In this paper, we show that these conclusions strongly rely on the assumption of full commitment by the government. Once lack of commitment is taken into account, then full insulation from economic shocks becomes impossible; the government then faces a tradeoff between the benefit of hedging and the cost of funding. Borrowing long-term provides the government with a hedging benefit since the value of outstanding government liabilities declines when short-term interest rates rise. However, borrowing long-term lowers fiscal discipline for future governments unable to commit to policy, which leads to higher future short-term interest rates. Through a series of exercises we show that the optimal debt maturity structure under lack of commitment is nearly flat, with the government actively managing its debt in response to economic shocks. Thus, optimal policy can be approximately achieved by confining government debt instruments to consols.

Our analysis leaves several interesting avenues for future research. First, our framework follows Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) and therefore ignores nominal bonds and the risk of surprise inflation. Taking this issue into account is important since it incorporates a monetary authority's ability to change the value of outstanding debt in response to shocks, and it also brings forward the issues of dual commitment to monetary and fiscal policy. We believe that our work is a first step in studying this more complicated problem. Second, our framework does not incorporate investment and financing frictions that may be affected by the supply of public debt. It has been suggested that short-term government debt is useful in alleviating financial frictions (see for example Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein 2015), and an open question remains how quantitatively important this friction is relative to the lack of commitment. Finally, our analysis ignores heterogeneity and the redistributive motive for

fiscal policy (see for example Werning 2007 and Bhandari et al. 2013). An interesting question for future research involves how incentives for redistribution can affect the public debt's maturity structure.

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Table 1: Debt Positions as a Percentage of GDP in Finite-Horizon Economies

	Benchmark	Std. Dev. (x2)	Std. Dev. (x4)	i.i.d.	Initial Debt Tilted Short	Initial Debt Flat
Panel A: Three-Period Model						
<i>Commitment</i>						
One-Year Bond	-10,057.38	-9,879.06	-9,500.32	-597.68	-9,941.93	-10,039.59
Consol	5,120.42	5,030.48	4,839.23	304.32	5,063.44	5,111.64
<i>Lack of Commitment</i>						
One-Year Bond	0.07	0.06	0.02	-0.10	-0.41	-0.02
Consol	2.32	2.37	2.47	2.68	2.78	2.40
Panel B: Four-Period Model						
<i>Commitment</i>						
One-Year Bond	-7,317.73	-7,189.12	-6,914.89	-447.65	-7,230.17	-7,320.67
Consol	2,529.06	2,485.42	2,392.17	154.97	2,500.39	2,530.03
<i>Lack of Commitment (All Maturities)</i>						
Date 0 Policies						
One-Year Bond	-0.04	-0.08	-0.10	-0.16	-0.45	-0.02
Two-Year Bond	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00
Consol	2.41	2.47	2.55	2.65	2.73	2.40
Date 1 Policies						
One-Year Bond	0.00	-0.03	-0.10	-0.06	0.05	0.00
Consol	2.44	2.54	2.73	2.63	2.59	2.43
<i>Lack of Commitment (One-Year and Consol)</i>						
Date 0 Policies						
One-Year Bond	-0.04	-0.08	-0.09	-0.16	-0.45	-0.02
Consol	2.41	2.47	2.55	2.64	2.72	2.40
Date 1 Policies						
One-Year Bond	-0.02	-0.04	-0.10	-0.07	0.06	-0.02
Consol	2.45	2.55	2.73	2.63	2.59	2.45

Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The table reports the debt positions in three-period (Panel A) and four-period (Panel B) economies with and without commitment.

Table 2: Debt Positions with Alternate Shocks

	Commitment	Lack of Commitment			
	Benchmark	Benchmark	20 Shocks	w/Fiscal Shock	w/Prod. Shock
Panel A: Fiscal Shocks					
One-Year Bond	-2,789.46	-0.005	-0.005	-	-
Consol	101.76	2.22	2.23	-	-
Panel B: Productivity Shocks					
One-Year Bond	-13.49	-0.007	-0.007	-0.028	-
Consol	2.71	2.21	2.24	2.15	-
Panel C: Discount Factor Shocks					
One-Year Bond	0.00	0.000	0.000	0.062	-0.014
Consol	2.26	2.26	2.36	2.24	2.15

Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The table reports the average debt position (% of GDP) over 1,000 simulations of 200 periods. The shock processes follow discrete Markov-chains with two states (columns 1 and 2), 20 states (column 3), and four states (last 2 columns).


