Expectations and Bank Lending

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Motivation

- Supply of credit a central issue in macro-finance
- Beliefs of lenders thought to be key, but mainly indirect evidence
 - Limited data on lenders' beliefs & connections to economic outcomes
 - Research on lending: mostly focuses on bank balance sheets
- Previous expectations research: mostly beliefs of central tendencies
 - But beliefs about tails are also central, esp for lending
 - Limited data on beliefs about tails

This paper: granular data on beliefs of largest lenders in US (FR Y-14A)

- Baseline + Tail (severely adverse)
- For each MSA by year: house price index growth, unemployment rate
- Link to US "credit registry": loans & firm outcomes (FR Y-14H1)

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Data Sources

FR Y-14A: projections of house price index (HPI), unemployment rate

- By 392 MSAs, each year: 2014—2019
- For both severely adverse scenario and baseline scenario
 - Severely adverse: describes hypothetical adverse economic conditions
 - Baseline: similar macro condition to average Blue Chip projections
 - Over nine quarter horizon

FR Y-14H1: loan-level data à la credit registry

- Both outstanding loan amount and new loan issuance
- We focus on C&I lending
 - In this period, relatively limited risky lending in residential mortgages

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Summary Statistics: Bank Projections

	# MSAs	# Banks	Ν	mean	p50	sd	25th	75th
SA HPI Drop	392	11	17,423	19.43	19.64	9.36	13.68	25.12
Baseline HPI Drop	392	8	12,794	-0.62	-0.67	1.35	-1.14	-0.15
SA Unempl Incr	392	8	9,467	4.80	4.80	2.12	3.55	5.97

- SA: severely adverse. HPI: house price index.
- HPI drop: (jumpoff HPI min HPI)/jumpoff HPI
- Unempl incr: (max unemployment rate jumpoff unempl rate)
- All units in percentages. Larger value means worse outcome.
- Unemployment projections have less coverage
 - One fewer year. Not as many banks.

Properties of Economic Projections

What Shapes the Projections?

		SA HPI	Baseline HPI	SA Unempl
Persistence	Lagged Projection	\checkmark	~	
	Lagged MSA Conditions			
Past MSA	MSA HPI Growth 06-09	✓	~	
Conditions MSA Unempl Increase	MSA Unempl Increase 06—09			✓
	Bank Tier 1			
Capital & Exposures	Risky Loan Exposure			
	Tier 1 * Risky Loan Exposure			

Determinants of the Projections

	HPI	Drop	Unempl Incr
	SA	Baseline	SA
Lagged Projection	0.616***	0.359***	-0.268
	(0.069)	(0.110)	(0.390)
L.MSA HPI Growth	0.106	0.007	· · · ·
	(0.112)	(0.024)	
L.MSA Unempl Rate	· · ·	· · · ·	0.049
			(0.159)
HPI Growth 06-09	-0.151***	0.008***	
	(0.034)	(0.002)	
Unempl Increase 06-09			0.010***
			(0.002)
L.Bank Non-IG Ratio in MSA	-0.004	0.001	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.003)
L.Bank Tier 1	-0.592*	0.050	0.176
	(0.350)	(0.048)	(0.106)
L.Bank ROA	-0.310	0.067	-0.335
	(0.632)	(0.041)	(0.230)
L.Log (Bank Assets)	-1.157	0.568	0.116
- 、	(2.330)	(1.130)	(0.310)
Observations	9,414´	7,952 [´]	6,436
R^2	0.552	0.171	0.106


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
Expectations and Bank Lending

Empirical Setup: Firm Level



Expectations of banks & firm outcomes

Empirical Setup: Loan Level



Expectations of banks & loan attribute (subsample of firms with multiple banks à la Khwaja-Mian 08)

Firm Level Results

	(1)	Firm I (2)	_evel Loan Grov (3)	vth
SA HPI Drop	-0.272***		-0.293***	
Baseline HPI Drop	(0.037)	0.187	(0.049) -0.032	
SA Unempl Incr		(0.293)	(0.324)	
L.Bank Tier 1		-1.243***		
L.Bank ROA	0.082***	(0.274) 0.048***	0.104***	
L.Log (Bank Assets)	-15.039***	(0.018) -21.894*** (2.767)	-25.025***	
Firm Controls Fixed Effects		Firm, MS	Yes A*Year, Industr	y*Year
Observations R^2	333,714 0.188	241,162 0.209	,	-

Firm Level Results

		Firm	Level Loan G	Growth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SA HPI Drop	-0.272***		-0.293***		-0.186**
	(0.037)		(0.049)		(0.090)
Baseline HPI Drop		0.187	-0.032		
		(0.293)	(0.324)		
SA Unempl Incr				-1.873***	-1.722***
				(0.335)	(0.392)
L.Bank Tier 1	-0.159	-1.243***	-0.592**	-0.252	-0.217
	(0.155)	(0.274)	(0.269)	(0.350)	(0.389)
L.Bank ROA	0.082***	0.048***	0.104***	-0.226***	-0.179***
			(0.021)		
L.Log (Bank Assets)	-15.039***	-21.894***	-25.025***	-21.959***	-21.327***
	(2.704)	(2.767)	(3.908)	(3.835)	(3.384)
Firm Controls			Yes		
Fixed Effects		Firm, MS	A*Year, Indi	ustry*Year	
Observations	333,714	241,162	239,558	209,524	182,853
R^2	0.188	0.209	0.210	0.240	0.281

