




SAFEGUARDING  
FINANCIAL MARKETS

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston  
1997 Annual Report

A close-up photograph of several gold bars. The bars are highly reflective and feature embossed markings, including the words "U.S. GOLD" and the number "500". The bars are arranged in a way that creates a sense of depth and texture, with light reflecting off their surfaces. A dark rectangular box with a thin gold border is superimposed over the center of the image, containing white text.


The Federal Reserve System is responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. monetary policy. It also supervises banks and bank holding companies, and provides financial services to depository institutions and to the federal government. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston is one of 12 regional Reserve Banks in the United States that, together with the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C., comprise the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston serves the First Federal Reserve District. The First District includes all of New England except Fairfield County, Connecticut.

# An Emerging Design for Stability.

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CATHY E. MINEHAN,  
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER





## etter from the President

The national and the New England economies continued to flourish in 1997—the seventh consecutive year in a remarkable recovery from the downturn of the early 1990's. Over 175,000 jobs were created in the region, unemployment reached an eight-year low, national rates of productivity surged, financial markets boomed on solid corporate profits, and consumer confidence reached 30-year highs, while, at the same time, rates of inflationary growth trended to 30-year lows.

It is hard to remember a better time for the American economy or for the banking industry. And yet despite the extraordinary economic strength and pervasive optimism of the past several years, one verity remains—things will change. Anticipating and preparing for such change are important aspects of this Bank's responsibility to its region, and to the nation.

There is no doubt that at least a portion of this country's economic good fortune stems from increasingly global markets. Global competition has spurred investments in productivity-enhancing equipment, software, and operational processes. It has provided new sources of both low-cost supply and increased demand for this country's exports, and has prompted intercompany consolidation as a way to achieve the scope and means necessary to deal in world markets. At the same time, however, increasing globalization, combined with de facto and de jure changes in the structure of the financial services industry; sophisticated new financial products; and revolutionary information and communications technology, present new challenges as well.

In this year's Annual Report essay, we have taken the opportunity of a fundamentally strong regional and national economy to discuss one aspect of these new challenges. Our topic is designing a supervisory approach to dealing with systemic risk—the potential for problems among interconnected financial institutions to cascade into greater problems that could threaten the real economy. The essay suggests that financial institution supervision should focus increasingly on the health of the financial system as a whole, and involve enhanced oversight of those institutions whose size, scope, and complexity can pose issues of systemic risk.

Supervision of multi-faceted financial services firms is of obvious importance in New England given the range of large financial service providers in the region and their importance to our economy. Moreover, the subject is of international concern as well, as evidenced by work done by the G-30 and the Bank for International Settlements.

Nationally, numerous attempts to enact financial modernization legislation and attendant supervisory reform in the last decade have been unsuccessful. However, the recently derailed Financial Services Competition Act of 1997 (H.R. 10) now is likely to receive renewed consideration in the wake of the planned merger of Citicorp and The Travelers Group, which was announced just as this essay was about to go to print. Clearly, the trend of increasing financial services industry consolidation and complexity that is anticipated in the essay is upon us, and the risks presented by this trend need to be assessed.

In addition to the essay, our Annual Report features some of the highlights of 1997 at the Bank, focusing on the challenges and achievements in the areas of our key responsibilities: economic research and monetary policy, supervision and regulation, and financial services. For the first time, the Bank's Report includes discussions by management and our outside auditing firm, Coopers and Lybrand, on the adequacy of the Bank's internal controls. These materials reflect the Bank's 1997 work in implementing the COSO internal control framework—an emerging audit standard and one that is used by other major financial institutions.

Overall, 1997 was an exciting and rewarding year—one that provided us the opportunity to refine our operations and services, improve our understanding of and contribution to economic and regulatory policy making, and reach out to our communities in an environment of growth, economic progress and financial stability. We at the Bank look forward to continuing to work with our directors and advisory councils, and with the community more broadly, to promote financial stability and economic growth amid the changes and challenges that await us in the years ahead.

In closing, I would like to give special thanks to two directors who completed their service as board members in 1997: Jane Walsh and Fred Mancheski. Their expertise and commitment to the Bank throughout their tenures were invaluable. It is only through the selfless contributions of our directors and advisory council members, and the outstanding efforts of our employees, that the Bank can meet its diverse public responsibilities.

*Carol E. Hyndes*



INCREASINGLY, THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN  
TRADITIONALLY SEPARATE FINANCIAL BUSINESSES...  
BANKING, INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES, FOR EXAMPLE...  
ARE BEING ERODED BY NEW PRODUCTS AND BY *DE FACTO*  
AND *DE JURE* CHANGES IN ALLOWABLE ACTIVITIES.



## SYSTEMIC SUPERVISION - *A Necessity of Financial Modernization*

by Cathy E. Minchan\*



The world of financial services has changed rapidly in the past decade. The recent pace of innovation suggests that change could, if anything, accelerate in the coming years. Such an environment poses difficult challenges for financial industry supervisors, especially in addressing threats to the overall stability of the financial system. Financial supervision in the United States has evolved in recent years to keep pace, but the coming, new environment may require an approach to supervision that more explicitly monitors the health of the financial system as a whole.

Aspects of this issue have been widely discussed in the regulatory and the financial services communities, nationally and internationally, as reflected in published works by the Bank for International Settlements and the Group of Thirty. The subject holds obvious importance to New England as well, given the breadth of the region's financial services industry and the importance of that industry to the region's economy.

