INCOME INEQUALITY, FINANCIAL CRISSES AND MONETARY POLICY

Isabel Cairó\textsuperscript{1} \quad Jae Sim\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1,2}The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

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The views herein do not reflect those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Income Inequality and Aggregate Demand

- Heterogeneity of Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC):
  - The most affluent with the least MPC (Jappelli and Pistaferri [2014])
  - Income inequality leads to insufficient aggregate demand (Summers [2015], Auclert and Rognile [2016]).

  “...society was so framed as to throw a great part of the increased income into the control of the class least likely to consume it...And so the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly contemplated... – the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, either by you nor by your children after you.” – Keynes [1919]
Income Inequality and Deflation Pressure

- According to NKs, the current inflation rate is the expected present value of unit labor cost, aka, labor income share.
- Labor has declined for more than four decades.
  - Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin [2013], Karabarbounis and Neiman [2014]; Koh, Santauelalia and Zheng [2016].
  - Real wage fails to keep up with productivity growth.
- Solow [2015] points out the declining bargaining power of the U.S. workers as the origin.
- If the trend continues, it is challenging to achieve the inflation target.
Unused income of the most affluent group should be stored somewhere.

Recent research finds a strong link between excessive credit growth and the likelihood of financial crises.

- Drehmann, Borio, Gambacorta, Jimenez and Trucharte [2010],
  Adrian, Covitz, and Liang [2015], Jorda, Schularick and Taylor [2012],
  Schularick and Taylor [2012]

Some argue for “leaning against the wind” monetary policy.

If income inequality is behind the financial instability, would you go after income inequality as well?
Income Inequality and Credit Growth

Top 1% Income share and Household Credit-to-GDP ratio.
Construct a general equilibrium model in which

- Inequality results in insufficient aggregate demand and deflation pressure
- By allocating a greater share of income to a group with the least MPC, and if excessive, can lead to an endogenous financial crisis.

Financial crisis à la Kumhof, Rancière and Winant [2016]

- Endogenize the production and income distribution.
- Introduce nominal rigidity, crucial in breaking the Say’s Law.

Study the implication for monetary policy.

- The stabilization function during crises paralyzed by the ZLB.
- Nonlinearity due to crises and the ZLB result in left-skewed distribution for equilibrium prices and quantities
- Making symmetric monetary policy rules inefficient.
Bird’s-Eye View of the Model
Household Block

- A GE with 2 types of agents with segmented asset markets

- Top 5% income earners (capitalists):
  - Own production firms and accumulate physical capital.
  - Accumulate private and government bonds
  - Weberian “spirit of capitalism” preferences, direct utility from financial wealth, lowering MPC

- Bottom 95% income earners (workers):
  - Can be employed or unemployed (searching for a job)
  - Do not develop preferences over financial wealth
  - Smooth consumption only by borrowing from private bond market
Bird’s-Eye View of the Model
New Keynesian Block

- A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing differentiated final goods using capital and labor
- Staggered pricing à la Calvo with partial indexation
- Monetary policy: an inertial Taylor rule subject to the ZLB
- Labor markets are subject to search and matching frictions
  - Bargaining power is an important driver of income inequality
- Three aggregate shocks:
  - Technology shock
  - Risk-premium shock
  - Bargaining power shock
The Capitalists

▶ “Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs.” – Weber

\[ U_T^t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\beta^T)^t \left[ \frac{(c_T^T - s c_{t-1}^T)^{1-1/\sigma_c} - 1}{1 - 1/\sigma_c} \right. \\
\left. + \psi^B \frac{[1 + b_t (1 - \chi) / \chi]^{1-1/\sigma_b} - 1}{1 - 1/\sigma_b} + \psi_G (1 + b_t^G)^{1-1/\sigma_g} - 1 \right] \]

▶ Demand for private and government bonds:

\[ q_t^B = \beta^T \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}^T}{\Lambda_t^T} (1 - h \delta_{t+1}^B) \frac{1}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] + \psi^B \left[ 1 + b_t \left( \frac{1 - \chi}{\chi} \right) \right]^{-1/\sigma_b} \]

\[ \frac{1}{1 + i_t} = \beta^T \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}^T}{\Lambda_t^T} \frac{\lambda_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] + \psi^G \frac{(1 + b_t^G)^{-1/\sigma_g}}{\Lambda_t^T} (1 + b_t^G)^{-1/\sigma_g} \]
The Workers