Table 3: Debt Positions with Commitment to Spending (Lucas and Stokey (1983) model)

	Commitment	Lack of Commitment	
	Benchmark	Benchmark	20 Shocks
Panel A: Fiscal Shocks			
One-Year Bond	-2789.32	-0.006	-0.008
Consol	101.76	2.22	2.21
Panel B: Productivity Shocks			
One-Year Bond	-90.06	-0.062	-0.060
Consol	5.54	2.24	2.31
Panel C: Discount Factor Shocks			
One-Year Bond	0	0	0
Consol	2.27	2.27	2.37

Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The table reports the average debt position (% of GDP) over 1,000 simulations of 200 periods for a model with exogenous public expenditure. The shock processes follow a discrete Markov chain with two states (columns 1 and 2) or 20 states (column 3). In the model with fiscal shocks (Panel A), public expenditure takes the same values as in the model with endogenous spending under commitment shown in Table 2. With different shocks (Panels B and C), public expenditure is fixed at the average of the values taken in the corresponding endogenous spending models under commitment.


Figure 1: Debt Positions Over Time With and Without Commitment



Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The figure shows the optimal debt positions over time with commitment (left panel) and without commitment (right panel). For the case where commitment is lacking, we report averages across 1,000 simulations.


Figure 2: Active Debt Management



Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The figure shows the evolution of debt positions for a particular sequence of shocks. The shaded areas indicate periods in which the fiscal shock is low.


Figure 3: Fiscal Policy without Commitment



Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The figure shows the evolution of tax rates, primary surpluses, and total debt for a particular sequence of shocks. The horizontal axis refers to years.


Figure 4: Debt Positions with Different Debt Maturities



Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The figure shows the optimal debt positions with commitment (left column) and without commitment (right column) under alternative values for the decay rate of the perpetuity. For the case with lack of commitment we report averages across 1,000 simulations of 200 periods.


Figure 5: Debt Positions under Alternative Variances and Persistences of Fiscal Shocks



Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The figure shows the optimal debt positions with commitment (left column) and without commitment (right column) under alternative values for the standard deviation (first row), and persistence (second row) of public expenditure. For the case with lack of commitment we report averages across 1,000 simulations of 200 periods.

Figure 6: Debt Positions under Alternative Preferences



Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: The figure shows the optimal debt positions with commitment (left column) and without commitment (right column) under alternative values for the risk aversion (first row) and curvature of leisure (second row). For the case with lack of commitment we report averages across 1,000 simulations of 200 periods.

Appendix

A-1 Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

The necessity of these conditions is proved in the text. To prove sufficiency, let the government choose the associated level of debt $\left\{ \left\{ \left\{ B_t^{t+k}(s^t) \right\}_{k=1}^{\infty} \right\}_{s^t \in S^t} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and a tax sequence $\left\{ \left\{ \tau_t(s^t) \right\}_{s^t \in S^t} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ that satisfies (9). Let bond prices satisfy (9). From (11), (10) is satisfied, which given (8) implies that (3) and (4) are satisfied. Therefore household optimality holds and all dynamic budget constraints are satisfied along with the market clearing requirement, so the equilibrium is competitive. ■

Proof of Corollary 1

Let us consider an environment with state-contingent debt. Specifically, let $B_t^{t+k}|s^{t+k}(s^t)$ correspond to a state-contingent bond purchased at date t and history s^t with a payment contingent on the realization of history s^{t+k} at $t+k$. The analog in this case to condition (9) is

$$1 - \tau_t(s^t) = -\frac{u_{n,t}(s^t)}{u_{c,t}(s^t)} \text{ and } q_t^{t+k}|s^{t+k}(s^t) = \frac{\beta \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k})}{u_{c,t}(s^t)}, \quad (\text{A-1})$$

and the analog to (11) is:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}} \beta^k \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) \left(u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k}) c_{t+k}(s^{t+k}) + u_{n,t+k}(s^{t+k}) n_{t+k}(s^{t+k}) \right) = \quad (\text{A-2})$$