Society has reaped huge benefits from global competition in providing financial services, spurred by the revolution in information technologies and the related development of sophisticated financial instruments. The advent of instantaneous communications has powerfully impacted financial activity worldwide, resulting in institutions that are globally active to an unprecedented degree.

The power of computers and the breadth of telecommunications networks, along with advances in financial theory, have spawned new products and allowed capital to flow more efficiently to projects and businesses worldwide. Such innovations and efficiencies promote economic growth but, at the same time, introduce levels of complexity and interdependency that present new risks as well.

The nation's largest financial intermediaries are among the institutions most affected by recent developments. Increasingly, the lines between traditionally separate financial businesses—banking, insurance and securities, for example—have become blurred by new products and by de facto or de jure changes in allowable activities. U.S. laws may or may not be changed to eliminate the restrictions imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act and permit full integration of financial services firms in the near future, but integration is taking place nonetheless. As these large firms face intensified competition from new rivals, consolidation within the financial services industry has become the common strategy to develop the scope and means needed to excel worldwide.

This trend shows no likelihood of diminishing—large financial conglomerates are likely to play an even greater role in the world economy as time progresses. Such conglomerates, whether their primary business is commercial banking, investment banking, or insurance, will continue to design new, customized products and deliver them

\*Eric Rosengren, John Campbell, and John Jordan of the Bank's Research Department, and Sharon Lesondak of the Banking Analysis Department provided valuable assistance in the preparation of this essay. The views expressed in the essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.



more efficiently over a wider geographic area. Sophisticated techniques for centralized risk management allow large firms to analyze risks across a spectrum of activities in the organization and allocate resources to the countries and products that provide the highest risk-adjusted returns. As these firms grow in size and scope, they also become more important players in domestic and international payments systems, and in the clearing and settlement of all types of financial transactions.

One inevitable side effect of these developments is a growing web of interconnectedness; problems within this group of financial giants can cause financial contagion that in turn can create gridlock in payment and settlement processes. While contagion risk alone is troublesome, even more critical is the possibility that gridlock will coincide with other problems and affect the viability of financial institutions more generally—a true systemic crisis. Current sophisticated risk management techniques act to control risks at the firm level, as does an increased emphasis by supervisors and market participants on financial transparency and, of course, the traditional lender-of-last-resort capabilities of the central bank can help to stem such crises as well. But, while the likelihood of a systemic crisis may be low, the costs, if realized, would be potentially enormous.

#### THE NATURE OF SYSTEMIC RISK

One way in which large financial institutions are interconnected is through the payments system, the set of mechanisms for daily clearing and settling of transfers


among banks, securities firms, and others. Systems that clear and settle large-value transactions stemming from payment orders and trading of financial instruments and their derivative products are used primarily by the largest financial institutions. In such systems, processing and settlement of payments are often not simultaneous, and the inability of one participant to settle could cause other participants to fail to meet their obligations. Isolated shocks could cascade into multiple problems. Such a cascade could be transmitted from the direct participants of a clearing system to financial institutions that depend on one of the participants to settle payment obligations. Risk controls both at the firm level and within clearing systems aim at reducing the probability of these problems, but this risk probably can never be fully eliminated.

Financial institutions are also interconnected when they invest in similar types of assets, some of which can be difficult for the marketplace to value or monitor. The disclosure of problems at one such institution can have spillover effects on others. For example, if short-term debt holders cannot distinguish between institutions, or even sovereign states, that are viable from those that are not, they may refuse to roll over the debt of institutions with assets similar to those of the troubled firms. If this refusal forces the liquidation of assets at fire-sale prices, initially solvent institutions may experience difficulties. The risk of “runs” is greatest for banks, because their deposit contract involves obligations that can be withdrawn essentially on demand, while at least a portion of their assets may lack a ready market value. But nonbank financial firms are not immune to run-like conditions.



## THE LINES HAVE BLURRED...

### IN LENDING *Credit Created*



### IN UNDERWRITING *Top 15 Underwriters, 1997*

Merrill Lynch  
Salomon Smith Barney  
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter  
Goldman Sachs  
Lehman Brothers  
J.P. Morgan  
CS First Boston  
Bear, Stearns  
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette  
Chase Manhattan  
Paine Webber  
Prudential Securities  
NationsBank  
NatWest Markets  
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell


### IN DERIVATIVES *Top 15 Derivatives Dealers, 1997*

Citicorp  
Goldman Sachs  
J.P. Morgan  
SBC Warburg  
Merrill Lynch  
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter  
Chase Manhattan  
UBS Securities  
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell  
NatWest Markets  
Bankers Trust  
BZW  
CS First Boston  
Bank America  
Lehman Brothers


■ Commercial Bank   ■ Securities Firm   ■ Insurance Company  
■ Subsidiary of Foreign Financial Services Company

## ...AND THE MAJOR PLAYERS HAVE CONSOLIDATED.

*Top 25 U.S. Banks' Share of Total Bank Assets, 1997*



Sources: Flow of Funds Database of the Federal Reserve System; Investment Dealers' Digest; Institutional Investor; FDIC Call Reports.



## EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK

Banks were supervised to varying degrees at the state level prior to the Civil War, but bank notes circulating at a wide range of discounts made interstate commerce difficult. To address the problem, legislation in the 1860s established a uniform national currency and brought the federal government into active supervision of national banks through the establishment of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The OCC, the first of the federal bank supervisors, was granted the responsibility for chartering and supervising national banks.