“Workers spend what they get, and capitalists get what they spend” – Kalecki

\[ U_t^B = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\beta^B)^t \frac{(c^B - s c_{t-1}^B)^{1-1/\sigma_c} - 1}{1 - 1/\sigma_c} \]

Per capita budget constraint:

\[ c_t^B = q_t^B b_t - (1 - h \delta_t^B) \frac{b_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + \frac{1}{1 - \chi} \left[ w_t n_t + (1 - \chi - n_t) b^u - \nu_t y_t \right] \]

where default cost follows \( \nu_t = \rho \nu_{t-1} + \gamma \nu \delta_t^B \)

Supply of private bond:

\[ q_t^B = \beta^B \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}^B}{\Lambda_t^B} (1 - h \delta_{t+1}^B) \frac{1}{\pi_{t+1}} \right] \]
Mechanism of Financial Crises

To default or not to default

- Non-pecuniary cost of default: $\tau_t$, following a logistic dist $\Xi(\cdot)$
- Crisis happens when:

$$
\delta^B_t = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \tau_t \leq U^D_t - U^N_t \\
0 & \text{if } \tau_t > U^D_t - U^N_t
\end{cases}
$$

- Probability of crisis:

$$
p^\delta_{t+1} \equiv \text{prob}(\delta^B_{t+1} = 1) = \Xi(U^P_{t+1} - U^N_{t+1}).
$$

- A crisis is a stochastic event, however, $p^\delta_{t+1}$ endogenous.
Monetary Policy: Dealing with the ZLB

- Monetary policy rule:

\[ i_t = \max \left\{ 0, \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i) \left[ i^* + \rho_\pi \left( \frac{\pi^Y_t - \pi^*_t}{4} \right) \right] \right\} \]

- Not only \( i_t \geq 0 \), but also \( \mathbb{E}_t [i_{t+j}] \geq 0 \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \)
- For a sufficiently large \( n \), \( \mathbb{E}_t [i_{t+n+1}] \geq 0 \) non-binding

- Use a mix of current (\( \epsilon_{m,t} \)) and news shocks (\( \{\epsilon_{N,j,t}\}_{j=1}^n \)):

\[ i_t = \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i) \left[ i^* + \rho_\pi \left( \frac{\pi^Y_t - \pi^*_t}{4} \right) \right] + \sigma_m \sum_{j=1}^{n} \epsilon_{N,j,t-j} + \sigma_m \epsilon_{m,t} \]
Calibration

- The model is calibrated to hit
  - DTI of bottom 95 income earners = 1.5
  - Income share of top 5 percent income earners = 0.38
  - Labor income share = 57 percent
  - Mean probability of financial crisis 1.3 percent quarterly
  - Default related parameters close to KRW except quarterly adjustment
  - Steady state unemployment rate = 5.9 percent
  - Price stickiness to hit 1 percent standard deviation in inflation rate
  - Real wage rigidity to match volatility of wages in the data
  - $b^G$ is set to hit 2 percent real interest rate in the long run.

- Shocks
  - Technology shock $\rho_z = 0.9$
  - Risk premium shock $\rho_\lambda = 0.9$
  - Bargaining power shock $\rho_\eta = 0.95$
  - $\sigma_z = 0.01$ and set $\sigma_\lambda$ and $\sigma_\eta$ to hit 1/3-1/3-1/3 var decomp share of output
Illustrating The Mechanism
Link b/w Income Inequality and Aggregate Demand

(a) MPC in general equilibrium
- Bottom 95 percent
- Top 5 percent

(b) Aggregate impact of income transfer, pct
- Output
- Investment
- Inflation rate, ann.
Model Dynamics Under Stress
Crisis and ZLB

No crisis, no zlb
Model Dynamics Under Stress
Crisis and ZLB

(a) Output, pct
(b) Cons. B95, pct
(c) Cons. T5, pct
(d) Investment, pct

(e) Income inequality, ppt
(f) DTI ratio (B95), ppt
(g) Asset prices, pct
(h) Real wage, pct

(i) Inflation, ann. ppt
(j) Unemployment, ppt
(k) Nominal rate, ann. pct
(l) Real rate, ann. ppt

No crisis, no zlb
Crisis, no zlb
Model Dynamics Under Stress

Crisis and ZLB

(a) Output, pct
(b) Cons. B95, pct
(c) Cons. T5, pct
(d) Investment, pct
(e) Income inequality, ppt
(f) DTI ratio (B95), ppt
(g) Asset prices, pct
(h) Real wage, pct
(i) Inflation, ann. ppt
(j) Unemployment, ppt
(k) Nominal rate, ann. pct
(l) Real rate, ann. ppt