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t+k} \in S^{t+k}} \beta^k \pi(s^{t+k}|s^t) u_{c,t+k}(s^{t+k}) B_{t-1}^{t+k}|s^{t+k}(s^{t-1}).$$

It is therefore necessary that (7) satisfies (8) $\forall s^t$ and (11) for $s^t = s^0$, where the last condition is identical to (A-2) for $s^t = s^0$. To prove sufficiency, let the government choose one-period state contingent debt $B_{t-1}^t|s^t(s^{t-1})$ so that the right-hand side of (A-2) equals $u_{c,t}(s^t) B_{t-1}^t|s^t(s^{t-1})$ and choose $\left\{ \left\{ B_{t-1}^t|s^t(s^{t-1}) \right\}_{s^t \in S^t} \right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ so as to satisfy (A-2) $\forall s^t$. Let $\tau_t(s^t)$ and $q_t^{t+k}|s^{t+k}(s^t)$ satisfy (A-1). Arguments analogous to those in the proof of Proposition 1 imply that the equilibrium is competitive. ■

Proof of Proposition 2

The debt positions are derived from combining (19) and (20). Let c_t^H and c_t^L correspond to the values of c at date t , conditional on $\theta_1 = \theta^H$ and $\theta_1 = \theta^L$, respectively. Using this notation, (19) implies

that

$$B_0^1 = \frac{2(c_2^H - c_2^L) - n(1 - \tau) \left(\frac{c_2^H}{c_1^H} - \frac{c_2^L}{c_1^L} \right)}{\frac{c_2^H}{c_1^H} - \frac{c_2^L}{c_1^L}}, \text{ and}$$

$$B_0^2 = \frac{2(c_1^H - c_1^L) - n(1 - \tau) \left(\frac{c_1^H}{c_2^H} - \frac{c_1^L}{c_2^L} \right)}{\frac{c_1^H}{c_2^H} - \frac{c_1^L}{c_2^L}},$$

which after substituting (20) yields:

$$B_0^1 = n(1 - \tau) \frac{\left[\begin{array}{l} \left(2\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{3} \sum_{k=0,1,2} \theta_k^{1/2} \right] - (\theta^H)^{1/2} \right) / (\alpha\theta^H + (1 - \alpha)\theta^L)^{1/2} \\ - \left(2\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{3} \sum_{k=0,1,2} \theta_k^{1/2} \right] - (\theta^L)^{1/2} \right) / (\alpha\theta^L + (1 - \alpha)\theta^H)^{1/2} \end{array} \right]}{(\theta_1^H / (\alpha\theta^H + (1 - \alpha)\theta^L))^{1/2} - (\theta_1^L / (\alpha\theta^L + (1 - \alpha)\theta^H))^{1/2}} < 0, \quad (\text{A-3})$$

$$B_0^2 = n(1 - \tau) \frac{\left[\begin{array}{l} \left(2\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{3} \sum_{k=0,1,2} \theta_k^{1/2} \right] - (\alpha\theta^H + (1 - \alpha)\theta^L)^{1/2} \right) / (\theta^H)^{1/2} \\ - \left(2\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{3} \sum_{k=0,1,2} \theta_k^{1/2} \right] - (\alpha\theta^L + (1 - \alpha)\theta^H)^{1/2} \right) / (\theta^L)^{1/2} \end{array} \right]}{((\alpha\theta^H + (1 - \alpha)\theta^L) / \theta^H)^{1/2} - ((\alpha\theta^L + (1 - \alpha)\theta^H) / \theta^L)^{1/2}} > 0, \quad (\text{A-4})$$

where we appeal to the fact that $\theta^H > \theta^L$ and $2\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{3} \sum_{k=0,1,2} \theta_k^{1/2} \right] > \theta^H$. To prove the first part, note that all of the terms in the numerator and in the denominator of (A-3) and (A-4) go to zero as δ goes to zero. Applying L'Hopital's rule implies (23) and (24). To prove the second part, consider the value of the two terms in (A-3) and (A-4) as $\alpha \rightarrow 1$. The denominator in (A-3) and (A-4) approaches 0. In contrast, the numerator in (A-3) and (A-4) approaches $2 \left(1 - (\theta^H / \theta^L)^{1/2} \right) < 0$. Therefore, $B_0^1 \rightarrow -\infty$ and $B_0^2 \rightarrow \infty$. ■