Despite supervision of banks by states and by the OCC, bank runs and financial panics continued to occur through the early 1900s. These crises were exacerbated by the inability of the banking system to provide for the orderly conversion of deposits to currency. Banks were forced to liquidate assets to meet obligations to depositors when reserves were exhausted. To curtail such disruptions to the financial system, the Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 as the country's central bank, lender-of-last-resort and mechanism for ensuring an elastic currency. The Federal Reserve was granted authority to supervise member banks, to provide a source of liquidity to member banks through its discount window and to establish a nationwide payments system. Bank supervisory authority thereafter was shared at the federal level, with the OCC supervising national banks and the Federal Reserve supervising state-chartered banks that elected to become members of the Federal Reserve System.

The third piece of our current bank supervisory structure was a by-product of the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. That era witnessed an unprecedented wave of bank failures, and as depositors lost savings, public confidence in the banking system collapsed. The underwriting of securities by bank affiliates was viewed as a contributing factor, and as a result the Banking Act of 1933 enforced a separation of banking from securities activities and established federal deposit insurance. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was organized to implement and administer the deposit insurance provisions. The FDIC was also granted authority to examine all insured banks, although in practice FDIC supervision has been confined primarily to state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.

Since the 1930s, commercial banks have been supervised by a combination of state banking supervisors, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC. Banks

Many of the largest securities and life insurance companies finance a portion of their operations with short-term debt; in times of financial turmoil, when some securities may be difficult to liquidate, the announcement of a problem at one such firm could cause lending to similar firms to be curtailed as well.

A related problem occurs when the failure of a major player in a particular asset market depresses the asset's value, causing other firms holding the same asset to suffer. The failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990, for example, caused the junk bond market to become illiquid. Many other markets are similarly structured. Moreover, if a market leader has developed an expertise that customers cannot easily replicate, its failure can sever important relationships, impairing financial and, potentially, economic activity.

The problems of interconnectedness can be multiplied by the simultaneous occurrence of a threat to the viability of financial institutions, such as a widespread "macro" shock to asset prices or a major international issue of sovereign insolvency. Events can proceed as follows: a decline in asset values exacerbates liquidity risk, perhaps leading to insolvency concerns about some financial institutions. A few key institutions falter, exacerbating problems because of their extensive connections with other firms. Because other firms are already weakened by the shock, they may lack the capital base to protect against counterparty problems, and additional failures can occur. In the end, the severity and cost of resolving the original macro problem multiplies and the system itself is in danger.

### FINANCIAL MARKET SUPERVISION

Mitigating systemic concerns is a central challenge for financial policy makers. Increased financial transparency has been encouraged as a way to enable markets to better assess risks, and arguably it has done so. But systemic risk, though rare, may be too unpredictable and widespread for markets to control fully. Indeed, governmental

supervision and regulation of free markets is premised on the need to ensure that broad areas of public interest are protected from harm as individual firms optimize profits. In terms of maintaining financial stability, government supervision and regulation has focused on three main areas:

- maintaining depositor and investor confidence and the safety of insurance funds;
- ensuring broad access to financial services and overall effectiveness and efficiency of markets; and
- preventing systemic contagion.

While all these objectives are important, increasingly the prevention of systemic contagion must take center stage.

The nation's current financial supervisory system evolved over time and in response to a variety of specific industry events. The creation of the Federal Reserve System, for example, was in part the direct result of the bank liquidity shortage brought about by the financial panic of 1907; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was founded on the heels of bank failures during the Great Depression. State financial service regulatory bodies coexist with federal, and, at least in the case of insurance companies, are the primary regulatory bodies. Whether state or federal, financial service regulators tend to focus on those industries and the risks they were established to oversee—for example, investor safety in the security industry is a major concern of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Bank holding company supervision and regulation is somewhat of an exception as it encompasses all the subsidiaries of the holding company, though, as a result of regulation, and as a matter of evolution, such subsidiaries are largely engaged in businesses closely related to banking. Thus, financial supervision and regulation often has a relatively narrow focus, though efforts at the Federal level—specifically through the President's Working Group on Financial Markets—are aimed in part at creating a broader perspective.

gradually regained viability and competed for funds, employing the use of holding company structures to engage in activities not permissible under a bank charter. Because of concerns that holding companies were being used to circumvent geographic and investment restrictions on banks, another layer of supervision was added to the existing framework in 1956: multi-bank holding companies were brought under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve, and in 1970 that authority was expanded to cover all bank holding companies. As supervisor of bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve was charged with ensuring that the nonbanking activities of those companies were closely related to banking and yielded net public benefits. It has been primarily through the holding company vehicle that banks have been permitted by supervisory authority to gain experience with nonbank financial products and services as well as to diversify their banking operations.

The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is the primary regulator of all federal and many state-chartered thrift institutions. The OTS was established as a bureau of the Department of the Treasury on August 9, 1989. Up until 1989, thrift institutions were primarily regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). However, not satisfied with the FHLBB oversight of the industry during the thrift crisis of the 1980s, Congress abolished the FHLBB and established the OTS.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was also established in the 1930s, to supervise the practices of the securities industry. The SEC exercises jurisdiction over the original issuance, distribution, and trading of securities as well as investment companies and advisors, pursuant to federal securities law. The SEC's supervisory framework relies on a combined public-private effort in which significant activities are delegated under federal securities laws to Self-Regulating Organizations (SROs), such as the New York Stock Exchange. SROs are responsible for preventing fraudulent acts, protecting investors, and providing for a free and open market. They also ensure an investment firm's ability to meet its day-to-day obligations given its rapid turnover of financial assets.

