# The disciplining effect of supervisory scrutiny in the EU-wide stress test

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
# Motivation

This paper looks behind the curtain of stress testing and sheds light on the effects of supervisory scrutiny

- Earlier work shows stress testing can affect bank risk [Acharya/Berger/Roman, 2018; Steri/Pierret, 2018, Cortés et al., 2020]
- ? Does supervisory scrutiny play a role?
- A great deal of stress testing is confidential between supervisors and supervised banks, e.g. communications about best-practice and stress testing techniques
- ? Do risk management capabilities built up for compliance purposes spill over into bank outcomes?
- Supervisory efforts can have a disciplining effect on banks [Hirtle/Kovner/Plosser, 2019; Kandrac/Schlusche, 2019]
- ? Do they in stress testing?


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- We investigate whether the supervisory scrutiny associated with the EU-wide stress tests has an effect on bank credit risk
- YES! The more scrutiny banks receive during a stress test exercise, the more they
  reduce credit risk.



Marginal effects of supervisory scrutiny on credit risk.

- We investigate whether the supervisory scrutiny associated with the EU-wide stress tests has an effect on bank credit risk
- We study the 2016 EU-wide stress test in a diff-in-diff setting



• 63 Tested SIs — 69 Non-tested LSIs

- We investigate whether the supervisory scrutiny associated with the EU-wide stress tests has an effect on bank credit risk
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- Risk is measured as risk weight density (RWD) for credit risk exposures

 $RWD_{i,t} = \frac{Risk-Weighted \ Credit \ Risk \ Exposure_{i,t}}{Total \ Credit \ Risk \ Exposure_{i,t}}$ 

- We investigate whether the supervisory scrutiny associated with the EU-wide stress tests has an effect on bank credit risk
- We study the 2016 EU-wide stress test in a diff-in-diff setting
- We explore the role of supervisory scrutiny
- The European design allows us to highlight the effect of supervisory scrutiny in contrast to other channels
- European stress test results do not necessarily lead to capital measures (profit distribution limits, capital requirements)
- We construct three metrics of supervisory scrutiny in the EU stress test
  - $\Rightarrow$  Today I focus only on one metric

# Stress test design and supervisory scrutiny metrics

The EU-wide stress test follows a Constrained Bottom-Up approach:

- Banks use their own models to generate stress test projections
- The ECB and banks interact during the Quality Assuarance (QA) between launch and publication of the stress test results
- The ECB mainly use two challenger approaches to ensure the credibility of banks' projections



Simplified cycle of the ECB Quality Assurance process.

High QA Quantity: Above-median number of communicated flags on credit risk

# Main Finding: Effect of supervisory scrutiny on credit risk

$$\begin{split} \textit{RWD}_{i,t} = & \beta_1(\textit{Post ST16}_t \times \textit{Tested}_i) + \beta_3 \textit{X}_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \delta_{t,j} + \epsilon_{i,t} \\ & + \beta_2(\textit{Post ST16}_t \times \textit{Tested}_i \times \textit{High Scrutiny}_i) \end{split}$$

	Baseline	Supervisory Scrutiny	Capital Structure	Both
Post x Tested	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.014 (0.016)	-0.054** (0.021)	-0.008 (0.021)
Post $\times$ Tested $\times$ High QA Quantity		- <mark>0.056***</mark> (0.020)		- <mark>0.055***</mark> (0.020)
Post $\times$ Tested $\times$ High Capital Guidance			0.028 (0.023)	0.011 (0.020)
Observations within-R2	924 0.132	924 0.155	924 0.127	924 0.152

 Banks with higher stress test intensity in form of high supervisory scrutiny reduce credit risk

# Conclusions

- We find that the 2016 European Stress Test exercise impacted SSM banks behaviour
- Higher supervisory scrutiny disciplines tested banks more
- Banks that had more interactions with the supervisor reduced their RWD more than banks that received less treatment.
- ✓ The scrutiny effect persists in a subsample of tested banks
- ✓ The scrutiny effect is independent of stress-test related capital effects
- Stress test design and stress test effects interact