

Discussion:
Short-Time Compensation in the U.S. and
California from 2000 to 2022,
by Rodriguez, Segal and von Wachter

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Labor Markets During and After the Pandemic
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Paper examines use of short-time compensation (STC) during pandemic recession

- STC can be a valuable tool for preserving worker-firm relationships in the event of a temporary reduction in demand
- Despite efforts to promote it, take-up of STC has remained very low in the United States compared to other countries
 - Partial UI and temporary layoffs offer alternatives to U.S. employers
- In data for California, outcomes during pandemic more favorable for STC recipients than for either partial or full UI recipients
 - Smaller earnings losses
 - More stable employment
 - Results are *descriptive*, not *causal*



Will discuss three topics

- 1) STC as an alternative to layoffs
- 2) Why STC take-up has remained so low in the United States
- 3) Whether partial UI could be redesigned to better substitute for STC



STC as an alternative to layoffs



STC versus layoffs

- Under STC, workers whose hours are reduced can receive pro-rated unemployment insurance payments
 - Example: Instead of laying off 20% of its workforce, a firm could cut all workers' hours by 20%. Workers would receive 80% of their wages and 20% of their full unemployment benefit.
- STC attractive for responding to a temporary downturn in demand
 - Can mitigate increase in unemployment
 - Reduces search congestion in the labor market
 - Avoids potential long run scarring effects of unemployment
 - Allows businesses to retain valued employees with firm-specific capital, avoiding recruiting and training costs when business picks back up
- Less well suited for addressing a permanent reduction in demand
 - May slow reallocation to more productive firms




Evidence on how STC affects outcomes of interest

- One strand of literature has used *cross-state or cross-country comparisons* to assess effects of STC on employment
 - Employment changes account for less of the cyclical adjustment in overall hours in countries with STC programs (Abraham and Houseman 1993, 1994, 1995; Van Audenrode 1994)
 - Employment changes accounted for less of the adjustment in overall manufacturing hours in states with STC programs during the Great Recession (Abraham and Houseman 2014)
 - Overall employment falls less during cyclical downturns in countries that use STC more extensively (Boeri and Bruecker 2011; Cahuc and Carcillo 2011; Hijzen and Venn 2011; Hijzen and Martin 2013; Giupponi, Landais and Lapeyre 2022)
- Institutional context is likely to matter



Figure 4

Short-Time Work Usage and Non-Employment During the COVID Crisis: Cross-Country Evidence



Source: Giupponi, Landais and Lapeyre, "Should We Insure Workers or Jobs During Recessions," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2022.



Evidence on how STC affects outcomes of interest (continued)

- Challenge for *firm-level* analysis: Firms that use STC may differ from firms that do not
 - Matching on observed characteristics unlikely to fully capture all relevant differences
 - Most convincing firm-level studies have exploited plausibly exogenous variation in access to STC related to regional variation in plan approval rates (Kopp and Siegenthaler 2021; Cahuc, Kramarz and Nevoux 2021) or differences in eligibility by firm size and industry (Giupponi and Landais 2020)
- Results from well-identified studies support view that
 - STC reduces size of employment declines at firms hit by large negative shocks
 - Extended STC may slow reallocation to more productive firms, but effect is small



Why has STC take-up remained so low in the United States?



Federal legislation during past two recessions has actively promoted STC ...

- Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (February 2012)
 - Full federal reimbursement for benefits under approved state plans for up to three years through August 2015
 - \$100 million in Federal funding for program administration and employer outreach
 - Timing not ideal; by time law passed, recovery already underway for more than two years
- CARES Act (March 2020, later extended)
 - Full federal reimbursement for benefits under approved state plans through December 31, 2020; extended through September 6, 2021
 - \$100 million in Federal funding for program administration and employer outreach
 - CARES Act STC provisions should have had larger effects than 2012 legislation
 - Enacted early in pandemic
 - Department of Labor clarified that recalled workers could be put on STC
 - STC recipients eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation payments of \$600/week from March 27, 2020 through July 31, 2020 and later payments of \$300/week from December 27, 2020 through September 6, 2021



... but take-up has remained low

Panel B: Monthly Initial Claims for Short-Time Compensation as a Share of All UI Initial Claims




Figure 1: Nationwide Initial Claims for Short-Time Compensation from 2000-2022

Rodriguez, Segal and von Wachter



Why has STC take-up not been larger?

- Paper suggests some explanations
 - Lack of information
 - RCTs in Iowa and Oregon found that informational mailings and other advertising efforts raised employer awareness and, in Oregon, subsequent STC use (Houseman et al 2017)
 - Administrative barriers
 - Cumbersome application and weekly reporting interface
 - Rules that can preclude participation (e.g., employers with negative UI account balances)
 - Complications for multistate employers caused by different rules in different states
 - Limits on permissible hours reductions (no more than 60% under Federal law and less in many states)
- Other factors not emphasized in paper also likely important
 - Role of local champions for STC program
 - Ease of layoffs as an alternative
 - Requirement to maintain benefits



Having a local champion is important

- In states where STC has been used most heavily, often can point to a local champion
 - Rhode Island during the Great Recession: Ray Filippone, Director of UI (since retired)
 - Oregon during the pandemic recession: David Gerstenfeld, UI Division Administrator until June 2020, then Acting Director, Employment Department
 - Michigan during the pandemic recession: Governor Gretchen Whitmer
- Conversely, ambivalence of state personnel charged with administering STC program may discourage use
 - In one state with a low-take-up STC program, the standard email sent to employers who inquired about used to begin by saying “**Your account will be charged for the benefits paid for your participation in the Voluntary Shared Work program. This may increase your unemployment insurance tax rate significantly.**” (bold in original); wording clearly reflected staff reservations