Responsibility for insurance supervision still rests primarily with the states, with coordination facilitated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Historically, state insurance commissioners have been independent regulators with legislated responsibility to administer and enforce state insurance laws. State insurance regulation emphasizes consumer protection, with supervisory approval often required for policy terms, rates, and disclosures. Consumer protection is also the principal focus of underwriter solvency oversight.



**BROAD-BASED FINANCIAL INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS, COUPLED WITH THE ADVENT OF INSTANTANEOUS COMMUNICATIONS, HAVE POWERFULLY IMPACTED FINANCIAL ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE, RESULTING IN INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE GLOBALLY ACTIVE TO AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE AND INCREASING THE POTENTIAL FOR MORE RAPID AND WIDESPREAD TRANSMISSION OF SYSTEMIC RISK.**



This fragmented system has the virtue of creating supervisors intimately aware of their particular industries, but it could lack the inherent strength of a system specifically crafted to achieve the goal of containing systemic risk. Moreover, the challenges facing supervisors are now evolving at an accelerated rate. Many of the complex, new financial products virtually defy categorization; they do not fall clearly within the traditional boundaries of commercial banking, investment banking, or insurance. As the financial services industry changes, so must the supervisory structure. It may be time to consider the benefits of a supervisor charged specifically with the objective of monitoring and ultimately limiting systemic risk in the financial system, wherever and in whatever financial industry structure it may arise.

#### THE SYSTEMIC SUPERVISOR: TWO MODELS

Any definition of the role of a systemic supervisor, and the specific institutions that it would oversee, would be the subject of considerable debate in legislative and other circles. However, as a first premise a systemic supervisor should be responsible primarily for those firms posing the greatest risks to the stability of the financial system—firms of significant size and impact relative to domestic and global markets; those extensively involved with the payments system and in the clearing of financial transactions more generally; and those that could create financial contagion in this country and abroad. Again, as a general premise, this definition would likely include the largest banks and securities firms, as well as financial conglomerates that control significant banking

organizations. It probably would not include finance companies, and many insurance and securities firms and banks in the United States whose activities are of such a scale, scope and complexity not to present undue systemic threat. And it certainly would not include non-financial companies which are fully outside of the public safety net.

The systemic supervisor would focus on limiting the risk of cascading transactional liquidity, and credit problems. Its emphasis would be on counterparty relationships, netting arrangements, concentration of assets and capital adequacy, relationships within the payments system and securities clearing systems, coordination with foreign supervisors, and the organization's consolidated risk management infrastructure. In addition, because of the complexity of the organizations supervised, enhanced financial disclosure would be essential, so that market evaluations and discipline could continue to complement supervisory evaluations.

A systemic supervisory approach might be implemented in a number of ways—all of which present some obstacles—but two models are worthy of discussion for illustrative purposes. Under one regime, a *systemic supervisor* would be solely responsible for the prudential supervision—the financial oversight, oriented towards safety and soundness—of all aspects of those firms that are potential conduits of a systemic crisis. Under this model, the systemic supervisor would oversee both functional business lines and the conglomerate's activities as a whole, and would be responsible for all prudential supervision of the firm, taking account of



the effect that risk-taking in any segment of the firm could have on the organization as a whole. Traditional functional supervisors would have little role in the prudential supervision of these large financial institutions, but would retain all other supervisory responsibilities, such as consumer and antitrust compliance, for the firm and its subsidiaries. Obviously this model would be a major change in the current regulatory regime, and while theoretically strong and arguably efficient, it may be less practical than other models, as is discussed more fully below.

The second choice is a *systemic coordinator*. Under this regime, the systemic supervisor would have ultimate responsibility for the prudential supervision of all firms that are potential conduits of a systemic crisis, but the actual monitoring and supervision would be a collaborative effort between the systemic supervisor and current functional supervisors. For firms whose activities cross business lines, the systemic supervisor, in addition to its focus on limiting systemic risk, would collect and disseminate information among the functional supervisors, and would evaluate capital levels, and examine internal controls, risk management, and managerial activities at the conglomerate level. This approach would represent less of a change from current practice, and is not radically dissimilar to other proposals, but it does require the systemic coordinator to assume responsibility for curbing risk without full control over the supervisory process.

In both approaches, supervision would not change for firms that do not cross functional lines and whose failure is deemed not to threaten the stability of the financial system. For intermediaries whose businesses cross functional lines, but do not pose the same degree of systemic risk, one of the functional supervisors could assume the role of coordinator and take responsibility for collecting and disseminating information. This supervisor

would also be responsible for examining the internal controls, risk management, and managerial activities at the conglomerate level.

Both approaches to systemic supervision could appear to increase the risk of moral hazard. Generally speaking, moral hazard occurs when people, institutions and even countries are shielded somehow from the full consequences of their actions, and, as a result, engage in more risk-taking than would be optimal otherwise. It has been argued, for example, that automobile seat belts present moral hazard; they could cause accidents since their use could encourage drivers to believe they can go faster more safely.

