

Comments on Bob Hall
“Why Has the Unemployment Rate
Fared Better than GDP Growth?”

John Fernald

October 14, 2016


My thanks to FRBSF colleagues for helpful conversations in recent years about the issues in this discussion. But the views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System

Unemployment rate is where it was in 2007 ...but output growth has disappointed

Business-sector output growth

Average annualized growth rate

Percent



Source: Fernald (2014a), BEA, BLS. Quarterly; samples end in Q4 of years shown except 1973 (end Q1) and 2016 (ends Q2). Output averages income and expend.

Paper


- Uses Okun's Law to control for the cycle
- Growth-accounting for non-cyclical output shortfall:
 - Labor (LFPR, working-age population)
 - TFP
 - Capital

My take: Slow growth from demographics and productivity— not Great-Recession

Business-sector output growth

Average annualized growth rate

Percent



- Okun’s Law was normal (with low potential)
- Demographics and productivity are slow
- Best guess: slow growth the new reality


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
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Okun's Law consistent with low potential

Hall, p.2: “U.S. Experience since the crisis is a major deviation from [Okun’s] Law”


Unemployment and Output

1949Q1-2016Q3



(From Daly, Fernald, Jorda, and Nechio, 2013)

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
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Okun like previous recessions...but with low potential growth

Unemployment and Output

1949Q1-2016Q3

Output
(4-quarter percent
change)




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
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
Output
(4-quarter percent
change)



Unemployment and Total Hours

1949Q1-2016Q3

Hours
(4-quarter percent
change)




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
Output
(4-quarter percent
change)



Unemployment and Total Hours

1949Q1-2016Q3

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
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Okun "loops" come from TFP

Unemployment and TFP

1941Q1-2016Q2

TFP
(4-quarter percent change)




Okun "loops" come from TFP

Unemployment and TFP


1941Q1-2016Q2

TFP
(4-quarter percent change)




Why has potential growth been so slow since 2007?

Has cyclical become structural? Maybe for hours...




1975 1985 1995
Source: BLS




1975 1985 1995 2

Has cyclical become structural? Maybe for hours...




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


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


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Has cyclical become structural? Maybe for hours...

- Oulton and Sebastia-Barriel (2013)
 - For *advanced* economies, financial crises do not permanently affect level of TFP or labor productivity
 - Employment per capita is permanently lower
- Huang, Luo, and Startz (2015)
 - TFP level recovers rapidly after all U.S. recessions
 - Hours worked no longer recovers (L-shaped)
- But U.S. employment growth would have slowed anyway
 - Krueger (2016), Gagnon, Johannsen, and Lopez-Salido (2016)


Slowing labor-force growth not (just) the Great Recession



TFP has been consistent (and slow)

Contributions to growth in U.S. output per hour

Business sector, percent change, annual rate




Source: Fernald (2014a). Quarterly; samples end in Q4 of years shown except 1973 (end Q1) and 2016 (end Q2). Capital deepening is contribution of capital relative to quality-adjusted hours. Total factor productivity measured as a residual.

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
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Capital: Unwinding of dynamics of Great Recession



Low growth is the new normal

Demographics: Low growth the new normal

- Demographics: Slow hours growth
 - Gagnon et al (2016): 1-1/4 percent slowdown since 1980
- If GDP per hour like 1973-95: GDP growth around $1\frac{3}{4}$ %
- Likely optimistic: Plateau in educational attainment means less growth in labor quality (Goldin-Katz, 2009; Jorgenson)
 - Bosler, Daly, Fernald, Hobijn (2016): Around $\frac{1}{4}$ pp less growth from that source, implying GDP growth around $1\frac{1}{2}$ %

Takeaway: Was the Great Recovery really 'Elusive'?

- Paper finds that growth in recovery exceeded (slow) potential
- Since 2007, TFP growth at its “typical” pace of past 40 years, plus demographics, can explain disappointing GDP growth
- May have to accept the new reality

