“Central Bank Perspectives on Central Bank Digital Currencies”
Rosengren delivers remarks at Harvard Law School's Program on International Financial Systems
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Eric S. Rosengren
President & Chief Executive Officer
Biography
Eric Rosengren is president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, one of 12 regional Federal Reserve banks. Eric is a participant in the Federal Open Market Committee, the monetary policymaking body of the United States. As CEO, Eric leads the Boston Fed’s work, which includes economic research and analysis, banking supervision and financial stability efforts, community economic development activities, and a wide range of payments, technology, and finance initiatives.
Eric was appointed president in 2007 and has taken a rigorously data-driven approach in forming his views on the national and regional economy. His research and policy positions pay close attention to both aspects of the Fed’s dual mandate – labor market outcomes as well as price stability. Eric’s work as a researcher and now as a policymaker has often focused on financial stability issues and their impact on the real Main Street economy. He has led a number of efforts to expand the Boston Fed’s outreach and impact on low- and moderate-income communities – among them hosting sizable foreclosure- prevention workshops for New England residents during the Great Recession, and running a competition for postindustrial New England communities to develop cross-sector collaboration and ultimately help improve the lives of lower-income residents.
Eric holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from Colby College, where he is the current chair of the board of trustees, and earned a master’s and doctorate in economics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Work Experience
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
President and Chief Executive Officer, 2007-
Executive Vice President, Supervision and Regulation Department, and Chief Discount Officer, 2005-2007
Senior Vice President, Supervision and Regulation Department, and Chief Discount Officer, 2003-2005
Senior Vice President, Supervision and Regulation Department, 2000-2002
Vice President and Economist (head of Banking and Monetary Policy section), Research Department, 1991-2000
Assistant Vice President and Economist, Research Department, 1989-1991
Economist, Research Department, 1985-1989
General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
Dissertation Fellowship, 1984-1985
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Teaching Assistant, 1981-1984
Thomas Watson Foundation, Melbourne, Australia
Research Fellow, 1979-1980
Education
B.A., Colby College, Waterville, highest honors in economics, 1979
Summa Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa
M.S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1984
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1986
Public Service
Trustee, Colby College
Member, Economics Advisory Board, the University of Wisconsin
Member, United Way President’s Council
Current Economic Conditions in New England: Where Do We Go from Here?
May 14, 2021 | Virtual
Whole Family Approach to Jobs Convening
Pandemic Ebbs and Flows: Economic Data, Inflation Concerns, and Policymaking
May 14, 2021 | Virtual
Maine Bankers Association Directors’ Forum
Remarks at the Panel Discussion, “Central Bank Perspectives on Central Bank Digital Currencies”
May 12, 2021 | Virtual
Program on International Financial Systems
Harvard Law School
Pandemic Ebbs and Flows: Economic Data, Inflation Concerns, and Policymaking
May 6, 2021 | Virtual
Vermont and New Hampshire Bankers Association
Pandemic Ebbs and Flows: Economic Data, Inflation Concerns, and Policymaking
May 5, 2021 | Virtual
What Comes Next for the Economy and Monetary Policy?
Boston College Carroll School of Management
Taking Stock of the Economic Recovery and the Opportunities to Bolster Financial Stability
April 12, 2021 | Virtual
Newton-Needham Regional Chamber
Publications
Journals
“Should the Federal Reserve Regularly Evaluate Its Monetary Policy Framework?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2018.
“Estimating Key Economic Variables: The Policy Implications.” Atlantic Economic Journal, volume 26, issue 2 (June 2018): 139-150.
"Credit Supply Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis," with Joe Peek. Annual Review of Financial Economics. vol 8, (2016): 81 - 95.
"Can Economic Opportunity Flourish When Communities Do Not?" Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 58th Economic Conference. The Russell Sage Journal of the Social Sciences, volume 2, issue 2 (May 2016).
"Should Full Employment be a Mandate for Central Banks? Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's 57th Economic Conference." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 46, issue S2 (October 2014): 169-182.
"Our Financial Structures – Are they Prepared for Financial Instability?" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to vol. 46, no 1 (February 2014): 143-156.
"How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility," with Burcu Duygan-Bump, Patrick M. Parkinson, Gustavo A. Suarez, and Paul S. Willen. The Journal of Finance. vol. 68, (2013): 715-737.
"Revisiting Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Environment: Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's 55th Economic Conference." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 44, no. 1 (February 2012).
"Global Financial Intermediaries: Lessons and Continuing Challenges." The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics. vol. 12, no 3, (2012).
"The Impact of Liquidity, Securitization, and Banks on the Real Economy." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 42 (September 2010): 221-228.
"Capital and Risk: New Evidence on Implications of Large Operational Losses," with Patrick deFontnouvelle, Virginia DeJesus-Rueff, and John Jordan. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 38, no. 7 (October 2006): 1819-1847.
"Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," with Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 95, no. 4 (September 2005): 1144-1166.
“Does the Federal Reserve Possess An Exploitable Informational Advantage?” with Joe Peek and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell. Journal of Monetary Economics. vol. 50, no. 4 (May 2003): 817-839.
