The Great Recession and Unemployment Insurance Solvency
Lessons for and from New England

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Material in this presentation is subject to further review and revision. Views expressed are the author’s and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.
Overview

• Background on UI program
• Borrowing in the Great Recession
• Data comparisons
• Lessons from New England
• Policy options
Unemployment insurance (UI): The basics

- Federal-state program established by the Social Security Act of 1935
- Primary objectives:
  - Provide temporary, partial compensation for lost earnings of individuals who become unemployed through no fault of their own
  - Stabilize the economy during economic downturns
- 53 separate programs (50 states + DC, PR, and VI)
Unemployment insurance (UI): The basics

- States operate programs within federal guidelines, but have flexibility

- Some common themes:
  - Eligibility tied to prior labor force attachment and circumstances of job separation
  - Benefit amounts tied to previous earnings (subject to a maximum) and typically available for up to 26 weeks
  - Financed by employer taxes
Unemployment insurance (UI): The basics

• Employers pay a per-employee state tax based on:
  • The state’s taxable wage base
  • The employer’s tax rate which depends on:
    • Experience rating
    • Overall financial health of the program
• Employers also pay a separate UI tax to the federal government (the FUTA)
UI accounting: The basics

- State UI trust fund accounts:
  - Employer tax payments flow in
  - Benefit payments flow out
  - Inflows (+ interest) - outflows = reserves
- Rely on concept of forward-funding
Borrowing from the federal government

- States can borrow from the federal government if trust fund reserves not sufficient
- “Typical” borrowing rules:
  - Interest-free short term borrowing (“cash-flow” loans)
  - More prolonged borrowing can mean:
    - Interest charges
    - Higher effective FUTA rates
UI borrowing in the Great Recession

• At least 35 states borrowed at some point, 29 still have outstanding loans totaling $39B. What this means:
  • Interest payments
    • Waived in 2009 and 2010
    • First payments due in September 2011 and totaled over $1B, mostly covered by employer taxes
  • Increased FUTA taxes
    • 21 states subject to higher rates 2011, more expected in 2012
# Focus on borrowing in New England states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>ME</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>NH</th>
<th>RI</th>
<th>VT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First loan quarter</td>
<td>Q4:09</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Q1:10</td>
<td>Q1:10</td>
<td>Q1:09</td>
<td>Q1:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total loan quarters (Q4:07-Q2:11)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak loan balance (Q4:07-Q2:11)</td>
<td>$810M</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$387M</td>
<td>$23M</td>
<td>$257M</td>
<td>$78M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak as % of quarterly wages</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan balance as of Q2:11</td>
<td>$810M</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$222M</td>
<td>$78M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan for interest repayment</td>
<td>Employer tax</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Employer tax</td>
<td>General fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First year for FUTA increase</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
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Questions explored in this research

• Why did many state UI program deplete their trust funds during or after the Great Recession, while others did not?
• What trends or reforms contributed to the insolvency (or solvency) of the New England UI programs?
Identifying factors related to solvency: Approach

- Classify states into three groups:
  - Non-borrowers (18 states)
  - “Light” borrowers (15 states)
  - “Heavy” borrowers (20 states)
- Compare groups on several dimensions:
  - Solvency at start of downturn
  - Severity of the downturn
  - Employer taxes
  - Program generosity
Key findings: Solvency at start of the downturn

- Strong relationship between borrowing and solvency heading into downturn

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<tr>
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<th>Light Borrowers</th>
<th>Heavy borrowers</th>
<th>CT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average high-cost multiple (Q4:07)</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key findings: Severity of the downturn

- Heavy borrowers, on average, faced higher unemployment during the downturn than other states

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peak unemployment rate (Q4:07-Q2:11)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key findings: Employer taxes

- Borrowers (light or heavy) had lower average ratios of taxable to total wages than non-borrowers

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<tr>
<td>Ratio of taxable to total wages (Q4:06-Q3:07)</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key findings: Program generosity

- No evidence of strong relationship between benefit generosity and borrowing

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<tr>
<td>Average replacement rate (Q4:06-Q3:07)</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why were many states so poorly positioned heading into the Great Recession?

- 2010 GAO report:
  - “Long-standing UI tax policies and practices in many states over 3 decades have eroded trust fund reserves, leaving states in a weak position prior to the recent recession. While benefits over this period have remained largely flat relative to wages, employer tax rates have declined. Specifically, most state taxable wage bases have not kept up with increases in wages, and many employers pay very low tax rates on these wage bases.”
  - Between 1980 and 2009, the average ratio of taxable to total wages across all state UI programs fell by 30 percent.
What lessons can we learn from the New England state UI programs?

- What hurt various New England states:
  - Erosion of taxable wage bases
  - Unbalanced reforms
  - Chronically low reserve levels
- What helped one New England state:
  - Balanced reforms and good timing
New England lessons: Erosion of the taxable wage base

Ratio of taxable to total wages: 1980-2009

Ratios in New Hampshire and Vermont fell by more than half

New England lessons: Unbalanced reforms

- Vermont
  - In late 1990s and early 2000s the state increased benefits
  - No concurrent changes to taxes
- Rhode Island
  - 1998 reform lowered and “de-indexed” the state’s taxable wage base
  - No concurrent changes to benefits
New England lessons: 
Chronically low reserve levels

• Massachusetts
  • Peak HCM (1971-2006): 0.63
  • Years with outstanding loans (1970-2006): 10
  • Likely contributing factor: State’s frequent overrides of statutory increases in tax rates

• Connecticut
  • Peak HCM (1971-2006): 0.45
  • Years with outstanding loans (1970-2006): 16
  • Likely contributing factor(s): Tax rate structure and target reserve level
New England lessons:  
Chronically low reserve levels (in Connecticut)

- Fund balance tax set each year to maintain fund balance equal to 0.8 percent of total wages
- Cannot exceed 1.4 percent, and must be lowered when reserves exceed fund target
- Target of 0.8 percent of wages is low by some standards
  - Estimates from 2011 suggested target would need to increase 75 percent to achieve AHCM of 1.0
New England lessons: Maine’s 1999 reform

• Balanced substance
  • Made minor benefit reductions
  • Raised taxable wage base
  • Moved to array method of assigning tax rates
    • Spread contributions more evenly across employers
    • Gave state more control over trust fund inflows
• Good timing
Policy options for strengthening UI trust funds

- Raising taxable wage bases and indexing them to growth in total wages
- Avoiding unbalanced reforms that ONLY increase benefits or ONLY lower taxes
- Re-examining employer tax rates and trust fund targets
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