Discussion: Low Interest Rates and Investor Behavior

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Low Interest Rates and Investor Behavior

- **Key question:** How do low interest rates affect portfolio choice?
  - **low:** artificially, or maybe partial equilibrium
  - **interest rates:** nominal, short-term treasury bills
  - **affect:** causal
  - **portfolio choice:** duration, credit, equity

- **behavioral versus rational versus frictional versus agency**

- **reaching for return versus reaching for yield**

- Real consequences of a behavioral reaching for return
  - low interest rates → portfolio choice → asset prices → real effects
Plan

- **Data:** What is the link between the level of interest rates and the valuation of equity and credit risk?
- **Investor behavior:** How would we expect investors respond to low rates?
- **Real consequences:** What are the potential consequences and implications for monetary policy, for financial stability, for corporate finance, for wealth inequality?
Data

What is the link between the level of interest rates and the valuation of equity and credit risk?
Interest Rates

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Inflation

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Rates and Valuation: The Data

- **Ideal experiment:** Lower rates, holding all else equal, and see the effect on investor preferences and the valuations of credit and equity risk
  - But, we don’t have experimental evidence here

- **Actual experiment:** The choice to lower rates is confounded by the fact that policymakers are responding to economic conditions that affect valuations, or maybe to valuations themselves
  - Omitted variable bias or reverse causality causes the correlations to flip: Low rate level appears when valuations are low
  - The data point instead to a link between low rate slope and valuations
Reaching for Yield: Low Rate Level → Spreads Fall?

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Reaching for Return: Low Rate Level → Equity Rises?

Correlation = +0.3
CAPE Correlation = -0.1

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Reaching for Yield: Low Slope → Spreads Fall?

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Reaching for Return: Low Slope → Equity Rises?

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Investor Behavior

How would we expect investors respond to low rates?
Investor Behavior, In Partial Equilibrium

- Rational
- Frictional
- Agency
- Behavioral: Prospect Theory
- Behavioral: Anchoring
Investor Behavior: Rational

• **Mean-variance maximizing investors** in the spirit of Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1964) combine stocks and long-term bonds with cash
  • Goal is to maximize the ratio of excess return to standard deviation

• Lowering the **slope** of interest rates leads to a mix of fewer stocks, more bonds, and less cash (or more leverage)
  • Keeping the slope constant and varying the level has no effect

• Goes in the **wrong direction** of lower rates leading to a lower allocation to stocks, but the **right direction** for reaching for yield through duration
Mean Variance Analysis

Source: Illustration
Investor Behavior: Frictional

- For example, investors in the spirit of Black (1972, 1973) and Brennan (1971) are mean-variance maximizers but they face **restricted borrowing**
  - In Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), investors at a corner increase risk through stock selection, not asset allocation

- Lowering interest rates, or really **relaxing borrowing constraints**, allows investors to buy more equities
  - Investors take risk through asset allocation, and not stock selection

- Goes in the **right direction** of lower rates leading to a higher allocation to stocks, but it is really about funding constraints, not the rate
Investor Behavior: Agency, Reaching for Yield

- Institutional investors, making asset allocation choices on behalf of investors, may be prone to...

- Reach for **yield**, for example as insurance companies do in Becker and Ivashina (2014), to increase risk/profits, given credit-rating-driven capital regulation
  - A related phenomenon is that the legal or mental accounting definition of “income” versus “principal” might lead investors to reach for yield to provide sufficient income from a trust account

- Goes in the **right direction** of lower rates leading to a higher allocation to higher yielding duration and credit, but it is about spreads more than rates
Yields of Insurance Company Holdings

Source: Becker and Ivashina, Yield in Basis Points of Highly Rated Bonds
Investor Behavior: Agency, Reaching for Return

- Institutional investors, making asset allocation choices on behalf of investors, may be prone to…

- Reach for return, for example as pension funds like CapPERS aim to deliver a high “discount rate” for public DB plans, e.g. Rauh and Novy-Marx (2011)
  - As nominal rates have dropped, return expectations have dropped by much less
  - Corporate DB plans by contrast have less regulatory flexibility in defining return expectations, and have moved to liability matching

- Goes in the right direction of lower rates leading to a higher allocation by public DB plans to stocks and alternative investments, where return expectations are more subjective
Nominal Investment Return Assumptions

Source: NASRA, Investment Return Assumptions of Public Pension Fund Plans Over Time, and in July 2018
Investor Behavior: Prospect Theory

- When the risk-free rate is low, reference-dependent investors “experience discomfort and become more willing to invest in risky assets to seek higher returns”
  - Where does the reference point come from? “A growing number of studies that point to the importance of personal history and experiences in economic decisions,” e.g. Malmendier and Nagel (2011)
  - Closely related to the problem faced by CalPERS
  - Preference-based and intentional