Low barriers to layoffs for U.S. employers

- In other countries, layoffs typically subject to significant notification and/or severance pay requirements
 - Negotiations with unions or works councils also may be required
- U.S. employers face few restrictions on layoffs
 - WARN Act requires 60 days notice for plant closings and mass layoffs at firms with 100 or more full-time employees
 - Threshold for triggering WARN requirements: 50 or more employees representing at least a third of employment at affected site or 500 or more employees
 - Requirements do not apply if 1) giving notice would undermine a firm's efforts to obtain new capital to stay in business; 2) layoff due to unforeseen circumstances; or 3) layoff due to a natural disaster
 - If layoff originally temporary and later becomes permanent, WARN Act requirements apply only once it is clear employees will not be recalled
 - WARN Act contains no severance pay requirement.



Job protection and short-time work take-up rates



Source: Based on [1]; Figure 7.

Requirement to maintain health insurance may make STC less attractive to U.S. employers

- U.S. health care costs are high
 - Average annual U.S. employer-provided health insurance premiums in 2022 \$7,911 (individual) and \$22,463 (family)
 - Average employer shares 83% (\$6,584) and 72% (\$16,357)
- Health care costs generally lower in other countries and not necessarily financed by employer contributions that must be continued during STC
 - United Kingdom: National health insurance financed through general tax revenues
 - Switzerland: Mandatory health insurance purchased by individuals, not employers
 - Germany: Health insurance costs lower than in the United States; requirement that employers continue social insurance contributions for workers on STC waived during both Great Recession and pandemic recession



Could partial UI be redesigned to be a better substitute for STC?



Partial UI and STC structured very differently




Partial UI

- Benefits payable only if earnings below a threshold, most commonly the weekly full benefit amount
- Benefit amount reduced with earnings less a disregarded amount
- Worker may or may not remain attached to original employer
- Any worker whose earnings low enough to qualify for partial UI may apply

STC

- Benefits payable if hours reduced 10 to 60 percent (band narrower in many states)
- Benefit amount proportional to reduction in hours
- Worker must remain attached to original employer
- Employer must apply to set up a STC plan and satisfy program requirements








Maine partial UI and STC programs

- WBA: 1/22 of average of 2 high quarters, to maximum of \$462
- Partial UI benefit: Qualify if gross earnings less than WBA plus \$5; benefit calculated disregarding \$100
- STC benefit: Pro-rated for hours reductions of 10% to 50%








Illinois partial UI and STC programs

- WBA: 47% times 1/26 of 2 high quarters, to maximum of \$505
- Partial UI benefit: Qualify if gross earnings less than WBA; benefit calculated disregarding 1/2 of WBA
- STC benefit: Pro-rated for hours reductions of 20% to 50%





California partial UI and STC programs

- WBA: 1/26 of high quarter earnings, to maximum of \$450
- Partial UI benefit: Qualify if earnings less than $1.25 \times \text{WBA}$; benefit calculated disregarding \$25 or 25% of earnings
- STC benefit: Pro-rated for hours reductions of 10% to 60%




Partial UI formulas could be made more generous


- Relevant parameters are 1) maximum WBA, 2) earnings eligibility threshold for partial UI, and 3) amount of earnings disregarded in calculating partial UI benefits.
- Consider the following option:
 - Set WBA equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ average weekly earnings (e.g., $\frac{1}{26}$ high quarter earnings) up to maximum WBA (e.g., \$500)
 - Set earnings eligibility threshold for partial UI as a multiple of the WBA rather than an absolute amount (e.g. up to 2X WBA)
 - Express earnings disregard as a percent of earnings rather than as a fixed amount or percent of WBA (e.g. $\frac{1}{2}$ of earnings)
- With these parameters, if average weekly earnings below 2X maximum WBA, partial UI benefits look just like STC benefits
 - Partial UI benefits in Montana (and until recently in Vermont) have looked a lot like this




Average Weekly Earnings=\$500



Average Weekly Earnings=\$1,000



Average Weekly Earnings=\$1,500



Hypothetical partial UI and STC programs

- WBA: ½ of weekly earnings to maximum benefit of \$500
- Partial UI benefit: Qualify if earnings less than 2X WBA; calculated disregarding half of earnings
- STC benefit: Pro-rated for hours reductions of 10% to 60%



Two possible paths forward for better supporting workers on reduced hours during downturns?

- Continue efforts to encourage employers to make use of STC
 - Do more to market program
 - Streamline administrative processes
 - Offer subsidies during economic downturns
 - Would not give up, but efforts not especially successful to date
- Make partial UI more accessible
 - Set earnings threshold for eligibility higher
 - Set disregard as a fraction of earnings rather than a fraction of the WBA or a fixed amount
 - If employers know workers can get partial benefits, even those not open to STC may be more inclined to see adjusting through hours as an option
 - Moral hazard a concern; could vary parameters depending on economic conditions (more generous during recessions)



Paper raises interesting issues about how UI is structured

- Existing system provides insurance against the effects of economic downturns in different forms
 - In 27 states, STC for workers on reduced hours
 - Partial UI for (a somewhat different set of) workers on reduced hours
 - Full UI for workers on layoff
- Important to consider how these three approaches interact with and complement one another

THANK YOU!

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