In the special case of financial institutions, aspects of moral hazard are often referred to by the phrase "too big to fail." It is thought that institutions so regarded have an incentive to engage in excessively risky activities, or, at a minimum, have a competitive advantage by virtue of their presumed protection from failure. In reality, moral hazard is mitigated by the fact that under current supervisory approaches, managers and shareholders of institutions that fail lose their jobs and investments, respectively, and uninsured creditors face some risk. However, some moral hazard exists, since many institutions are perceived as so critical to markets that they could not be allowed to fail abruptly. However, there is a sense of ambiguity currently about which institutions at any point in time might be so regarded. A systemic supervisor, in either model, would undermine this ambiguity, a fact which would sharpen the dilemma for policy makers.



IT MAY WELL BE TIME TO CONSIDER THE BENEFITS  
OF A SUPERVISOR CHARGED SPECIFICALLY WITH LIMITING  
RISK IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN WHATEVER FINANCIAL  
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE IT MAY ARISE.





On the one hand, clearly identifying institutions subject to systemic supervision could, at a minimum, give those institutions a cachet that in and of itself could heighten risk taking. On the other hand, enhanced supervisory information for the systemic supervisor could lessen the probability of a systemic crisis, and speed response when one occurs. Arguably, enhanced information and speed become even more vital as the financial services industry grows increasingly more complex and global. The trade-off with ambiguity is difficult, but it may be well worth considering.

Finally, systemic supervision under either approach could complicate the difficult issue of how much and under what circumstances supervisory information is shared internationally, simply by making the repository of relevant data and that repository's information-sharing role more explicit. Currently, international information-sharing is handled on a case-by-case basis, under general BIS agreements and various bi-lateral understandings, and reflects a delicate balance between the need to respond quickly to problems and the legitimate information needs of the appropriate bodies in other countries. Systemic supervision could complicate this process and create expectations as to information flows that could be counterproductive. Even without a change in supervisory regime, however, increasing globalization may require increased transparency.

#### **SYSTEMIC SUPERVISION: THE REASONABLE MODEL**

Implementing systemic supervision under either of the alternatives presents considerable risks and challenges, and, as a result, could generate significant controversy and debate. However, the more far reaching of the alternatives—a single systemic supervisor

model—is the more radical, largely as a result of at least three key issues.

First, the task of a systemic supervisor may be quite complex. It may not be feasible for a single supervisory body to assess the risk implications of a broad range of constantly evolving financial services conducted in the same large organization. However, a systemic coordinator working with functional regulators may be able to more effectively address the complexity involved, though issues related to how to coordinate organization-wide capital requirements and risk controls; information-sharing; the level of regulatory overlap; and the limits of regulatory responsibility without full control will doubtless prove difficult.

Second, it may not be possible to arrive at precise definitions of what constitutes systemic risk, or the specific institutions that would be overseen by the systemic supervisor, without some legislative involvement. The development and passage of such legislation would be difficult at best. Lodging authority in a single systemic supervisor likely exacerbates this problem, as major financial institutions might be faced with a move from one known supervisory body or bodies to the new supervisor. Systemic coordination may well ease this transition.

Finally, the single systemic supervisor alternative may confer too much power on a single supervisory body. Under this alternative, other banking and industry supervisors would remain, and would oversee the activities of less systemically sensitive organizations. However, the systemic supervisor's relationship with the largest, most globally active financial services firms could make it a "first among equals" to a perhaps unparalleled degree in recent U.S. regulatory history. The systemic coordinator approach, however,





shares supervisory power more broadly, though it could involve a second level of arguably burdensome supervisory authority for those organizations currently not managed as bank holding companies.

#### **SYSTEMIC SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY**

There is no question that implementing systemic supervision, while ultimately necessary, will not be easy to do or without complications and challenge. One of these involves deciding on the appropriate systemic supervisory body. There are several possibilities. Various agencies of the U.S. government have an obvious interest in financial stability and a key role to play particularly if taxpayer funds are involved. Several countries, including the United Kingdom, are looking to an independent supervisory body to oversee all financial institutions. However, even in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is expected to retain responsibility for financial stability. In other countries, and in the United States, there are good reasons for the central bank to play a substantial role as well.

As the central bank of the United States, the Federal Reserve has an independence from political influence that is helpful in making difficult supervisory and regulatory calls. Protecting financial stability is the inherent responsibility of all central banks and that is one reason why they have broad lender-of-last-resort powers. Clearly these functions are the first line of defense against systemic contagion. The Federal Reserve also has the key task of ensuring the country has a reliable and efficient national payments system. This provides a unique insight into those mechanisms that are often involved in the transmission of systemic risk, and allows policy and operational responses aimed at

risk reduction. Finally, the Federal Reserve has a long and respected tradition of working with other central banks and in shaping international perspectives on supervisory and payments matters.

To be sure, academicians and others have argued that central banks could be diverted from their core purpose of promoting price stability if they were also responsible for financial supervision and regulation. As noted above, some countries have ceded broad financial industry supervision and regulation to an independent body, with various links, and sometimes none, to the central bank. It is also true that central bank supervision of banks has had its failures as well as its successes worldwide. However, in this country, the Federal Reserve's record of supervisory oversight, its demonstrated ability in the last fifteen years or so to balance the task of controlling inflation with its supervisory responsibility, and its important focus on financial stability strongly suggest that it play a role in systemic supervision, however it might be implemented.

#### **AN EMERGING DESIGN FOR STABILITY**

Competition and innovation flourish best within the context of a safe, sound financial system. The need for systemic supervision is becoming more widely recognized as global financial intermediaries increase their penetration in many countries. While these institutions provide financial services in a more efficient and cost-effective manner, they also increase the speed and severity of the transmission of financial and real shocks. The potential for heightened systemic risk calls for a supervisor that crosses traditional institutional lines, and whose primary focus is the stability of the financial system as a whole. This is an area in which the Federal Reserve can and should play an important role.