Loan Level Results

	Loan Growth					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
SA HPI Drop	-0.278** (0.107)		-0.337** (0.127)			
SA Unempl Incr	()	-1.016*** (0.187)		-1.330*** (0.231)		
L.Log (Bank Assets)	-8.575 (6.568)	3.520 (11.887)	-14.701** (6.853)	-8.163 (9.057)		
L.Bank Tier 1	-0.248 (0.813)	1.078 (0.909)	-0.397 (0.933)	1.203 (1.275)		
L.Bank ROA	10.327 (8.567)	-2.095 (10.674)	12.508 (10.967)	-7.307 (15.945)		
Fixed Effects		Bank*MSA	, MSA*Year			
	Firm, In	dustry*Year	Firm	*Year		
Observations R^2	169,884 0.002	80,446 0.003	165,773 0.354	77,580 0.478		

Magnitude

SA HPI Drop:

- Point estimate: ~ -0.3
- Inter-quartile range: ~ 12 pp
- Implied difference in loan growth: -3.6pp

SA Unemployment Increase:

- Point estimate: ~ -1.5
- Inter-quartile range: \sim 2.4pp
- Implied difference in loan growth: -3.6pp

Average loan growth: 0.11pp. Raw inter-quartile range: 8.5pp.

Firm Level Real Outcomes: Total Leverage & CAPX

	То	otal Levera	ge		CAPX	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SA HPI Drop	-0.044*** (0.014)			-0.017*** (0.005)		
Baseline HPI Drop	. ,	0.099*** (0.034)		. ,	0.055 (0.057)	
SA Unempl Incr			-0.040 (0.058)			-0.002 (0.029)
L.Bank Tier 1	0.016 (0.017)	0.004 (0.016)	0.107*** (0.037)	-0.024*** (0.002)	-0.015*	-0.000 (0.012)
L.Bank ROA	0.187***	0.252***	0.031	-0.010	-0.145	0.043
L.Log (Bank Assets)	-0.775 (0.601)	()	$(0.501)^{-1.501***}$ (0.564)	(0.600) -0.232 (0.600)	-0.780	(0.153) (0.339)
Firm Controls			Yes			
Fixed Effects		Firm, I	MSA*Year,	Industry*Y	ear	
Observations R^2	190,328 0.798	140,661 0.794	100,134 0.798	126,397 0.466	90,731 0.521	82,002 0.508

Firm Level Real Outcomes: Total Leverage & CAPX

	Total L	everage	CAF	УX
	Non-IG	IG	Non-IG	IG
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SA HPI Drop	-0.037***	-0.026	-0.029**	0.006
	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.011)
L.Bank Tier 1	0.005	-0.017	-0.035***	-0.006
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.007)
L.Bank ROA	0.084 (0.071)	0.097 (0.123)	-0.027 (0.058)	0.004
L.Log (Bank Assets)	-2.228***	-2.581***	0.384	0.812
	(0.790)	(0.915)	(0.873)	(0.768)
Firm Controls		Ye	S	
Fixed Effects	Firn	n, MSA*Year	, Industry*Ye	ar
Observations R^2	142,688	45,097	66,986	30,161
	0.830	0.905	0.428	0.510

Real effects esp strong for risky firms w/ limited financing sources

Regional Aggregate Impact

Granular Instrumental Variable (GIV) of Gabaix-Koijen 20

For each MSA (i) and year (t), use projections of banks j (η_{ijt}):

$$G_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{N} m_{ijt-1} \eta_{ijt} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \eta_{ijt}$$

- Take residuals of projections η_{ijt} after MSA×Year FE; value weight the residuals using bank market shares.
- Use idiosyncratic variations in beliefs. Weight by market share (m).

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One IQR change in MSA-level SA HPI projections $\Rightarrow \sim 0.8$ pp lower MSA GDP growth in next year

COVID-19

Major *negative* shock

• Does bank credit supply matter? If so, how?

Banks which were more pessimistic in good times:

- Have less pass due (maybe more capacity to lend)
- Still they lend less, because pessimism is persistent

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Summary

- Large literature on bank capital/liquidity & credit supply
 - Credit supply shocks not just about bank balance sheet
- Collect granular data on banks' economic projections
 + Match with lending decisions
- Banks' expectations, especially about downside, are important
- Beliefs about tails much less understood
 - May be shaped in different ways than beliefs about average outcomes
 - Past tail events may "scar" beliefs about downside
- Implications for bank lending during COVID-19

Thank You



Wells Fargo Regional Analysis of Raleigh, NC

Special Commentary

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Raleigh Economy Remains on Track


Executive Summary

- Raleigh remains one of the nation's fastest growing economies, with payrolls rising at a more than 3% annual pace—well ahead of the national and statewide rates. Durham-Chapel Hill also continues to post solid gains, with payrolls rising 0.8% in 2019.
- The Triangle region is anchored by three major research institutions which fuel an ecosystem
 of innovation and collaboration with the private sector and government. Many graduates stay
 in the region, which ranks near the top of many quality of life rankings, including best places to
 live, do businesses, raise a family or start a career.
- The Triangle has one of the nation's most highly educated workforces and one of the highest
 concentrations of high-paying STEM jobs. The Triangle's median income is over \$70,000 and
 Wake County's per capita income is the highest in the state.

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Difference with Diagnostic Expectations

Diagnostic Expectations: Belief in Response to Recent Shocks



Our data:

- Past tail events have different impact on tail vs baseline projections
- Most recent shock is not the primary driver