Proof of Lemma 1

(26) follows from the government's first order conditions and (19). If $n(1 - \tau) + B_0^1 \leq 0$ and $n(1 - \tau) + B_0^2 > 0$, then (19) can be satisfied with equality by choosing c_1 and c_2 arbitrarily close to 0. The same argument holds if $n(1 - \tau) + B_0^1 > 0$ and $n(1 - \tau) + B_0^2 \leq 0$. ■

Proof of Proposition 3

From our discussion regarding Lemma 1, the optimal values of B_0^t satisfy $B_0^t > -n(1 - \tau)$ for $t = 1, 2$ and this is true $\forall \delta \in [0, 1)$. Moreover, given (18), which binds, and (26), the optimal values

of B_0^t satisfy $B_0^t < \infty$ for $t = 1, 2$, since otherwise c_1 and c_2 are arbitrarily large and the government achieves an arbitrarily low level of welfare. This is also true $\forall \delta \in [0, 1)$, implying that the solution to (30) must admit an interior solution.

Consider the optimum characterized by the first-order conditions to (30) with respect to B_0^1 and κ . Algebraically combining these first-order conditions implies the following optimality condition:

$$\frac{d}{d\kappa} \log \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{\theta_1^{1/2} + \theta_2^{1/2} \kappa^{-1/2}}{\theta_1^{1/2} + \theta_2^{1/2} \kappa^{1/2}} \right) + \frac{d}{d\kappa} \log \mathbb{E} \left(\theta_1^{1/2} + \theta_2^{1/2} \kappa^{1/2} \right)^2 = 0. \quad (\text{A-5})$$

Let $\Omega(\delta)$ correspond to the set of κ satisfying (A-5) given δ . Because the left-hand side of (A-5) is continuous in $\kappa \in [0, \infty]$ and $\delta \in [0, 1)$, $\Omega(\delta)$ is closed and the set must contain all of its limit points. Therefore, $\lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \Omega(\delta) = \Omega(0)$. Consider the solution to (A-5) if $\delta = 0$. In that case, (A-5) can be rewritten as

$$\frac{d}{d\kappa} \log \left(\frac{1 + \kappa^{-1/2}}{1 + \kappa^{1/2}} \right) + \frac{d}{d\kappa} \log \left(1 + \kappa^{1/2} \right)^2 = 0,$$

which simplifies to

$$\frac{\kappa^{-3/2}}{1 + \kappa^{-1/2}} = \frac{\kappa^{-1/2}}{1 + \kappa^{1/2}}$$

which holds if and only if $\kappa = 1$. Therefore, if $\delta = 0$, the unique κ under lack of commitment satisfies $\kappa = 1$. By continuity, this solution coincides with the solution as $\delta \rightarrow 0$. To complete the proof, note that the value of B_0^1 and B_0^2 satisfying (31) implies from (26) that (20) is satisfied. Therefore, the same welfare as under full commitment is achieved, which must be optimal since the welfare under lack of commitment is weakly bounded from above by welfare under full commitment. Moreover, there cannot exist any other policy with $B_0^1 = B_0^2$ which yields higher welfare, since from (26), such a policy cannot satisfy (20).

To complete the proof consider the first-order condition to (30) with respect to B_0^1 given $\kappa = 1$

$$\theta_0 \frac{n(1-\tau)}{\left(3 - 2n(1-\tau)(n(1-\tau) + B_0^1)^{-1}\right)^2} 2n(1-\tau)(n(1-\tau) + B_0^1)^{-2} = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left(\theta_1^{1/2} + \theta_2^{1/2} \right)^2. \quad (\text{A-6})$$

By some algebra (A-6) yields (31). ■

Proof of Proposition 4

The analogous steps to those of the proof of Proposition 3 can be utilized to show that (34) must hold as $\alpha \rightarrow 1$. ■

A-2 Welfare Cost of Lack of Commitment and Insurance

The analytical example in Section 4 also allows us to compare the welfare cost of lack of commitment to the welfare cost of lack of insurance. In particular, it is useful to consider the welfare cost of a suboptimal debt maturity structure in settings with and without lack of commitment, and to see whether the maturity

structure matters more in one setting relative to another.