# Making a Difference...



A 1997 Celebration of Excellence project team.



Federal Reserve Society officers and executive committee.



President Minchan, First Vice President Connolly and the Bank's 1997 United Way Coordinator, Antonio Mendieta, at a United Way fundraising event.

Some of the staff who ran in the 1997 United Way Road Race.



# in Our Bank and Community

*First Vice President Connolly  
with staff graduates of New England  
College of Finance.*



*First Vice President Connolly  
with 1997 Bank interns.*



*Teacher and Students from Gorham, New Hampshire,  
New England finalists at the annual Fed Challenge in  
Washington, D.C., with Bank staffers.*

*The 1997-1998 visiting Hubert H.  
Humphrey Fellowship Scholars.*



# 1997 Bank Highlights

The major activities and undertakings of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston relate to the role of the Federal Reserve System in the areas of monetary policy, supervision and regulation, and financial services. These activities and undertakings reflect the Bank's strong commitment to the public purpose of the Federal Reserve System.

## ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND MONETARY POLICY

The extraordinary performance of the economy over the last several years has challenged some of the traditional models and tools used in economic forecasting, spurring innovative research at the Bank in the area of monetary policy. Several articles on inflation and unemployment, and the dynamic tension between the two, were published by our Research Department in 1997. Other major economic research activities undertaken this year focused on assessing the implications of changing financial markets. One study looked at the ability of mutual funds and the banks that service these funds to respond to a decline in the stock market. Another study, which is part of an ongoing effort to explore the implications of the globalization of financial markets, assessed cutbacks in Japanese lending in the United States and appeared as an article in the *American Economic Review*.

The Bank also sponsored two significant conferences on key economic issues of our times. Our well-known annual spring economic conference addressed Social Security reform and the choices facing policy-makers. A fall conference focused on the devolution movement—its normative underpinnings, its extent to date, its likely duration, and the capacity of states to undertake devolved responsibility. The proceedings of both of these conferences are published. A somewhat related effort in 1997 was our work with the University of Massachusetts in launching *Massachusetts Benchmarks*, a quarterly publication providing timely and unbiased assessments of the Massachusetts economy. The Bank also continued to publish the *New England Economic Review* and the *Regional Review*, which have a combined circulation of twenty-four thousand.

## SUPERVISION AND REGULATION

Supervision and regulation of banking organizations, which is the focus of this annual report, is another major responsibility of the Federal Reserve System. In 1997, in addition to considering a model for a future supervisory framework, the Bank's Supervision and Regulation Group shared its expertise on risk, capital markets, fiduciaries, and the mutual fund and insurance industries with other supervisory personnel, both throughout the Federal Reserve System and at other bank regulatory agencies.

In continuing to refine risk-focused supervision techniques, we realized benefits in several areas. Some of these arose from participation in interdistrict and cross-disciplinary efforts that served to both enhance and export our skills. We also found that reorganizing our function and reallocating our resources on the basis of perceived risk has provided the flexibility to take on special projects within the Bank and to continue to lead System initiatives. The latter includes chairing and expanding the activities of the System's Committee on Nonbank Financial Institutions, which is taking on added importance as barriers between banking organizations and other financial service providers continue to erode. We were also pleased to be able to promote the evolution of the System's supervisory approach to fiduciary businesses by chairing the first interdistrict fiduciary task force as well as the System's Course Committee on Trust Examiner Training, sponsoring the first Senior Forum for fiduciary specialists, and developing examination procedures for fiduciary activities of large, complex companies. A special project on mutual fund activities, undertaken in conjunction with the Bank's Research Department and support from another Reserve Bank, was an example of an effort that achieved excellent results through both interdistrict and cross-disciplinary participation.



## FINANCIAL SERVICES

In our provision of financial services to New England depository institutions, and in our national leadership role for the Federal Reserve's retail payments activities, we implemented numerous improvements during 1997 and laid the foundation for even more effective and efficient services in the future.

We improved our own check operations as well as the national check collection system by consolidating the processing of Maine checks into our Boston office, with new products to ensure continued high-quality service for depository institutions in Maine. Meanwhile, use of our electronic check presentment services grew by 50 percent.

Both locally and nationally we fostered greater use of electronic Automated Clearing House (ACH) payments. Our collaborative efforts with the New England ACH Association helped to encourage several regional utilities to offer this electronic payment option to their customers. In our national retail payments work we reduced Federal Reserve ACH fees twice during the year and introduced pricing incentives to increase ACH volume. We also launched a market research program to look at the ACH from the perspectives of consumers and businesses and identify key product improvements.

For large-value payments on the Fedwire funds transfer system, we completed the District-wide implementation of new formats which facilitate the automated flow of payment information between Fedwire and other payment networks. In addition, we expanded the daily Fedwire operating schedule from 12 to 18 hours.

Our Bank contributed extensively to the work of a special committee of the Board of Governors, led by Vice Chair Alice Rivlin, which considered the future role of the Federal Reserve in the national retail payments system. After listening to hundreds of stakeholders in over 60 national and regional forums, the committee concluded that the Federal Reserve should continue to provide check and ACH services, and should be more active in working collaboratively to improve these services and plan for new payment instruments. In 1998 we are assuming broader responsibilities in Boston to lead the Federal Reserve's financial services activities, and we expect to be very active in carrying out the committee's recommendations.