- Goes in the right direction of lower rates leading to a higher allocation to riskier, higher return asset classes
Prospect Theory

- **400,000 people will die**
- **1/3 chance that no one will die and 2/3 chance that all 600,000 will die**
- **200,000 people will be saved**
- **1/3 chance that 600,000 will be saved and 2/3 chance that no one will be saved**

![Graph showing probability distributions and decision outcomes](image)
Investor Behavior: Anchoring

- When the risk-free rate is low, anchored investors feel like the return “a risky asset look[s] quite attractive”
  - “people tend to evaluate stimuli by proportions (i.e. 6/1 is much larger than 10/5) rather than by differences”
  - Belief-based and maybe unintentional

- Goes in the right direction of lower rates leading to a higher allocation to riskier, higher return asset classes
Anchoring

Travel to save $50 on a $1,500 TV

Travel to save $20 on a $60 phone

Mean Allocations in Risky Asset: Dutch Sample

Risk-Free Rate (%)
Experimental Evidence

- Very useful approach to separating funding constraints or agency problems from non-standard preferences, biases, and heuristics
  - About ruling in a behavioral mechanism, rather than ruling the others out

Two small comments:

- Which is better, hypothetical or incentivized?
- What is the analogue to the observable return on the risky asset?
  - Reaching for yield (observably higher yields that come with duration or credit risk) versus an unknown return on equities
Real Consequences

What are the potential consequences and implications for monetary policy, for financial stability, for corporate finance, for wealth inequality?
Real Consequences: Monetary Policy

- These mechanisms suggest an underemphasized **causal and intended** channel for monetary policy, that lower interest rates raise risky asset prices
  - Through **cost-of-capital** and **wealth** effects

- Likely there are also **non-causal and unintended** links, in the spirit of e.g. Campbell, Viceira, Sunderam (2016):
  - Higher (lower) input prices/wages invite tightening (loosening) 
    bad (good) for bonds, bad (good) stocks
  - Higher (lower) output prices/demand invite tightening (loosening) 
    bad (good) for bonds, good (bad) for stocks
  - Higher (lower) asset prices/demand invite tightening (loosening) 
    bad (good) for bonds, good (bad) for stocks

1970s, early 80s: Corr > 0

1987, Recent: Corr < 0
Stock-Bond Correlations

-1.0  -0.8  -0.6  -0.4  -0.2  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0

9/11  Volcker  Crash of ‘87  LTCM  9/11

Rolling, 720 Day
Rolling, 120 Day
Lehman Brothers

Brexit
Trump Election
Real Consequences: Corporate Finance in the Recent Era

- These mechanisms suggest an underemphasized causal channel for monetary policy, that lower interest rates are designed to prop up risky asset prices

- **Implication/Corollary:** Stimulative monetary policy may lead companies to issue riskier claims
  - Depends on whether the primary effects are reaching for **yield** (which would suggest duration and riskier forms of credit) or reaching for **return** (which would suggest equity)
  - This is perhaps an intended cost-of-capital channel
Real Consequences: Wealth Effects in the Recent Era

• These mechanisms suggest an underemphasized causal channel for monetary policy, that lower interest rates are designed to prop up risky asset prices

• Implication/Corollary: Stimulative monetary policy may lead to greater wealth inequality as the gains in asset values accrue to the top end of the income and wealth distribution
  • Somewhat ironic that many critics of Fed policy in the crisis were its beneficiaries
  • Private equity investors are a case in point: Arguably, the entire asset class was saved by the V-shaped pattern that brought asset prices back from their depths before refinancing leveraged loans was contractually required
  • This is perhaps an intended wealth-effect channel
Real Consequences: Financial Stability in the Recent Era

• These mechanisms suggest an underemphasized causal channel for monetary policy, that lower interest rates are designed to prop up risky asset prices

• Implication: Monetary policy may be focused narrowly on the price level, but the consequences are asset price bubbles and crashes that adversely impact financial stability and amplify the business cycle
  • This is also a cost-of-capital or wealth-effect channel, but it is unintended and comes as a byproduct of maintaining stable prices through monetary policy
Conclusions

- Twin effects of reaching for yield and reaching for return, stimulated by low interest rates, mean that monetary policy can be an important driver of asset prices, both in fixed income and in equity markets.
  - Anecdotal ← “Greenspan Put”
  - Experimental ← This paper
  - Empirical ← “Risk on, risk off” era of asset pricing

- Is the equity market (cost of capital/wealth) channel of monetary policy intended?
- Or, is it an unintended and undesirable byproduct of trying to achieve price stability and GDP growth with monetary (versus fiscal) policy?