“Identifying the Macroeconomic Effect of Loan Supply Shocks,” with Joe Peek and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. vol. 35, no. 6, part 1 (December 2003): 931-946.
“Troubled Banks, Impaired Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Relative Access to Credit,” with Michael Klein and Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 92, no. 3 (June 2002): 664-682.
“Determinants of the Japan Premium: Actions Speak Louder than Words,” with Joe Peek. The Journal of International Economics. vol. 53, no. 2 (April 2001): 283-305.
“Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States,” with Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 90, no. 1 (March 2000): 30-45.
“The Market Reaction to the Disclosure of Supervisory Actions: Implications for Bank Transparency,” with Joe Peek and John Jordan. Journal of Financial Intermediation. vol. 9 (June 2000): 298-319.
“Modernizing Financial Regulation: Implications for Bank Supervision.” Journal of Financial Services Research. vol. 16, no. 2-3 (December 1999): 117-123.
“The Poor Performance of Foreign Bank Subsidiaries: Were the Problems Acquired or Created?” with Joe Peek and Faith Kasirye. Journal of Banking and Finance. vol. 23, no. 2/4 (February 1999): 579-604.
“Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?” with Joe Peek and Geoffrey M. B. Tootell. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. vol. 114 (May 1999): 629-653.
“Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending: It's Not Just Bank Size That Matters,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Banking and Finance. vol. 22, no. 6-8 (August 1998): 799-819.
“Derivatives Activity at Troubled Banks,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Financial Services Research. vol. 12, no. 2/3 (October/December 1997): 287-302.
“The International Transmission of Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan,” with Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 87, no. 4 (September 1997): 495-505.
“Will Legislated Early Intervention Prevent the Next Banking Crisis?” with Joe Peek. Southern Economic Journal. vol. 64, no. 1 (July 1997): 268-280.
“The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. vol. 27, no. 3 (August 1995): 625-638.
“Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Banking and Finance. vol. 19, no. 1 (June 1995): 679-692.
“Bank Regulatory Agreements and Real Estate Lending,” with Joe Peek. Real Estate Economics. vol. 24, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 55-73.
“The Real Exchange Rate and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Relative Wealth vs. Relative Wage Effects,” with Michael Klein. Journal of International Economics. vol. 36, no. 3-4 (May 1994): 373-390.
“Empirical Evidence on Vertical Foreclosure,” with Jim Meehan. Economic Inquiry. vol. 32 no. 2 (April 1994): 303-317.
“Failed Bank Resolution and the Collateral Crunch: The Advantages of Transferable Puts,” with Katerina Simons. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 135-147.
“Bank Real Estate Lending and the New England Credit Crunch,” with Joe Peek. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 33-58.
“Defaults of Original Issue High-Yield Convertible Bonds.” The Journal of Finance. vol. 48, no. 1 (March 1993): 345-362.
“State Restrictions of Hostile Takeovers.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism. vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1988).
“The Australian Trucking Industry: Is There a Need for Government Regulation?” Australian Economic Papers (December 1981).
Other material (past 10 years only)
"Credit Supply Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis" Current Policy Perspectives No. 15-5 with Joe Peek
"Implications of the Financial Crisis for Risk Management and Macroprudential Supervision," with Joel Werkema. In Banks at Risk, Peter Hoflich, ed., John M. Wiley & Sons, Asia, (2011).
"The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy," with Joe Peek. In The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Allen Berger, Philip Molyneux, and John Wilson, eds., Oxford University Press; First Edition (2010): 257-277; Second Edition (2015): 453-473.
"Revisiting the CRA," with Janet L. Yellen. In Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, (2009): 1.
"Market and Risk Management Innovations: Implications for Safe and Sound Banking" Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. vol. 92, nos. 1-2 (2007).
"Implications of Alternative Operational Risk Modeling Techniques," with Patrick de Fontnouvelle and John Jordan. In The Risks of Financial Institutions, Mark Carey and René M. Stulz, eds. University of Chicago Press, (2007): 475-512.
"Secondary Bank Lending in Japan," with Zekeriya Eser and Joe Peek, in Japan's Great Stagnation: Financial and Monetary Policy Lessons for Advanced Economies, Michael Hutchison and Frank Westermann, eds., CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, (2006): 129-155.
"Crisis Resolution and Credit Allocation: The Case of Japan," with Joe Peek. In Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and Resolution, Patrick Honohan and Luc Laeven, eds. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, (2005): 276-306.
"Commentary on 'Disclosure, Volatility, and Transparency: An Empirical Investigation into the Value of Bank Disclosure.'" Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. vol. 10, no. 2 (September 2004): 49-51.
Role of the President 
The president and chief executive officer guides the focus of the Bank’s economic research and gathers economic intelligence through interactions with the Bank’s board of directors, advisory councils, and other business and community contacts. The president represents the First District at the Federal Open Market Committee and provides key insights to those policy discussions. Additionally, the president and chief executive officer ensures the Bank maintains an effective system of bank supervision and contributes to collective Federal Reserve System actions and directions.
The process by which Federal Reserve Bank presidents are selected, appointed, and reappointed is set forth in the Federal Reserve Act. The president is appointed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s board of directors with the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for a term of five years.