Our financial services and information technology staff played a central role in preparing the Bank's systems for Century Date Change and planning for extensive testing during 1998 and 1999 with the depository institutions of New England. Financial services, accounting and control, and other key areas also implemented a COSO-based framework of controls for the Bank's financial reports. The firm of Coopers and Lybrand reviewed and tested those controls and attested to their adequacy. Management's assertion letter and Coopers and Lybrand's attestation appear on the following pages.

## PUBLIC AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

The Bank is a strong advocate of fair lending, community economic development, and both economic and workforce-readiness education. A key fair lending/community initiative in 1997 was our Residential Mortgage Project, which for the first time brought together the various players in the home buying and mortgage process—real estate brokers, mortgage brokers, appraisers, home inspectors, lenders, etc.—in a collaborative effort to facilitate the home purchase process for low and moderate income buyers in the Boston area. This project will be extended to other New England communities in 1998 and the years to come. In addition to the mortgage program, we held conferences on access to credit for women entrepreneurs, automobile leasing, and consumer fraud in 1997.

Our relatively new "Fed Challenge" economic education program, in which teams of students from high schools in New England compete against each other in a mock monetary policy scenario, was expanded from four to fifteen high schools in 1997. The regional winner went on to compete against the finalists from other Reserve Banks at the national level.

In 1997, we also continued our long-standing partnerships with local schools and organizations in a wide array of school-to-work and literacy programs.

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ALSO PICTURED:

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Paul M. Connolly, *First Vice President*



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ADVISORY COUNCIL



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Urban League of Eastern  
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Cabot Creamery

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Cooper Instrument Corporation

James Brett  
*(Advisor)*  
President  
The New England Council

*Also Pictured:*  
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Paul M. Connolly  
First Vice President

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Vice President and Director  
Vermont National Bank

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Officer and Director  
Nutmeg Federal Savings  
and Loan Association

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Associate Professor of  
Economics, University of  
Massachusetts/Boston

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Development Corporation

Michael Finnegan  
Vice President and Community  
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Claire Monier  
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Finance Agency

Ronald L. Phillips  
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Coastal Enterprises, Inc.

Gustave Seelig  
Executive Director  
Vermont Housing and  
Conservation Fund

Gail Snowden  
President  
First Community Bank  
at BankBoston

Ken Wade  
District Director for  
New England Neighborhood  
Reinvestment Corporation

*Also Pictured:*  
Cathy E. Minehan  
President



COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
ADVISORY COUNCIL





## TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The management of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (FRBB) is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the Statement of Financial Condition, Statement of Income, and Statement of Changes in Capital as of December 31, 1997 (the "Financial Statements"). The Financial Statements have been prepared in conformity with the accounting principles, policies, and practices established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and as set forth in the Financial Accounting Manual for the Federal Reserve Banks, and as such, include amounts, some of which are based on judgments and estimates of management.

The management of the FRBB is responsible for maintaining an effective process of internal controls over financial reporting including the safeguarding of assets as they relate to the Financial Statements. Such internal controls are designed to provide reasonable assurance to management and to the Board of Directors regarding the preparation of reliable Financial Statements. This process of internal controls contains self-monitoring mechanisms, including, but not limited to, divisions of responsibility and a code of conduct. Once identified, any material deficiencies in the process of internal controls are reported to management, and appropriate corrective measures are implemented.

Even an effective process of internal controls, no matter how well designed, has inherent limitations, including the possibility of human error, and therefore can provide only reasonable assurance with respect to the preparation of reliable financial statements.

The management of the FRBB assessed its process of internal controls over financial reporting including the safeguarding of assets reflected in the financial statements, based upon the criteria established in the "Internal Control—Integrated Framework" issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Based on this assessment, the management of the FRBB believes that the FRBB maintained an effective process of internal controls over financial reporting including the safeguarding of assets as they relate to the Financial Statements.

Cathy E. Minehan, President

Paul M. Connolly, First Vice President



**TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON:**

We have examined management's assertion that the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (the "Reserve Bank") maintained an effective internal control structure over financial reporting and over the safeguarding of assets as they relate to the Financial Statements as of December 31, 1997, included in the accompanying Management's Assertion.

Our examination was made in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included obtaining an understanding of the internal control structure over financial reporting, testing, and evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of the internal control structure, and such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

Because of inherent limitations in any internal control structure, errors or irregularities may occur and not be detected. Also, projections of any evaluation of the internal control structure over financial reporting to future periods are subject to the risk that the internal control structure may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Reserve Bank maintained an effective internal control structure over financial reporting and over the safeguarding of assets as they relate to the Financial Statements as of December 31, 1997, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based upon the criteria established in "Internal Control—Integrated Framework" issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).