Formally, let us compare the government's problem under full commitment—when the government is only concerned with hedging—to the government's problem under lack of commitment—when the government is concerned both with hedging and lack of commitment. In these two environments, consider how important it is to choose the optimal debt maturity. We can show that, for low values of volatility, choosing the right maturity structure to address the lack of commitment is an order of magnitude more important than choosing the maturity to address lack of insurance.

Formally, note that (10) implies that government welfare in our model (16) can be written as a function of four variables: B_0^1 , B_0^2 , B_1^2 conditional on $\theta_1 = \theta^H$, and B_1^2 conditional on $\theta_1 = \theta^L$. Now suppose that a government were forced to choose some B_0^1 and B_0^2 , but it could freely choose B_1^2 conditional on the shock. A government under full commitment would choose the optimal stochastic value of B_1^2 to maximize *ex-ante* (date 0) welfare. In contrast, a government under lack of commitment would choose the optimal stochastic value of B_1^2 to maximize *ex-post* (date 1) welfare. With this observation in mind, let

$$W^C(\mathbf{x}) \text{ for } \mathbf{x} = \{B_0^1 + B_0^2, B_0^2 - B_0^1, \delta\} \quad (\text{A-7})$$

correspond to the value of government welfare under commitment conditional on specific values of $B_0^1 + B_0^2$, $B_0^2 - B_0^1$, and δ , where B_1^2 is optimally chosen by a fully committed government. This representation is feasible since $B_0^1 + B_0^2$ and $B_0^2 - B_0^1$ uniquely pin down B_0^1 and B_0^2 . Define $W^N(\mathbf{x})$ analogously for the case of lack of commitment, where B_1^2 is now optimally chosen by a government without commitment. Given our discussion in the main text, $W^C(\mathbf{x}) = W^N(\mathbf{x})$ if $B_0^2 - B_0^1 = 0$. In other words, a flat debt maturity minimizes the cost of lack of commitment since both governments choose the same values of B_1^2 .

Let

$$\mathbf{x}^C = \left\{ \bar{B}, 2n(1-\tau) \left(\frac{\theta_0^{1/2} + 2}{3} \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} + 1 \right), 0 \right\} \text{ and } \mathbf{x}^N = \{ \bar{B}, 0, 0 \}$$

for $\bar{B} = 2n(1-\tau) \left(\theta_0^{1/2} - 1 \right) / 3$. Embedded within \mathbf{x}^C and \mathbf{x}^N are the optimal values of B_0^1 and B_0^2 conditional on $\delta \rightarrow 0$ under commitment and lack of commitment, as follows from Propositions 2 and 3. Therefore, $W^C(\mathbf{x}^C)$ and $W^N(\mathbf{x}^N)$ represent welfare under the optimal choices of B_0^1 and B_0^2 given $\delta \rightarrow 0$ in the cases of full commitment and lack of commitment, respectively.

Using this notation, we can evaluate the sensitivity of welfare to the debt maturity $B_0^2 - B_0^1$ in the cases of full commitment and lack of commitment. We can show that welfare is much less sensitive to debt maturity under full commitment than under lack of commitment. Letting $j = C, N$, it follows that we can achieve the following second-order approximation of welfare around \mathbf{x}^j :

$$W^j(\mathbf{x}^j + \Delta \mathbf{x}) \approx W^j(\mathbf{x}^j) + \frac{1}{2} \Delta \mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{H}^j(\mathbf{x}^j) \Delta \mathbf{x}, \quad (\text{A-8})$$

where $\mathbf{H}^j(\mathbf{x}^j)$ is the Hessian matrix of $W^j(\cdot)$ evaluated at \mathbf{x}^j , and $\Delta \mathbf{x} = \left[\Delta_{B_0^1 + B_0^2}, \Delta_{B_0^2 - B_0^1}, \Delta_\delta \right]$ corresponds to the perturbations in the vector \mathbf{x} . Equation (A-8) takes into account that the first-order

terms are all equal to zero, and this follows from the fact that in each case the objective is evaluated at the optimum at zero volatility with $\delta = 0$.