No crisis, no zlb
Crisis, no zlb
Crisis, zlb
Properties of Simulated Economy

- Negative correlation b/w income inequality and aggregate demand
- Near perfect correlation b/w excess credit and prob. of crises
- Significant deflation bias with negatively skewed distribution

Table: Moments of Key Variables Under Baseline Monetary Policy Rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>w/o ZLB</th>
<th>w/ ZLB</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. corr( income inequality, y)</td>
<td>-0.633</td>
<td>-0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. corr( income inequality, π)</td>
<td>-0.929</td>
<td>-0.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. corr( income inequality, b/y)</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. corr(b/y, pδ)</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. E(pδ), quarterly, pct</td>
<td>1.307</td>
<td>1.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. E(i), quarterly, pct</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. E(π), quarterly, pct</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td>-0.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. E(y)</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>0.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. frequency of binding ZLB, pct</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. skewness (i)</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. skewness (π)</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. skewness (y)</td>
<td>-0.548</td>
<td>-1.315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endogenously Skewed Distribution

(a) Inflation rate

(b) Output

(c) Cons. B95

(d) Cons. T5

No crisis, no zlb
Endogenously Skewed Distribution

(a) Inflation rate
(b) Output
(c) Cons. B95
(d) Cons. T5

No crisis, no zlb
Crisis, no zlb
Endogenously Skewed Distribution

(a) Inflation rate
(b) Output
(c) Cons. B95
(d) Cons. T5

- No crisis, no zlb
- Crisis, no zlb
- Crisis, zlb
Alternative Monetary Policies

1. Time-Varying Inflation Target:

\[ i_t = i^* + \frac{\rho_\pi}{4} (\pi^y_t - \pi^*_t) \]

where \( \pi^*_t = (1 - \rho_{\pi^*}) \pi^* + \rho_{\pi^*} \pi^*_{t-1} + \sigma_{\pi^*} \delta^B_t \)

2. Price Level Targeting:

\[ i_t = i^* + \frac{\rho_\pi}{4} \Pi_t \]

where \( \Pi_t \equiv \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\pi^y_{t-s} - \pi^*) = \log \left( \frac{P_t}{(1 + \pi^*)^t P_0} \right) \).
Moments Under Alternative Rules

(a) Mean default probability

(b) Skewness inflation rate

(c) Mean interest rate

(d) Frequency ZLB

(e) Mean size monetary policy shock

(f) Mean cons. B95

Corr(inc. inequality,y)

Corr(cons. inequality,y)
Moments Under Alternative Rules

1.32 1.33 1.34
Mean default probability
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
Std. Dev. inflation rate
(a)
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20
...
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20

Mean inflation rate
(c)
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20
...
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20

Mean interest rate
(b)
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20
...
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20

Mean size monetary policy shock
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Frequency ZLB
(d)
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20
...
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20

Mean cons. B95
(e)
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20
...
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20

Mean cons. T5

Corr(inc. inequality, y)
(f)
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20
...
ρπ = 1
ρπ = 20

Corr(cons. inequality, y)

Inflation targeting
Time-varying inflation targeting
Moments Under Alternative Rules

(a) Std. Dev. inflation rate vs. Mean default probability

(b) Std. Dev. inflation rate vs. Skewness inflation rate

(c) Mean inflation rate vs. Mean interest rate

(d) Frequency ZLB vs. Mean size monetary policy shock

(e) Mean cons. B95 vs. Mean cons. T5

(f) Corr(inc. inequality, y) vs. Corr(cons. inequality, y)

Inflation targeting
Time-varying inflation targeting
Price level targeting
Asymmetric Loss Function


Linex: \[ L = \frac{\exp[\lambda(\pi_t - \pi^*)] - \lambda(\pi_t - \pi^*) - 1}{\lambda^2} \]

- Financial instability represents itself as skewed distribution.
- Asy. loss function may represent the desire for financial stability.
Distributions Under Optimized Rules
Lambda = -0.5 case

(a) Inflation rate
(b) Output
(c) Cons. B95
(d) Cons. T5

Baseline Optimized R1 (λ=-0.5) Optimized R2 (λ=-0.5)
Conclusion

- We show a possibility that income inequality can be behind:
  - Insufficient aggregate demand
  - Deflation pressure
  - Excessive credit growth
  - Financial Instability

- We show that monetary policy’s stabilization function during financial crises may be severely distorted due to the ZLB constraint

- An efficient policy rule should take into account the presence of disproportionately large downside risks