*Copers & Lybrand L.L.P.*

March 21, 1998

Boston, Massachusetts



# Statement of Condition

<i>in millions</i>	December 31, 1997	December 31, 1996
<b>ASSETS</b>		
Gold certificates	\$ 624	\$ 661
Special drawing rights certificates	530	636
Coin	23	13
Items in process of collection	441	706
Loans to depository institutions	21	0
U.S. government and federal agency securities, net	26,458	23,198
Investments denominated in foreign currencies	637	830
Accrued interest receivable	250	209
Prepaid statutory surplus transfer to the U.S. Treasury	20	0
Interdistrict settlement account	0	1,024
Bank premises and equipment, net	123	122
Other assets	20	21
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>\$ 29,147</b>	<b>\$ 27,420</b>
<b>LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL</b>		
<b>Liabilities:</b>		
Federal Reserve notes outstanding, net	\$ 22,984	\$ 25,417
<b>Deposits:</b>		
Depository institutions	1,544	1,048
Other deposits	7	7
Deferred credit items	412	511
Statutory surplus transfer due U.S. Treasury	0	37
Interdistrict settlement account	3,621	0
Accrued benefit cost	50	47
Other liabilities	13	13
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>\$ 28,631</b>	<b>\$ 27,080</b>
<b>Capital:</b>		
Capital paid-in	262	172
Surplus	254	168
<b>Total capital</b>	<b>516</b>	<b>340</b>
<b>Total liabilities and capital</b>	<b>\$ 29,147</b>	<b>\$ 27,420</b>

These statements of income, condition, and changes in bank capital are prepared by Bank management. Copies of audited financial statements, complete with footnotes, are available by contacting the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's Public & Community Affairs Department, P.O. Box 2076, Boston, MA 02106-2076. Telephone 617.973.3459.



# Statement of Income

<i>in millions</i>	December 31, 1997	December 31, 1996
<b>INTEREST INCOME:</b>		
Interest on U.S. government securities	\$ 1,519	\$ 1,328
Interest on foreign currencies	14	19
Interest on loans to depository institutions	1	1
Total interest income	1,534	1,348
<b>OTHER OPERATING INCOME (LOSS):</b>		
Income from services	68	68
Reimbursable services to government agencies	8	9
Foreign currency (losses), net	(97)	(72)
Government securities gains, net	1	2
Other income	9	9
Total other operating income (loss)	(11)	16
<b>OPERATING EXPENSES:</b>		
Salaries and other benefits	75	73
Occupancy expense	12	12
Equipment expense	10	9
Cost of unreimbursed Treasury services	1	2
Assessments by Board of Governors	28	33
Other expenses	72	69
Total operating expenses	198	198
Net income prior to distribution	\$ 1,325	\$ 1,166
<b>DISTRIBUTION OF NET INCOME:</b>		
Dividends paid to member banks	\$ 12	\$ 10
Transferred to surplus	90	1
Payments to U.S. Treasury as interest on Federal Reserve notes	0	827
Payments to U.S. Treasury as required by statute	1,223	328
Total distribution	\$ 1,325	\$ 1,166

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# Statement of Changes in Capital

For the years ended December 31, 1997<sup>oo</sup> and December 31, 1996

<i>in millions</i>	Capital Paid-in	Surplus	Total Capital
Balance at January 1, 1996 <i>(5.4 million shares)</i>	\$ 171	\$ 171	\$ 342
Net income transferred to surplus		1	1
Statutory surplus transfer to the U.S. Treasury		(4)	(4)
Net change in capital stock issued <i>(26 thousand shares)</i>	\$ 1		\$ 1
Balance at December 31, 1996 <i>(5.4 million shares)</i>	\$ 172	\$ 168	\$ 340
Net income transferred to surplus		90	90
Statutory surplus transfer to the U.S. Treasury		(4)	(4)
Net change in capital stock issued <i>(1.8 million shares)</i>	\$ 90		\$ 90
Balance at December 31, 1997 <i>(5.2 million shares)</i>	\$ 262	\$ 254	\$ 516

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<sup>oo</sup> During 1997 the value of Bank capital increased because of the effect of bank mergers.



# Summary of Operations

	CALENDAR YEAR 1997		CALENDAR YEAR 1996	
	Daily Average Volume	Daily \$ Value of Transactions	Daily Average Volume	Daily \$ Value of Transactions
<b>Services to Depository Institutions</b>				
<b>Funds Transfer</b>	43,062 transfers	\$130.2 billion	39,122 transfers	\$106.3 billion
<b>Automated Clearing House<sup>o</sup></b>				
Commercial ACH Items Originated	582,486 items	\$1.2 billion	N/A	N/A
Government ACH Items Originated	1,470 items	\$5 million	N/A	N/A
<b>Check Processing (Commercial)</b>				
Total Volume	4.0 million checks	\$3.1 billion	4.2 million checks	\$2.9 billion
Processed Volume	3.5 million checks	\$2.7 billion	3.4 million checks	\$2.5 billion
Fine Sort Volume	0.5 million checks	\$0.3 billion	0.7 million checks	\$0.3 billion
Processed Returns	44,104 items	\$0.04 billion	44,778 items	\$0.04 billion
Government Volume	43,275 items	\$0.04 billion	85,984 items	\$0.08 billion
Adjustments Processed	1,019 items		933 items	
<b>Cash Operations</b>				
Cash Shipped	6.9 million notes	\$96.2 million	6.9 million notes	\$93.9 million
Cash Received	6.5 million notes	\$90.0 million	6.4 million notes	\$85.4 million
<b>Services to the U.S. Treasury</b>				
Electronic Book Entry Securities	8,465 Transfers	\$111.3 billion	7,593 Transfers	\$99.8 billion

<sup>o</sup> As a result of Boston's conversion to centralized ACH processing in April 1996, comparable 1996 data are not available.



**Our Mission** As part of the nation's central bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston promotes sound growth and financial stability in New England and the nation. The Bank contributes to local communities, the region, and the nation through its high-quality research, regulatory oversight, and financial services, and through its commitment to leadership and to innovation.

Integrity, Serving the Public, **Our Values**  
Respect, Leadership, Excellence, Continuous Improvement



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