Now consider the sensitivity of $W^j(\cdot)$ with respect to debt maturity by evaluating the term in (A-8) for some $\Delta \mathbf{x}$. The elements of (A-8) which depend on $\Delta_{B_0^2 - B_0^1}$ are

$$\frac{W_{12}^j(\mathbf{x}^j) \Delta_{B_0^1 + B_0^2} \Delta_{B_0^2 - B_0^1} + W_{22}^j(\mathbf{x}^j) \Delta_{B_0^2 - B_0^1}^2 + W_{23}^j(\mathbf{x}^j) \Delta_{B_0^2 - B_0^1} \Delta \delta}{2}. \quad (\text{A-9})$$

Note that $W_{23}^j(\mathbf{x}^j) = 0$ for $j = C, N$, and this follows from the fact that the derivative is evaluated at the optimum at zero volatility.

Now let us consider the value of (A-9) in the case of full commitment with $j = C$. With some algebra manipulation, it can be shown that $W_{12}^C(\mathbf{x}^C) = W_{22}^C(\mathbf{x}^C) = 0$. This result is consistent with our previous discussion that in the knife edge case with $\delta = 0$, optimal debt maturity is indeterminate. Since these terms are zero, under full commitment, welfare is insensitive to the debt maturity $B_0^2 - B_0^1$ given a second-order approximation. Clearly, welfare is sensitive to the total value of debt $B_0^1 + B_0^2$, but it is not, however, sensitive to the maturity of this debt. Note that this fact does not mean that welfare is independent of debt maturity; it just means that it is not dependent up to a second-order approximation around zero volatility. A higher order approximation of welfare around zero volatility does yield that welfare depends on the maturity of debt $B_0^2 - B_0^1$, and it does so through the interaction of debt maturity with the volatility of the shock δ .

In comparison, let us consider the value of (A-9) in the case of lack of commitment with $j = N$. Algebraically, it can be shown that $W_{22}^C(\mathbf{x}^C) < 0$. This result is consistent with our previous discussion that the optimal values of B_0^1 and B_0^2 are uniquely determined in the case of $\delta = 0$. More specifically, any deviation from a flat maturity structure with $B_0^1 = B_0^2$ strictly reduces welfare, and welfare is strictly concave at the optimum with $W_{22}^j(\mathbf{x}^j) < 0$. Therefore, under lack of commitment, welfare is sensitive to the debt maturity $B_0^2 - B_0^1$ to a second-order approximation.

Thus, choosing a suboptimal debt maturity under full commitment is less costly than choosing a suboptimal debt maturity under lack of commitment. In this regard, the cost of lack of commitment is of higher-order importance than the cost of lack of insurance, and, when the variance is low, the debt maturity should be structured to fix the problem of lack of commitment.

A-3 Numerical Algorithm for Solving Infinite-Horizon Economy

In the numerical algorithm, we use a collocation method on the recursive problem's first-order conditions. We solve for an MPCE in which the policy functions are differentiable and we directly approximate the set of policy functions $\{c, n, g, B^S, B^L, q^L\}$.²⁸ The approach finds a fixed point in the policy function space using an iterative method to find the solution. We cannot prove that this MPCE is unique, though our iterative procedure always generates the same policy functions independently of our initial guesses.

²⁸In the cases in which there is commitment to taxes or spending, we either impose the additional constraint or, equivalently, approximate a smaller set of policy functions.

The stochastic shock processes are discretized using the procedure described in Adda and Cooper (2003). The functions are approximated on a coarse grid, where the debt's market value ranges from -500 percent to 500 percent of GDP. The results are very similar whether we use a different amplitude for the grid, and different types of functional approximation (splines, complete, or Chebyshev polynomials).