Office of the President

Eric S. Rosengren
Eric S. Rosengren
President & Chief Executive Officer

up down Biography

Publications

Journals

"Can Economic Opportunity Flourish When Communities Do Not?" Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 58th Economic Conference. The Russell Sage Journal of the Social Sciences, volume 2, issue 2. Forthcoming.

"Should Full Employment be a Mandate for Central Banks?  Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's 57th Economic Conference." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.  vol. 46, issue S2 (October 2014): 169-182.

"Our Financial Structures – Are they Prepared for Financial Instability?" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to vol. 46, no 1 (February 2014): 143-156.

"How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility," with Burcu Duygan-Bump, Patrick M. Parkinson, Gustavo A. Suarez, and Paul S. Willen. The Journal of Finance. vol. 68, (2013): 715-737.

"Revisiting Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Environment: Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's 55th Economic Conference." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 44, no. 1 (February 2012).

"Global Financial Intermediaries: Lessons and Continuing Challenges." The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics. vol. 12, no 3, (2012).

"The Impact of Liquidity, Securitization, and Banks on the Real Economy." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 42 (September 2010): 221-228.

"Capital and Risk: New Evidence on Implications of Large Operational Losses," with Patrick deFontnouvelle, Virginia DeJesus-Rueff, and John Jordan. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 38, no. 7 (October 2006): 1819-1847.

"Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," with Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 95, no. 4 (September 2005): 1144-1166.

“Does the Federal Reserve Possess An Exploitable Informational Advantage?” with Joe Peek and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell. Journal of Monetary Economics. vol. 50, no. 4 (May 2003): 817-839.

“Identifying the Macroeconomic Effect of Loan Supply Shocks,” with Joe Peek and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. vol. 35, no. 6, part 1 (December 2003): 931-946.

“Troubled Banks, Impaired Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Relative Access to Credit,” with Michael Klein and Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 92, no. 3 (June 2002): 664-682.

“Determinants of the Japan Premium: Actions Speak Louder than Words,” with Joe Peek. The Journal of International Economics. vol. 53, no. 2 (April 2001): 283-305.

“Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States,” with Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 90, no. 1 (March 2000): 30-45.

“The Market Reaction to the Disclosure of Supervisory Actions: Implications for Bank Transparency,” with Joe Peek and John Jordan. Journal of Financial Intermediation. vol. 9 (June 2000): 298-319.

“Modernizing Financial Regulation: Implications for Bank Supervision.” Journal of Financial Services Research. vol. 16, no. 2-3 (December 1999): 117-123.

“The Poor Performance of Foreign Bank Subsidiaries: Were the Problems Acquired or Created?” with Joe Peek and Faith Kasirye. Journal of Banking and Finance. vol. 23, no. 2/4 (February 1999): 579-604.

“Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?” with Joe Peek and Geoffrey M. B. Tootell. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. vol. 114 (May 1999): 629-653.

“Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending: It's Not Just Bank Size That Matters,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Banking and Finance. vol. 22, no. 6-8 (August 1998): 799-819.

“Derivatives Activity at Troubled Banks,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Financial Services Research. vol. 12, no. 2/3 (October/December 1997): 287-302.

“The International Transmission of Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan,” with Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 87, no. 4 (September 1997): 495-505.

“Will Legislated Early Intervention Prevent the Next Banking Crisis?” with Joe Peek. Southern Economic Journal. vol. 64, no. 1 (July 1997): 268-280.

“The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 27, no. 3 (August 1995): 625-638.

“Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Banking and Finance. vol. 19, no. 1 (June 1995): 679-692.

“Bank Regulatory Agreements and Real Estate Lending,” with Joe Peek. Real Estate Economics. vol. 24, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 55-73.

“The Real Exchange Rate and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Relative Wealth vs. Relative Wage Effects,” with Michael Klein. Journal of International Economics. vol. 36, no. 3-4 (May 1994): 373-390.

“Empirical Evidence on Vertical Foreclosure,” with Jim Meehan. Economic Inquiry. vol. 32 no. 2 (April 1994): 303-317.

“Failed Bank Resolution and the Collateral Crunch: The Advantages of Transferable Puts,” with Katerina Simons. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 135-147.

“Bank Real Estate Lending and the New England Credit Crunch,” with Joe Peek. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 33-58.

“Defaults of Original Issue High-Yield Convertible Bonds.” The Journal of Finance. vol. 48, no. 1 (March 1993): 345-362.

“State Restrictions of Hostile Takeovers.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism. vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1988).

“The Australian Trucking Industry: Is There a Need for Government Regulation?” Australian Economic Papers (December 1981).

Other material (past 10 years only)

"Credit Supply Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis" Current Policy Perspectives No. 15-5 with Joe Peek

"Implications of the Financial Crisis for Risk Management and Macroprudential Supervision," with Joel Werkema. In Banks at Risk, Peter Hoflich, ed., John M. Wiley & Sons, Asia, (2011).

"The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy," with Joe Peek. In The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Allen Berger, Philip Molyneux, and John Wilson, eds., Oxford University Press; First Edition (2010): 257-277; Second Edition (2015): 453-473.

"Revisiting the CRA," with Janet L. Yellen. In Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, (2009): 1.

"Market and Risk Management Innovations: Implications for Safe and Sound Banking" Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. vol. 92, nos. 1-2 (2007).

"Implications of Alternative Operational Risk Modeling Techniques," with Patrick de Fontnouvelle and John Jordan. In The Risks of Financial Institutions, Mark Carey and René M. Stulz, eds. University of Chicago Press, (2007): 475-512.

"Secondary Bank Lending in Japan," with Zekeriya Eser and Joe Peek, in Japan's Great Stagnation: Financial and Monetary Policy Lessons for Advanced Economies, Michael Hutchison and Frank Westermann, eds., CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, (2006): 129-155.

"Crisis Resolution and Credit Allocation: The Case of Japan," with Joe Peek. In Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and Resolution, Patrick Honohan and Luc Laeven, eds. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, (2005): 276-306.

"Commentary on 'Disclosure, Volatility, and Transparency: An Empirical Investigation into the Value of Bank Disclosure.'" Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. vol. 10, no. 2 (September 2004): 49-51.

Role of the President Role of the President

The president and chief executive officer guides the focus of the Bank’s economic research and gathers economic intelligence through interactions with the Bank’s board of directors, advisory councils, and other business and community contacts. The president represents the First District at the Federal Open Market Committee and provides key insights to those policy discussions. Additionally, the president and chief executive officer ensures the Bank maintains an effective system of bank supervision and contributes to collective Federal Reserve System actions and directions.

The process by which Federal Reserve Bank presidents are selected, appointed, and reappointed is set forth in the Federal Reserve Act. The president is appointed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s board of directors with the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for a term of five years.